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Military law in the United States has always functioned as a system of
jurisprudence independent of the civilian judiciary. It has its own body
of substantive laws and procedures which has a different historical deri-
vation than the civilian criminal law. The first American Articles of War,
enacted by the Continental Congress in 1775,1 copied the British Arti-
cles, a body of law which had evolved from the 17th century rules
adopted by Gustavus Adolphus for the discipline of his army, rather than
from the English common law.2 Despite subsequent alterations by Con-
gress, the American military justice code still retains certain substantive
and procedural aspects of the 18th century British code. Dissimilarity
between military and civilian criminal law has been further encouraged
by the isolation of the court-martial system. The federal courts have
always been reluctant to interfere with the court-martial system, as ex-
plained by the Supreme Court in 1953 in Burns v. Wilson:3 "Military
law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart
from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment. This
Court has played no role in its development; we have exerted no super-
visory power over the courts which enforce it .... . As a result, the
court-martial system still differs from the civilian court system in such
aspects as terminology and structure, as well as procedural and sub-
stantive law.
The military has jealously guarded the distinctive aspects of its system
of justice. The procedural framework of the court-martial evolved over
*Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Law; A.B., 1959, Georgetown
University; M.A., 1962, 1967, University of Texas at El Paso; LLB., 1962, Har-
vard University.
1 The first Articles of War were adopted by resolution of June 30, 1775. 1
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 90 (Lib. of Cong. ed.
1904-1937). They were repealed and replaced by Articles of War authorized by
resolution of September 20, 1776. Id. at 435-82. For an analysis of the Articles in
relation to the British code see G. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MiLrrARY LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 1-12. 339-44 (3d ed. rev. 1918) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
2 DAVIS, supra note 1, at 13, 340.
3 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
4 Id. at 140.
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the years as a practical means of formalizing punishment of soldiers and
sailors by their commanders. Its principal characteristic was control by
the commander. Since military units were sometimes isolated from other
units and the civilian population, it was necessary that court-martial
authority be decentralized, with lower echelon commanders possessing
the power to convene a court-martial and staff it with their own officers
so that a determination could be made quickly and the unit could get
back to its main task. Thus, the court-martial had to be a relatively
simple proceeding, with few legal formalisms, sometimes conducted in
the field with a drum as a desk, hence the term "drum-head justice."
There was little pretense at providing an impartial and adversary "ju-
dicial" hearing. The purpose was to determine the facts and administer
a punishment which would provide deterrence to other men and, if possi-
ble, return the individual to his role as a functioning soldier as quickly
as possible. Thus, it was not uncommon for crimes which would draw
a prison sentence today, such as assault with a deadly weapon, to be
punished only by corporal punishment,5 while crimes which threatened
disciplinary order often resulted in harsh sentences, including death.0 No
one blushed in admitting that the court-martial was not a real trial; that
the commander used it to enforce his disciplinary policies and inculcate
military values in his men; that it was administered by officers alone;
that there was no right to review; and that the penalties were calculated
to set an example and not to provide equal justice.
Throughout the 19th century and well into the 20th, the court-martial
system was still an autonomous legal system with its own distinct pro-
cedures and laws relatively unaffected by civilian notions of criminal
law and judicial due process. Perhaps the best example of the military's
attitude is the statement of General William T. Sherman, Commanding
General of the Army from 1869 to 1883, before a congressional com-
mittee in 1879:
I agree that it will be a grave error if by negligence we permit the
military law to become emasculated by allowing lawyers to inject into it
the principles derived from their practice in the civil courts, which be-
long to a totally different system of jurisprudence.
The object of the civil law is to secure to every human being in a com-
munity all the liberty, security, and happiness possible, consistent with the
5 There was a wide variety of punishments in the 19th century including death,
imprisonment, fine, suspension from rank, pay and command, drumming out and
cashiering, and such corporal punishments as flogging with cat-o'-nine-tails,
marking the letter D (for deserters) on the serviceman's hip, and stripes. See W.
DE HART, OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION AND PRACTICE
OF COURTS MARTIAL 68-70, 245-51 (1846) [hereinafter cited as DE HART].
6 A number of offenses carried the possible sentence of death, usually executed
by shooting or hanging. Id. at 247-48. By Act of Congress of May 29, 1830, no
deserter could be punished by death in time of peace. Id. at 54.
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safety of all. The object of military law is to govern armies composed of
strong men, so as to be capable of exercising the largest measure of
force at the will of the nation.
These objects are as wide apart as the poles, and each requires its own
separate system of laws, statute and common. An army is a collection of
armed men obliged to obey one man. Every enactment, every change of
rules which impairs the principle weakens the army, impairs its values,
and defeats the very object of its existence. All the traditions of civil
lawyers are antagonistic to this vital principle, and military men must
meet them on the threshold of discussion, else armies will become de-
moralized by evengrafting on our code their deductions from civil
practice.
7
General Sherman's view of military justice was consistent with his em-
phasis upon professionalism in the small volunteer post-Civil War
army,8 and until World War I this view was generally accepted and rare-
ly criticized. However, the nature of the issue changed dramatically with
World War I. The Articles of War which applied to the millions of con-
scripted servicemen in World War I was essentially the same code as
that enacted in 1775 by the Continental Congress. Court-martial abuses
and outrageously severe sentences led to the first public movement for
the civilianization of military law. For the first time the question was
asked why members of the military had to be subjected to a system
which failed to afford them the constitutional and due process rights to
which they would be entitled in civilian courts.
The World War I movement for civilianization was led by General
Samuel T. Ansell, the acting Judge Advocate General of the Army. In
sharp contrast to the prevailing view as described by General Sherman,
General Ansell argued that the military system itself was foreign to our
American system of justice and was injuring the effectiveness of the
Armed Forces:
I contend-and I have gratifying evidence of support not only from
the public generally but from the profession-that the existing system
of Military Justice is un-American, having come to us by inheritance
and rather witless adoption out of a system of government which we re-
gard as fundamentally intolerable; that it is archaic, belonging as it does
to an age when armies were but bodies of armed retainers and bands of
mercenaries; that it is a system arising out of and regulated by the mere
power of Military Command rather than Law; and that it has ever re-
sulted, as it must ever result, in such injustice as to crush the spirit of
the individual subjected to it, shock the public conscience and alienate
public esteem and affection from the Army that insists on maintaining
it.9
7 Quoted in Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Spec. Subcomn. of the House
Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 780 (1949). This passage was
quoted recently with favor in Hansen, Judicial Functions for the Commander?,
41 MIL. L. REV. 1, 54 (1968).
SSee S. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 230-31 (1957).
9 Ansell, Military Justice, 5 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1919).
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General Ansell called for major changes in the court-martial system
which, had they been adopted, would have removed many of the tradi-
tional peculiarities of military law and embraced many of the modes of
civilian law. Instead of vaguely defined crimes he called for the drafting
of military crimes with definiteness. In place of a court-martial controlled
by the commander through his powers to appoint the court members,
oversee the administration of the court, and review the sentence, Ansell
called for an independent military judge, a court chosen by the judge
rather than the commander, and the right of the accused to have a
portion of the court chosen from his own rank. Ansell further asked for
definite limits on sentences, a mandatory and binding pretrial investi-
gation, right to lawyer counsel, and a civilian court of military appeals.
In short, General Ansell urged the partial remaking of the military law
system along civilian court lines, and the reworking of substantive laws
and due process procedures in conformity with civilian standards.
Most of General Ansell's proposals were rejected by the Congress
with only a few reforms reflected in the new Articles of War passed in
1920.10 The ensuing 50 years have witnessed a continuous civiliani-
zation of military justice, with particular acceleration in the post-World
War II period and the present Vietnam War era. The argument for dis-
tinctly different procedures and due process rights in military law and
an overtly disciplinarian approach to justice made by General Sherman,
although not totally discredited, has undergone serious reexamination.
Chief Justice Warren in his James Madison Lecture at the New York
University Law Center in 1962 expressed the view that the autonomy
of the military law system could no longer be accepted without question
in a day of large scale conscription:
I suppose it cannot be said that the courts of today are more knowl-
edgeable about the requirements of military discipline than the courts in
the early days of the Republic. Nevertheless, events quite unrelated to
the expertise of the judiciary have required a modification in the tradi-
tional theory of the autonomy of military authority.
These events can be expressed very simply in numerical terms. A few
months after Washington's first inauguration, our army numbered a
mere 672 of the 840 authorized by Congress. Today, in dramatic con-
trast, the situation is this: Our armed forces number two and a half
million; every resident male is a potential member of the peacetime
armed forces; such service may occupy a minimum of four per cent of
the adult life of the average American male reaching draft age; reserve
obligations extend over ten per cent of such a person's life; and veterans
are numbered in excess of twenty-two and a half million. When the
authority of the military has such a sweeping capacity for affecting the
lives of our citizenry, the wisdom of treating the military establishment
10 Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759, 787 [hereinafter cited as Articles
of War, 1920].
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as an enclave beyond the reach of the civilian courts almost inevitably is
drawn into question.1 1
Interest in further civilianization of military justice in the post-World
War II period resulted from continued conscription,12 and the steady
expansion of individual rights in civilian society and law. 13 Substantial
civilianizaton resulted from the passage of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) in 1950,14 from the decisions of the United States
Court of Military Appeals which was established by the UCMJ, 5 and
from expanded federal court reviewability of military determinations."
However, the UCMJ, as enacted, was a compromise which left com-
manders in control of court-martial machinery and appointments and,
although it extended substantial due process rights to servicemen, it
failed to go as far as General Ansell had recommended in remaking the
court-martial structure and procedures along civilian court lines. The
only major change since the UCMJ, the Military Justice Act of 1968,7
adopted further civilian court terminology and modes, particularly for
military trial and appeal judges, but failed to make basic changes in the
court-martial structure and command control of court-martial machinery.
Despite an expansion of federal court reviewability of courts-martial, re-
view is still narrowly limited to questions of jurisdiction and denial of
constitutional rights on petition for habeas corpus. The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals, although now accepting the proposition that constitutional
safeguards apply to military trials except insofar as they are made in-
applicable expressly or by necessary implication," has still failed to ex-
11Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181, 187-88
(1962) (footnotes omitted).
12 For a history of conscription during this period see AMEIC.AN FijENDs SERv-
ICE COMMITTEE, THE DRAFT? 1-9 (1968); THE DRAFT (S. Tax ed. 1967).
13 For commentaries on the expansion of individual rights by the Supreme Court
in a variety of areas see Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term: Foreword: "State
Action," Equal Protection, anzd California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69
(1967); Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964 Term: Foreword: The High Court.
The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HxAv. L REV. 56
(1965).
14Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107 (1950), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §
801 et seq. (1964).
15 See generally Quinn, The United States Court of Military Appeals and Mili-
tary Due Process, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 225 (1961).
16 For a discussion of availability of judicial review of military determinations
see Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion of
Remedies Doctrine, 55 VA. L. REV. 483 (1969); Comment, God, The Army and
Judicial Review: The In-Service Conscientious Objector, 56 CLt.F. L REV. 379
(1968).
17Pub. L. No. 90-632 (Oct. 24, 1968).
1s United States v. Jacoby, I 1 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47
(1960).
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tend certain civilian due process rights to servicemen in courts-martial.',
Thus, the civilianization movement has only achieved a portion of its
objectives. This article will consider the growth and development of the
civilianization movement from World War I to the present, and those
aspects and structures which still remain as targets for reform in light
of the conflicting arguments concerning further civilianization of mili-
tary justice.
II. PRE-WORLD WAR I RESISTANCE To CIVILIANIZATION
When the Continental Congress turned to the task of providing for
the government of the newly raised continental army, it looked to British
military law with which Americans were familiar as a result of their
service with the British army during the Seven Years' War.20 British
military law was regulated by the Mutiny Act2l (a statute passed by
Parliament in 1689 which established rules for the offenses of mutiny
and desertion) and by the Articles of War (regulations issued by the
King, although more often by a military officer specially appointed to
issue them in the King's name, pursuant to authority granted by the
Mutiny Act, which established crimes, penalties, and procedures for
courts-martial). The Mutiny Act of 1689 was part of the limitation on
regal power accepted by William and Mary after the "bloodless revo-
lution," and it was significant in establishing parliamentary control over
the military, with a distinct preference against standing armies, by re-
quiring that the act be renewed from year to year.22 Thus, the British
military law in effect at the time of the American Revolution contained
certain inherent civilianizing aspects. However, the actual crimes and
procedures codified in the Articles of War were characteristically mili-
tary, and despite ultimate control by Parliament, little direct civilian in-
fluence was felt in military justice.
The American military development closely paralleled that of the
British. The Constitution divided powers over the military between the
executive and legislative branches, with the President as Commander in
19E.g., United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963) (right
to lawyer counsel in lower courts-martial); United States v. Crawford, 15
U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964) (right to trial by jury of one's peers).
20 H. CAMPBELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY LAW 7 (1946).
21 Mutiny Act, 1 W. & M., c. 5 (1689). See generally DAVIS, supra note 1, at 2-4;
DE HART, supra note 5, at 1-2.
22 W. LUNT, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 461-62 (3d ed. 1945).
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Chief of the Army, Navy, and militia,2 but with Congress possessing
effective control by virtue of constitutional powers to declare war; raise
and support armies; provide and maintain a navy; and to make rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.24 It has
never been doubted that Congress, under its power to make rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, possesses
the authority to establish the substantive laws and procedural rules gov-
erning courts-martial. However, there was some confusion as to the na-
ture of courts-martial: Were they judicial or semi-judicial bodies sub-
ject to the Constitutional limitations placed on the judiciary, or were they
administrative bodies not within the scope of the judicial article, article
III? It was not until 1857 in Dynes v. Hoover that this question was
definitively decided with the holding that military courts are not part of
the federal judiciary under article III but are agencies of the executive
under articles I and II. This decision resulted in a distinct isolation of
military law from civilianizing influences. Dynes was used to support the
propositions that military courts are not bound by the Bill of Rights or
other constitutional limitations on the exercise of judicial power 2 0 that
since courts-martial are not really courts at all but only executive agen-
23U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 provides: "The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States ...."
24U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 gives Congress the power "Itlo declare War ...To
raise and support Armies . . .To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.
2 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
26 Typical of the statements by courts as to the inapplicability of the Bill of
Rights to the military are the following:
This is not to say that the members of the military forces are entitled to
the procedure guaranteed by the Constitution to defendants in the civil
courts. As to them due process of law means the application of the pro-
cedure of the military law.
United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664, 666 (3d Cir. 1944).
It has been indicated in a number of cases that the powers of Congress
in the government of the land and naval forces of the United States are
not affected by any of the Constitutional amendments.
Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483, 486 (10th Cir. 1953). See also Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950); Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
This view seems to have been rejected by implication by the Supreme Court in
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), and was rejected expressly by the Court of
Military Appeals in United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244
(1960). See also United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249
(1967). However, as late as 1965, the Navy cited the two quotes above for the
proposition that the Bill of Rights does not apply directly to the military. Mem-
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cies, they need not function as judicial bodies;27 and that courts-martial,
as executive agencies, are independent of the federal judiciary and not
subject to review by direct appeal, writ of error, or certiorari.28 Thus, by
the second half of the 19th century, the military's autonomous power
over its own legal system was firmly established. The civilian judiciary
had no power of review except as to the question of jurisdiction in a
habeas corpus action. Although the President, and through him the
Secretary of War, possessed nominal authority over the administration of
military law, military courts, in fact, operated virtually independent of
such authority.2 9 Finally, although Congress held the authority to alter
the military justice system through legislation, it showed little interest
in doing so, and alterations in the Articles of War were few and far be-
tween. Revisions of the Articles of War were made in 1806, 1874, 1916,
and 1920, but the body of military substantive laws and procedural rules
in effect during World War I was still basically the Articles of War passed
by the Continental Congress in 1775, as modified upon adoption by
Congress in 1789.0
The Army was governed by the Articles of War and the Navy by the
Articles for the Government of the Navy. The two codes differed in
terminology and structure and at times in substantive and procedural
law, each being a product of different historical traditions and reflecting
the different problems and needs of each service. However, both court-
martial systems through World War I possessed the following general
characteristics:
orandum for Respondent at 1-2, 5-9, LeBallister v. Warden, United States Dis-
ciplinary Barracks, 247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965) (denying writ of habeas
corpus).
27 Winthrop was the chief proponent of this view. For an attack on his position
see testimony of General Ansell, Hearings on S. 5320 Before the Senate Comm. on
Military Affairs, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 48-52 (1919) [hereinafter cited as 1919
Hearings].
2 Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895);
Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863). See W. WINTHROP, MILI-
TARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 50 (2d ed. 1920). For a discussion of the concept of a
"split constitution" see Barker, Military Law-A Separate System of Jurisprudence,
36 U. CWN. L. REV. 223 (1967).
2 9 See DAvis, supra note 1, at 203:
In acting upon the proceedings of a court martial, the legal reviewing
officer acts partly in a judicial and partly in a ministerial capacity. He
"decides" and "orders" and the due exercise of his proper functions
cannot be revised by superior military authority. Thus a reviewing of-
ficer who has duly acted upon a sentence and promulgated his action in
orders cannot be required by a higher commander, or by the Secretary of
War, to revoke such action.
30 Id. at 342-43.
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1. Statement of Crimes and Punishments-The Articles of War"1
contained extensive rules32 which intermixed substantive crimes and pro-
cedural regulations. A few crimes were singled out specifically, and there
were broad provisions under which various types of unspecified conduct
could be punished by court-martial.' The crimes denounced were typi-
cally military crimes such as making prohibited enlistments, 3 making
of false certificates or a false muster by officers,31 and mutiny."Z Also
denounced was conduct which would not be prohibited under civilian
law, such as disobedience of lawful commands of a superior officer,37
drunkenness on duty,38 upbraiding another officer or soldier for refusing
a challenge,39 using reproachful or provoking speeches or gestures to
another soldier or officer,40 and use of contemptuous or disrespectful
words against the President and other federal and state officials." Until
1863, the Articles of War did not include common-law felonies, such
as larceny, murder, assult, battery, and rape, and after 1863 a court-
martial had jurisdiction to try such crimes only "in time of war, in-
surrection, or rebellion." This limitation was removed in 1916 except
that courts-martial could not try servicemen accused of murder or rape
committed within the continental United States in peacetime. 2 Thus,
when civilian-type crimes were committed which did not constitute mili-
3 This discussion focuses only on the Army's Articles of War, but most of the
basic characteristics mentioned were also common to the court-martial system es-
tablished by the Articles for the Government of the Navy.
32Act of April 10, 1806, ch. XX, 2 Stat. 359 [hereinafter cited as Articles of
War, 1806] (contained 101 articles); Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 5, 18 Stat. 228
[hereinafter cited as Articles of War. 1874] (contained 128 articles); Act of
Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 650 [hereinafter cited as Articles of War,
1916] (contained 121 articles); Act of June 20, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759 (here-
inafter cited as Articles of War, 1920] (contained 121 articles).
33 E.g., articles forbidding "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" and
"disorders and neglects to the predjudice of good order and discipline in the mili-
tary."
3 Articles of War, 1874, art. 3. By 1920. when enlistments had been taken out
of the hands of officers, this article was dropped. Articles of War. 1920, art. 54
specifying the crime of fraudulent enlistment remained.
35 Articles of War, 1874, arts. 13, 14; Articles of War, 1920, arts. 55, 56.
36 Articles of War, 1874. art. 22; Articles of War, 1920, art. 66.37 Articles of War, 1874, art. 21; Articles of War, 1920, art. 64.
38Articles of War, 1874, art. 38; Articles of War, 1920. art. 85.
39 Articles of War, 1874. art. 28; Articles of War, 1874. arts. 26. 27 made duel-
ling or participation therein a crime. Articles of War, 1920, art. 91 made duelling
or participation therein a crime but dropped the express provision concerning up-
braiding another for refusing to duel.
40 Articles of War, 1874, art. 25; Articles of War, 1920, art. 90.
41 Articles of War. 1874, art. 19; Articles of War, 1920, art. 62.
42Act of March 3. 1863, ch. 75 § 30, 12 Stat. 731, 736; Articles of War, 1874,
art. 58; Articles of War, 1916, arts. 92, 93.
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tary offenses, courts-martial did not attempt to try them, leaving them
to the civilian courts.
Most of the crimes in the Articles of War were described without
any attempt to define the elements of the offense. The crime of desertion
is one example:
Any officer or soldier who, having received pay, or having been duly en-
listed in the service of the United States, deserts the same, shall, in time
of war, suffer death, or such other punishment as a court-martial may
direct; and in time of peace, any punishment, excepting death, which a
court martial may direct.43
The essential elements of a crime, such as the intent and act required,
were matters of custom. Several well-known military law experts in the
19th century, such as De Hart,44 Davis, 45 and Winthrop, 40 were some-
times consulted, and later the Manual for Courts-Martial was developed
to provide more detailed information concerning crimes. There was no
maximum penalty for any crime, except for a limitation as to the death
penalty, and punishments were whatever "a court-martial may direct."
2. Pretrial Proceedings-The court-martial process was begun by
the preferral of charges by any officer. There was no right to an inde-
pendent pretrial investigation since the fifth amendment specifically ex-
cepts cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia from the
right to indictment by a grand jury.47 However, by the late 19th century
the post commander or the commander of a unit in the field was required,
upon receipt of charges, "to make such personal investigation as is suffi-
cient to satisfy him (a) whether the case is one in which a trial is neces-
sary to the interests of discipline; [and] (b) if such trial is believed by
him to be necessary, whether the evidence in support of the charges is
such as to warrant a conviction." 48
3. Role of the Commander-The court-martial was a function of
command, and the commander was expected to use it to maintain order
and discipline. There was a hierarchy of courts which could be convened
by commanders at different levels. The lowest courts, originally called the
field-officer's court-martial, 49 and later called summary courts, could
43 Articles of War, 1874, art. 47.
44 DE HART, supra note 5.
4 5 DAvIs, supra note 1.
46 WINTHROP, supra note 28.
47 For a discussion as to the effect of the specific military exemption on inter-
pretation of other amendments not containing such exemption see Henderson,
Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 293 (1957); Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original
Practice 1, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1958); Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of
Rights: The Original Practice 11, 72 HARv. L. REV. 266 (1958).
48 DAvis, supra note 1, at 79.
49Id. at 211-16.
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be convened by lower ranking commanders and could impose only limit-
ed sentences. The next courts, originally called regimental and garrison
courts-martial, 50 and later called special courts-martial, could be con-
vened by higher commanders and could impose a more severe, although
still limited, sentence. Finally, a general court-martial could be convened
by commanders of divisions or separate brigades or an officer of higher
rank and could impose unlimited sentences. The hierarchy of courts per-
mitted subordinate commanders to discipline their own men, and higher
courts-martial were generally used only if the subordinate commander
had sent the case up the chain of command, or the superior commander
had wanted a court-martial of higher degree.
All court-martial functions were carried out by the commander
through his subordinates. The commander made the determination
whether to court-martial, appointed all court-martial personnel including
the court and counsel, oversaw the administration of the trial, and re-
viewed the decision and sentence.
4. Membership and Selection of the Court-The commanding officer
who convened the court selected the members from among the officers
under his command and was called the "appointing authority" when
acting in this capacity. There were no restrictions on the method of selec-
tion used, although originally only line officers could be appointed, with
such officers as surgeons and chaplains excluded.51 Later, the selection
process was expanded to allow all commissioned officers to serve but not
enlisted men. There was no set number of court members, only a mini-
mum number was required. For example, a general court-martial had to
have at least five members and a special court-martial at least three.'
The commander had the power to remove or replace any court members,
even during the trial, so long as the number remained at the minimum
or above.
5. Judicial Functions-There was no judge in a court-martial. The
functions performed by a judge in a civilian court were divided among
the prosecutor (originally called the judge advocate), the senior court
member (called the president), and the court members themselves. The
president presided over the trial. The judge advocate carried out many
judicial and administrative duties, such as swearing in the witnesses and
advising the court as to legal matters. ' 3 The court itself determined all
issues arising during the trial, such as motions for continuance and objec-
tions to the competency of a witness or the admissibility of evidence. The
usual procedure was for the court to vote secretly on such issues.-1 Court
50 Id. at 216-19; DE HART, supra note 5, at 61-64.
51 DE HART, supra note 5, at 37-49.
52 See Articles of War, 1874, art. 75; Articles of War, 1920, arts. 5, 6.
5 DAvis, supra note 1, at 37-38.
5AId. at 122.
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members or counsel were not lawyers, except for the prosecutor judge
advocate in some cases.
6. Defense Counsel-There was no right to counsel in a court-mar-
tial but, in practice, a nonlawyer officer was often appointed as defense
counsel if requested by the accused in a general court-martial. Defense
counsel were rarely provided in special and summary courts-martial.65
7. Nature of the Trial-The court-martial functioned more like an
administrative disciplinary proceeding than a judicial proceeding. Al-
though by the second half of the 19th century some of the trappings of
civilian courts had begun to appear in courts-martial, the proceedings re-
tained a distinctly nonjudicial appearance. The court members were
seated at a long table according to rank with the president in the center.
There was strict observance of rank throughout the proceedings with
saluting by all participants. There were no rules of evidence. Davis,
writing in 1898, observed that courts-martial "should in general follow,
so far as they are applicable to military cases, the rules of evidence ob-
served in the civil courts, and especially those applied by the courts of
the United States in criminal cases," but added that "as courts-martial
are not bound, however, by any statute in this particular, it is thus open
to them, in the interests of justice, to apply these rules with more indul-
gence than in the civil courts." 51
The court members took an active role in the trial. They could ques-
tion the accused and witnesses, recall witnesses, and call upon the judge
advocate to have any uncalled individual ordered to testify as a witness.57
The decision of the court was not announced since the decision was only
considered final after it was reviewed by the appointing authority in his
capacity as "reviewing authority," and he had the power, even if the
verdict was acquittal, to return it and require the court to deliberate for
a different verdict or a different sentence.58
8. Post-Trial Proceedings-The commander who convened the court
was also the "reviewing authority" and had the power to approve or dis-
approve the sentence in whole or in part or to return it to the court for
revisions. 59 The reviewing authority provided the only available review
except in cases involving a sentence of dismissal of an officer, death, or
in cases involving generals where it was provided that the sentence
should not be executed without the confirmation of the President.10
551d. at 38-39.
56Id. at 251.
5 7 1d. at 130-31.
58 Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 28 MIL.
L. REV. 17, 29 (1965) (reprinted from 6 VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953)); Brown,
The Crowder-Ansell Dispute: Tize Emergence of General Samuel T. Ansell, 35
MIL. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1967).
59 DAVIS, supra note 1, at 202-04.
60 Id. at 200, 203.
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These characteristics of the court-martial system through World War
I were essentially what General Sherman was defending when he pro-
tested the emasculation of military law by allowing lawyers to inject into
it the principles derived from their practice in civil courts. The movement
for civilianization of military law which began during World War I has
sought to alter each of these characteristics.
III. THE WORLD WAR I MOVEMENT FOR
CIVILIANIZATION OF MILITARY LAW AND
GENERAL ANSELL'S PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The World War I movement for civilianization of military law resulted
from public anger over stories, filtered back to relatives, friends, and con-
gressmen, of severe court-martial sentences and unfair and arbitrary pro-
ceedings. "The sentences of courts-martial," General Ansell testified in
1919, "have shocked at least my own sense of justice." 61 He cited a
number of cases with unduly severe sentences, for example, 40 years
at hard labor for 20 days of absence without leave (AWOL) and
escape from confinement; 30 years for insulting a sergeant who had
ordered accused to give him his cigarettes; 20 years for a three-month
AWOL; and ten years for unlawful possession of a pass.62 The most ex-
treme case arose out of an alleged mutiny of a company of Negro soldiers
at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, in the summer of 1917. 111 will had de-
veloped between the Negro troops, who were segregated and assigned to
distinctly menial duties, and some of the white civilian population. The
Negro soldiers seized rifles and ammunition, and a fight resulted in a
number of deaths of both civilians and soldiers. Sixty-three Negro soldiers
were court-martialled, 55 were convicted, and 13 were sentenced to
death. The commanding general approved the convictions and ordered
the death sentences executed.6 Thus, as General Ansell testified, "the
men were executed immediately upon the termination of the trial
and before their records could be forwarded to Washington or examined
by anybody, and without, so far as I can see, any one of them having had
time or opportunity to seek clemency from the source of clemency, if he
had been so advised." '
Cases like the Fort Sam Houston mutiny trials displayed not only
severe sentences but also the basic unfairness of court-martial proceed-
61 1919 Hearings, supra note 27, at 36.
62 1d. at 37, 79-92.
63Id. at 39-42.
64 1d. at 39.
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ings. General Ansell was particularly disturbed by the large number of
cases containing legal errors and insufficient evidence to support convic-
tion, and by the fact that after a commander approved the conviction,
no one, including the Judge Advocate General, had the right to review it
further. A particularly outrageous case came to Ansell's attention in Oc-
tober 1917, involving the court-martial of a number of noncommis-
sioned officers at Fort Bliss, Texas, on charges of mutiny for refusing to
attend drill formation while they were under arrest for a minor infrac-
tion. These men were apparently correct in relying upon a regulation
which provided that a noncommissioned officer under arrest should per-
form no duty, but nevertheless the officer persisted in his order and, upon
their continued refusal, had them court-martialed for mutiny. The Judge
Advocate General's office found no legal support for the mutiny convic-
tions as related by General Ansell:
Those men did not commit mutiny. They were driven into the situation
which served as the basis of a charge by the unwarranted and capricious
conduct of a young officer commanding the battery who had been out of
the Military Academy but two years. Notwithstanding the offense was not
at all made out by the evidence of record, notwithstanding the oppressive
and tyrannical conduct of the battery commander, notwithstanding the un-
fair and unjust attitude of the judge advocate which all appeared on the
record, these noncommissioned officers were expelled from the Army in
dishonor and sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from seven to
three years.65
Despite the findings of patent illegality, the Judge Advocate General
had no power to remedy the situation. However, General Ansell drafted
an opinion urging that the conviction be set aside. He contended that
under a proper interpretation of the statutes, the Judge Advocate General
could set aside findings of a court-martial even after the commander had
approved such findings and ordered the sentence executed.00 General An-
sell's immediate superior, Major General Enoch H. Crowder, opposed
this view and eventually won out when the issue was taken to the Sec-
retary of War. Thus began the famous "Crowder-Ansell Dispute," a con-
troversy arising out of the issue of the power of the Judge Advocate
General to reverse court-martial convictions,6 7 which led to the first im-
portant movement for civilianization of military law in American history.
General Ansell was removed from his post and dispatched on a tour of
European countries. He returned with the conclusion from comparative
studies of military jurisprudence that "notwithstanding [that] our Gov-
ernment in other directions, in the realm of civil jurisprudence, is a far
65 Id. at 11.
66 Id. at 44-59, where general Ansell's opinions are set out in full.
67 For a discussion of the dispute see Morgan. supra note 58, at 19-21; Brown,
supra note 58, at 43.
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more liberal Government than any one of those named [England, Italy,
and France], in the field of military jurisprudence it is a harsher Govern-
ment." 68 He thereafter drafted a bill, called the Chamberlain bille9 for
Senator George E. Chamberlain of Oregon who sponsored it, which pro-
posed the first major revision of the substantive and procedural law gov-
erning courts-martial.
General Ansell proposed a sweeping reform of military justice. In tes-
tifying before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in February
1919, he spoke as bluntly and critically as any American military man
has dared to speak about military justice:
Army officers, acting on a mistaken sense of loyalty and zeal, are accus-
tomed to say, somewhat invidiously, that "courts-martial are the fairest
courts in the world." The public has never shared that view ...
This is not a pleasant duty for me to perform. I realize, if I may be
permitted to say it, that I am arraigning the institution to which I be-
long-not the institution, but the system and practices under it-an in-
stitution which I love and want to serve honestly and faithfully always.
Yet an institution has got to be based on justice, and it has got to do
justice if it is going to survive, and if it is going to merit the confidence
and approval of the American people. Indeed, if our Army is going to be
efficient, justice has to be done within it, whether in war or in peace. 70
The significant aspect of General Ansell's proposal was his acceptance
of the philosophy of civilianization. He assailed the tradition-honored
view that courts-martial could not, because of constitutional limitations
and military necessity, conform to the judicial standards followed in
civilian courts. He began by attacking Winthrop, whose 1886 treatise
on military law had become the bible of military men. He termed Win-
throp's contention that a court-martial is "not a part of the judiciary, but
an agency of the executive department," as "illogical and fallacious." 71
"It is rather surprising," Ansell observed,
that an unsupported textbook statement, sustained by so little logic,
should have gone so long unexamined by those in military authority,
even if judicial decisions had not exposed the fallacy. To be sure, courts-
martial are not part of the judicial system referred to as such in the Con-
stitution. The courts of the several territories have never been courts of
the United States in the constitutional sense, nor have they ever had any
other constitutional basis than the power of Congress to make rules for
the government and disposition of the Territory of the United States. But
who would contend that they are under the Executive power?
72
It is odd, as General AnseU remarked, that the argument that courts-
68 1919 Hearings, supra note 27, at 43.
69S. 64, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919) (the bill was introduced in the House as
H.R. 367, 66th Cong., Ist Sess. (1919)).
70 1919 Hearings, supra note 27, at 49, 81.
71 Id. at 49.
72 Id.
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martial were only executive agencies and therefore not judicial in nature
had been accepted without question for so long. Even the British system
recognized the essentially judicial quality of courts-martial. 73 As Ansell
stated before the congressional committee:
The court-martial tries a man not only for the military aspect in-
volved in his act; it tries him for the violation of the law of the land re-
sulting from that act. For instance, if a soldier commits homicide, he is
tried, not, as we used to think, for his act, in so far as it is prejudicial to
the military establishment. The court-martial passes upon that unlawful
homicide and every issue involved in it just exactly as, and concurrently
with, a district court of the United States or as any other trial court.
Now, when we come to subject a man to a code of penal law which
covers every aspect of his conduct, every activity of his life far more
generally than does the usual civil penal code, when we try him not only
for violation of the military law but of the law of the land, when we give
him a punishment that is in every respect the same kind of punishment
in quantity, in finality, and in the regard which the law entertains for it,
that a civil trial court can give, those functions are necessarily, inherent-
ly, and primarily judicial . . . .74
Ansell's attack on Winthrop's view of military courts as nonjudicial
in nature was an important event in the movement for civilianization
of military law because it removed the legal barrier which had always
been thought to prevent reform of military procedures along civilian
court lines. Of course, the argument is still made today that a court-
martial cannot provide all the elements provided in a civilian court be-
cause it is limited by the logistic exigencies of the service and must
serve the disciplinary needs of the commander. But this is a considerably
more liberal position than Winthrop's view that there is something in-
herently limiting in the nature of the court-martial due to constitutional
and statutory mandates, which require it to function as a nonjudicial
executive agency. Ansell's attack on the basic "executive agency rather
than judicial proceeding" argument was so forceful that his view is now
generally accepted.
General Ansell's proposals for changes in the substantive and proce-
dural law of courts-martial (the Chamberlain bill only dealt with the
Army Articles of War) 75 covered the entire court-martial proceeding
from investigation through appeal. His basic premise was that the exer-
cise of penal power by military courts "should be in keeping with the
progress of enlightened government and should not be inconsistent with
those fundamental principles of law which have ever characterized An-
73 See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: PRINCIPALLY
IN THE ORDER, AND COMPRISING THE WHOLE SUBSTANCE OF THE COMMENTARIES
159-62 (1819).
74 1919 Hearings, supra note 27, at 40-41.
75 id. at 11.
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glo-American jurisprudence." 7 He did not propose the complete civil-
ianization of military law nor the abolition of all distinctive military
structures. However, his proposals were derivative of civilian court
standards. His basic proposals, as contained in the Chamberlain bill, will
be discussed in relation to the eight characteristics of the court-martial
system which have already been examined:
1. Statement of Crimes and Punishments-The Chamberlain bill re-
wrote a number of the punitive provisions of the Articles of War in an
attempt to delineate the elements of the crimes and to remove vague and
ambiguous language. It also would have established, for the first time, a
maximum punishment for each offense. An example of the bill's attempt
to provide more certainty as to the elements of crimes can be seen from
its definition of the crime of "mutiny and sedition" which had previous-
ly been stated as:
Any person subject to military law who attempts to create or who begins,
excites, causes, or joins in any mutiny or sedition in any company, party,
post, camp, detachment, guard, or other command shall suffer death or
such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.77
The bill would have done away with the "sedition" part of the crime and
defined "mutiny" as follows:
Any person subject to military law who, in concert with another or others,
unlawfully opposes, resists, or defies superior military authority, with the
deliberate and fixed intent to usurp or subvert the same, shall be guilty
of mutiny and shall be punishable with death or confinement for life or
for a fixed period; and any person subject to military law who attempts
to create or who begins, excites, causes or joins in any mutiny, shall be
punishable with the punishment authorized for mutiny.78
General Ansell was particularly disturbed by the general article, called
the "devil's article" by soldiers, because it specified no particular crime
and could be used to punish any conduct which displeased a com-
mander. 79 The congressional committee's comment on the Chamberlain
bill stated:
Under the general article, defining neither the crime nor the punish-
ment, more than a fourth of all our trials are had. The man who yes-
terday was a civilian becoming today a soldier becomes at the same time
76Address by General Ansell to the Pennsylvania Bar Association, June 26,
1919, in 25 PA. BAR ASS'N ANNUAL REP. 280, 282 (1919).
77 Articles of War, 1916, art. 66 (a slight revision of Articles of War, 1874, art.
22).
78S. 64, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., art. 66 (1919), printed in SENATE Co.i.t. ON
MILITARY AFFAIRS, 66TH CONG., IST SESS., ARMY ARTICLES: COMPARATIVE PRINT
SHOWING THE BILL (S. 64) TO ESTABLISH MILITARY JUSTICE 29 (Comm. Print
1919). [hereinafter cited as S. 64, 1919].
79 Nichols, The Devil's Article, 22 MIL. L. REV. 111 (1963). See Hagan, The
General Article-Elemental Confusion, 10 MIL. L. REV. 63 (1960).
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triable and punishable for conduct which the professional soldier holds
to be a violation of unwritten or customary military standards.8 0
The bill attempted to make two important changes in the general arti-
cle. First, it took the catch-all and assimilative crimes portion of the
general article ("all crimes or offenses not capital, of which persons sub-
ject to military law may be guilty")"' and adopted in its place an assimi-
lation, for both offenses and punishments, of the criminal statutes of the
United States and the District of Columbia. 82 Second, as to misconduct
not specifically made a crime either in the articles, the Federal Penal
Code, or the District of Columbia Code, it retained the broad definition
of the general article ("conduct to the prejudice of good order and mili-
tary discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the military serv-
ice") but limited the punishment to six months.83
2. Pretrial Proceedings-The 1917 Manual for Courts-Martial had
required the officer exercising summary court-martial jurisdiction over
the accused to make a preliminary investigation of the charges, and to
give the accused an opportunity to make a statement or present evi-
dence.8 4 The Chamberlain bill would have made this investigation a re-
quirement of statutory law, and would have required further that the
charges could not be referred for trial unless an officer of the Judge Ad-
vocate General's department certified in writing that a punishable of-
fense was charged with legal sufficiency, and unless it was apparent that
prima facie proof of guilt existed.85 This was consistent with Ansell's
desire to remove from the commander the sole judgment as to when
there should be a court-martial and to inject a lawyer, whenever possible,
into the process.
3. Role of the Commander-The Chamberlain bill would have re-
tained the hierarchy of military courts, with the general, special, and
summary courts-martial. However, it did attempt to limit the functions
of the commander in the court-martial process. First, it sought to limit
the authority to convene a general court-martial.80 Under existing law,
any commanding officer "when empowered by the President" could con-
vene a general court-martial and, in practice, this power was delegated
by the President to the War Department and far down the chain of com-
mand. It was too easy to court-martial a man. The unlimited power of
the President to authorize any commander to appoint general courts un-
necessarily increased the number of courts without a corresponding ben-
80 Comment, S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, at 38.
81 Articles of War, 1916, art. 96.
82S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, art. 96 at 38.
83 Id.
84 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES ARMY ff 76 (1917).
85 S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, art. 20 at 11.
88 Articles of War, 1916, art. 8.
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efit to the service.8 7 The Chamberlain bill would have limited convening
authority to the President, Superintendent of the Military Academy, com-
manding officer of a territorial division, department, corps, tactical divi-
sion, "or of any isolated body of troops consisting of a regiment or more
which by reason of delay and difficulty of communication with it the
President shall find it necessary to constitute a separate general court
jurisdiction." 88 This was an attempt to set some limiting standards on
the delegation of the convening authority and reflected Ansell's belief
that there would be a better chance for justice at a higher command
where military lawyers would be available.8 9 The bill also would have
limited considerably the commander's control over courts-martial by re-
moving his power to appoint court members, requiring counsel in general
courts to be lawyers, and providing for a military judge in general courts,
which provisions will be discussed in detail below.
4. Membership and Selection of the Court-Ansell realized that
crucial aspects of any court-martial were the personnel sitting on the
court and the method of their selection. The Chamberlain bill would
have required exactly eight members for a general court-martial and
three members for a special court-martial. 90 It also would have altered
the commander's power to select the court and to control it during the
trial. First, it provided that enlisted men would be tried by courts con-
taining members from their own rank. Three out of the eight members
of a general court-martial and one out of three members of a special
court-martial would be required to be of the same rank as the accused. 9'
The bill also would have increased the requirement for two-thirds con-
currence of the court for conviction to three-quarters and would have re-
quired unanimity for imposition of the death penalty.9 2 Thus, court mem-
bers of the accused's own rank, constituting more than one-third of the
court, would have held the determining votes as to conviction or not.
Second, the Chamberlain bill attempted to change, for the first time, the
commander's power to handpick the court members, a practice particu-
larly foreign to civilian justice. The appointing authority would be per-
mitted to designate a panel "consisting of those who are by him deemed
8 7 Comment, S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, at 6.
88 S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, art. 8 at 6.
89 Subsequent history raises doubts as to the assumption that higher level com-
manders will display less interest in using the court-martial to carry out their own
disciplinary policies. The use of courts-martial to suppress anti-war dissent during
the Vietnam War period, which has been criticized by some, has been almost en-
tirely by high level commanding generals. See, e.g., Sherman, Dissenters and De-
serters, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 6, 1968, at 23; Sherman, Buttons, Bumper Stickers
and the Soldier, NEW REPUBLIc, Aug. 17, 1968, at 15.
90S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, arts. 5, 6 at 6.
9 1 Id.
92S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, art. 46 at 20.
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fair and impartial and competent to try the cases to be brought before
them," 93 but a court judge advocate would be required to sit with each
court-martial and would choose the court members from the panel. Again
this indicated Ansell's faith in the introduction of legal officers into the
court-martial process as a panacea. We now may feel that his faith was
unrealistic in light of subsequent experience indicating that legal officers
under a commander also have difficulties in functioning with absolute
impartiality and devotion to an accused's cause.94 However, his pro-
posals that members of an accused's rank should hold a decisive number
of votes on the court and that selection of the court should be left to
someone other than the commander would have been a significant break
from the traditional commander control of courts-martial.
The bill also proposed that in selection of the court the accused should
be given two peremptory challenges, instead of one as before, 5 and that
he should be permitted, for the first time, to challenge the entire court
array by submitting an affidavit indicating that its composition or con-
stitution manifested an inability to render justice, or that the appointing
officer had acted with prejudice.95 It is questionable whether this pro-
vision would have been adequate to prevent "packing" of the court by
the appointing authority, but it would have permitted the accused to
raise the issue of an unfair court, and presumably to require disclosure
of the method of selection used, and to place the burden on the appoint-
ing authority to show that the selection was not unfair.
5. Judicial Functions-Ansell disliked the existing court-martial
structure with its judgeless court, and with judicial functions being per-
formed by the prosecutor judge advocate. The Chamberlain bill would
have required the appointing authority to appoint a lawyer from the
Judge Advocate General's Corps or, if not available, an officer recom-
mended by the Judge Advocate General as specially qualified by reason
of legal learning or judicial temperament, to serve as court judge advocate
for each general and special court-martial.9 7 There would be a division of
duties along civilian court judge-jury lines. The court judge advocate
would attend all sessions of the court but would not be a voting member.
He would be given most of the functions held by a civilian judge. He
would rule upon motions and questions of law, summarize the evidence
and applicable law at the conclusion of the case, review findings of guilt
for legal sufficiency, and impose sentence with power to suspend it in
whole or in part. He also would have certain other responsibilities as a
93S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, art. 10 at 7.
94 See comments of Professor Keeffe concerning the "independence" of the staff
judge advocate at p. 47 infra.
95 S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, art. 23 at 12.
96 Id.
97S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, art. 12 at 7-8.
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sort of "ombudsman" to insure that the proceedings were fair, including
ruling on challenges and questions related to the competency and im-
partiality of the court and insuring that the accused would not suffer any
disadvantage due to ignorance or incapacity (with the power to call wit-
nesses if necessary "to elicit the truth").9 Ansell saw the court judge
advocates in the role of genuine judges, and his hopes for fairness in
court-martial proceedings were based in large part upon the military
creating a respected and independent trial judiciary similar to that of
civilian courts.
6. Defense Counsel-One of the traditional duties and prerogatives
of a commissioned officer, whether a lawyer or not, had always been to
act as counsel in courts-martial. This was satisfactory only so long as a
court-martial was not really a judicial proceeding and the law played a
rather minor role in the outcome. The Chamberlain bill provided that an
accused in a special or general court-martial would be represented by
the military counsel of his choice.9 The counsel selected by the accused
would have to be appointed "unless the appointing authority shall furnish
the court with a certificate which shall be placed in the record that such
assignment cannot be made without serious injury to the service and
setting forth the reasons therefor." 100 The bill also provided that if the
accused made it appear to the court judge advocate that he needed the
assistance of a civilian counsel but could not afford to hire one, the judge
advocate would employ civilian counsel and pay for his services. If the
accused were found guilty, the judge advocate would be able to order a
deduction from the accused's pay of two-thirds of his monthly pay.101
Since the military justice system has never looked with favor upon ex-
panded use of civilian lawyers in courts-martial, this was a rather radical
civilianizing proposal. The rest of the provisions as to counsel, however,
without a requirement that they be lawyers, were not among the stronger
provisions of the Chamberlain bill.
7. Nature of the Trial-Ansell's fondest wish was to remake the
court-martial into a judicial proceeding. Passage of the Chamberlain bill
98 Id.
99S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, art. 22 at 7-8.
100Note the similar language in The Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L No.
90-632 § 827 (Oct. 24, 1968), 1 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1570-71 (1968)
(article 27 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) [hereinafter cited as UCMJJ
concerning appointment of lawyer counsel in special courts martial.
If counsel having such qualifications cannot be obtained, the court may
be convened and the trial held but the convening authority shall make a
detailed written statement, to be appended to the record, stating why
counsel with such qualifications could not be obtained.
101 S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, art. 22 at 12.
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would have altered many of the distinctive features of the court-martial
which gave it the appearance of an administrative hearing. The introduc-
tion of a judge, the requirement for counsel of accused's choice, the pre-
trial investigations, and the post-trial appeal remedies would have de-
manded that the administrative flavor of the court-martial give way to
a more judicial one. The bill's compromises with military tradition, how-
ever, such as leaving the court-martial administration under the individ-
ual commander, would have prevented a thoroughly judicial atmosphere.
The bill also would have required that the rules of evidence applicable in
the United States district courts apply in courts-martial. The 1917
Manual for Courts-Martial did contain rules of evidence for courts-
martial, written under the direction of Professor Wigmore. 10 2 However,
Ansell argued that military courts too often ignored the Manual and pro-
posed that the exact evidentiary rules applicable in civilian courts should
govern in courts-martial. °3
8. Post-Trial Proceedings-Among the most criticized features of the
court-martial system were the post-trial proceedings. There had been a
number of World War I cases in which, after an acquittal by the court-
martial, the commander refused to accept the verdict and returned the
case to the court-martial, resulting in a conviction the second time
around.10 4 The Chamberlain bill would have required that an acquittal be
announced immediately in open court, and would have taken away from
the reviewing authority the power to return an acquittal for reconsidera-
tion or to revise a sentence upward.105
Especially significant were the bill's proposals for appellate review.
Review by the commander was one of the keystones of the court-martial
system, and this was the issue which led to the Crowder-Ansell dispute.
Ansell felt strongly that civilians not in the chain of command or affected
by military loyalty should be involved in reviewing court-martial con-
victions. The Chamberlain bill would have created a military appeals
court of three judges appointed by the President with lifetime tenure
during good behavior and the pay and retirement privileges of a federal
circuit court judge. 10 The court would have been located "for con-
venience of administration only" 107 in the office of the Judge Advocate
General, an unattractive choice it would appear today. The court would
102 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES ch. 11 (1917). Articles of
War, 1916, art. 38, provided that the President could prescribe the modes of proof
used in courts-martial if not inconsistent with the Articles of War.
103S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, art. 41 at 19. See also testimony of General An-
sell, Hearings on S. 64 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Military Af-
fairs, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 268 (1919).
104 See 1919 Hearings, supra note 27, at 34.
105S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, arts. 34, 50 at 24-26.
106 S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, art. 52 at 24-26.
107 Id. at 24.
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have reviewed every general court-martial conviction in which the sen-
tence involved death, dishonorable discharge or dismissal, or confinement
for more than six months. The scope of review would have extended to
"correction of errors of law evidenced by the record and injuriously af-
fecting the substantial rights of an accused, without regard to whether
such errors were made the subject of objection or exception at the
trial." I's The court would have been empowered to disapprove a finding
of guilty or approve only so much as involved a lesser included offense,
or disapprove the sentence in whole or part and to order a new trial, or
report to the Secretary of War for transmission of recommendations of
clemency to the President. The bill did not attempt to create a hier-
archical set of appeal courts or boards as found in civilian courts, and it
failed to provide for court review of special or summary courts-martial.
However, it did require that after the appointing authority had approved,
he would have to forward the records of the trial to general headquarters
appointed by the President. There a judge advocate would review the
proceedings with the power, in case of error prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused, to revise the proceedings.109
The Chamberlain bill ran into immediate difficulties in Congress. Its
advocates, who had themselves invoked the patriotism of Americans
against court-martial abuses, found that, with the war over and the boys
coming home, patriotism had begun to cut the other way. Professor Wig-
more told a 1919 Maryland Bar Association meeting:
The prime object of military organization is Victory, not justice. In
that death struggle which is ever impending, the Army, which defends
the Nation, is ever strained by the terrific consciousness that the Nation's
life and its own is at stake. No other objective than Victory can have
first place in its thoughts, nor cause any remission of that strain. If it
can do justice to its men, well and good. But justice is always secondary,
and Victory is always primary."10
Howard Thayer Kingsbury, a New York lawyer and Judge Advocate
General of the New York Guard during the war, expressed the tradi-
tional military argument in favor of command control of courts-martial
in a 1919 article in the National Service Digest:
In civil life each individual owes obedience to the organized government
of the community, but not to any individual civil officer as such; in the
military organization, each member owes obedience to an individual-his
commanding officer. The commander is responsible for the conduct of
the forces, and in the nature of things he must have all the powers neces-
sary to make his authority effective.
For this reason there should not be in the army a distribution of co-
ordinate powers between executive and judicial authority, and any pro-
108 Id. at 25.
109 S. 64, 1919, art. 39, supra note 78, at 17, 22.
110 24 MD. STATE BARa Ass'N TR.ANSACTIONS 183, 188 (1919).
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posed reform of court-martial procedure which contemplates setting
up a military judiciary, independent of executive command, proceeds
upon an unsound basis."'
Kingsbury closed with the now familiar argument against reform of
courts-martial that "it does not appear that the proportion of unjust
judgments or excessive penalties is any greater than in the ordinary
civil and criminal tribunals," and so "there is no occasion for any dras-
tic or revolutionary changes in the existing system of military justice." 112
After hearings on the Chamberlain bill were held in November 1919,
it became obvious that the proponents of the bill could not muster
enough support to overcome the opposition of the military and the War
Department. The subcommittee considering the bill failed to report it
out of committee, adopting instead a limited revision of the Articles of
War which was passed as part of the Army Reorganization Act of
1920.113 "The Ansell draft," remarked Professor Edmund Morgan years
later, "was badly mutilated." 114
The 1920 Articles of War made no changes in the wording of crimes
from the 1916 Articles, but the President was given authority to prescribe
maximum punishments for crimes. 1 5 A pretrial investigation by an in-
vestigating officer appointed by the commander would be provided
in general courts where the accused could offer evidence and witnesses,
but the officer's recommendation would not be binding upon the corn-
mander.116 Virtually all of the Chamberlain bill's proposals for limiting
the role of the commander were rejected. The rules with respect to
membership and selection of the court remained basically unchanged.
Only officers would continue to sit on courts, and the only limitation
on the commander's selection would be that he would choose those
officers that he considered best qualified "by reason of age, training,
experience, and judicial temperament." 17 No definite number of court
members was established; general courts would have from five to 13
members, special courts from three to five. A two-thirds vote would still
be required to convict, except that a three-quarters vote would be re-
quired for a sentence of life or one of more than ten years, and a unani-
mous vote for death."18 The number of peremptory challenges would
remain at one without any right to challenge the array. There was still
"'1 Kingsbury, Courts-Martial and Military Justice, 5 NATIONAL SERVICE WITHl
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY DIGEST 280 (1919).
112 Id. at 281.
113 Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, ch. II, 41 Stat. 759, 787. For description of this
legislative history see Brown, supra note 58, at 14.
114 Morgan, supra note 58, at 21.
115 Articles of War, 1920, art. 45.
116 Id. art. 70.
117Id. art. 4.
118 Id. art. 43.
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no provision for a judge, but the appointing authority in a general court-
martial would detail one member of the court who had to be a lawyer
from the Judge Advocate General's Corps to serve as the "law mem-
ber." 119 He would rule upon interlocutory questions and instruct the
court on the presumptions of innocence and the burden of the prose-
cution. However, his rulings would be final only as to admissibility of
evidence as he could be overruled by a majority vote of the court on all
other matters.1 20 It was also provided that a defense counsel would have
to be appointed for all special and general courts-martial, but he would
not be required to be a lawyer. 2 1 The Chamberlain bill's proposal for a
civilian military appeals court was rejected. Commanders would con-
tinue to review court-martial convictions and sentences, but could not
review sentences upwards or return an acquittal to the court for recon-
sideration.'2 The reviewing authority would have to refer the records
of general courts-martial to his staff judge advocate for review prior to
taking final action, but he would not be bound to accept the judge ad-
vocate's advice.m2 The Judge Advocate General was required to es-
tablish in his office a board of review consisting of three or more officers
who would review the records of all sentences requiring confirmation by
the President (cases involving generals, dismissal of officers, or cadets),
and cases involving death, unsuspended dismissal, dishonorable dis-
charge, or confinement in the penitentiary.12 4 However, the board's
recommendations were to be given to the Judge Advocate General who
could render them advisory by disagreeing with them and forwarding
the case to the Secretary of War for action by the President.
The 1920 Articles can hardly be considered an important reform of
military justice, and the Chamberlain bill, despite its rejection, con-
tinued to provide the principal guidelines for the reform movement. The
most unsatisfactory of the Chamberlain bill's provisions, such as the
failure to provide that different court-martial functions should be per-
formed by personnel not subject to commander's control, resulted from
General Ansell's excessive faith in the salutary effect of military lawyers
in court-martial proceedings and his quite understandable lack of ap-
preciation of the logistic potentialities of the modem military. Who, for
example, could have foreseen in 1919 the ability of the military to fly
judges, counsel, and legal personnel from Okinawa to Vietnam for a
court-martial without straining the fighting capacity of the Armed
1 9 Id. art. 8.
120 Id.
12 1 Id. art. 17.
=~ Id. arts. 40, 47.
123 Id. art. 46.
m Id. art. 50 .
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Forces? 125 However, the Chamberlain bill, with its emphasis upon less-
ening command control and upon requiring a trial in part by one's peers,
still stands as a goal for reformers today.
IV. THE POST WORLD WAR II REFORM MOVEMENT
AND THE PASSAGE OF THE UCMJ
"When Johnny came marching home again from World War II,"
wrote Robinson 0. Everett, Commissioner of the United States Court of
Military Appeals,
he brought with him numerous complaints about justice as then dispensed
in the Army and the Navy. Many of these were prompted by a con-
viction that the administration of military justice had not always lived
up to the goals of fairness and impartiality which were accepted as part
of the American legal tradition. 126
More American servicemen than ever before had experienced military
justice first hand, and it was clear that they did not like it. There had
been over 1,700,000 courts-martial during the war,12 7 most of them re-
sulting in convictions. There had been 100 capital executions, and
45,000 servicemen were still imprisoned when the war ended. 128 Some
80 percent of the courts-martial were for acts which would not have
been crimes in civilian life, with absence without leave and desertion
the most frequent charges. 129 In the Army alone, 20,392 men were con-
victed of desertion, one of the most serious crimes under the Articles, for
an average conviction rate of 3.7 per 1,000 per year. 130 Undue severity of
125The Army Judge Advocate General serviced Vietnam courts-martial from
Okinawa until July 1965. Joint Hearings on S. 754-62, S. 2906-7 Before the Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 911 (1966). For a discussion of the various kinds of logistics problems
arising in Navy courts-martial see Ochstein, The Dockside Court: The Dockside
Special Court-Martial of Cominlant, JAG J., December 1957-January 1958, at 19.
12 6 R. EVERETT, MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
9 (1956).
127 White, The Background and the Problem, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 197, 200
(1961); Letter from New York State Bar Association to Committee on Military
Justice, Jan. 29, 1949, at 5, in VI Papers of Professor Edmund Morgan on the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, on file in Treasure Room, Harvard Law School
Library [hereinafter cited as Morgan Papers].
12 8 Id.
129 Statement of Professor Arthur John Keeffe, Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before
Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 780
(1949), in VI Morgan Papers.
130 N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1968, at 4, col. 8.
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sentences was still one of the principal complaints. A clemency board, ap-
pointed by the Secretary of War in the summer of 1945 to review all
general court-martial cases where the accused was still in confinement,
remitted or reduced the sentence in 85 percent of the 27,000 cases re-
viewed. 131 Substantial numbers of servicemen who had never been in
trouble with the law served time in military jails, and came home from
the war with military records showing court-martial convictions or less
than honorable discharges. Senators and Congressmen were flooded with
complaints. Rear Admiral Robert J. White described the ground swell
of criticism against military justice: "The emotions suppressed during
the long, tense period of global warfare were now released by peace, and
erupted into a tornado-like explosion of violent feelings, abusive criti-
cism of the military, and aggressive pressures on Congress for funda-
mental reforms in the court-martial system." 132
It was obvious that court-martial abuses would not be so easily for-
gotten as they were after World War I. When Secretary of the Army
Patterson slighted court-martial reform in July, 1945, with the familiar
argument that military justice compares favorably with civilian justice
because of provisions for review and clemency, there was an outburst
of public disagreement. Within a short time, he was calling for an "over-
hauling" of the court-martial system. 13 The Secretary of the Navy had
already appointed committees to recommend court-martial changes,134
since the Navy's court-martial system, without the benefit of the 1920
Army reforms, was even more inadequate than that of the Army.
On March 18, 1946, the Secretary of War appointed the Board on
Officer-Enlisted Men's Relationships, headed by General James Doo-
little, to investigate the charges of unfairness and arbitrariness in the
military.135 The board considered thousands of letters and held hearings.
Although it was not primarily concerned with military justice, it con-
cluded that "the largest differential which brought the most criticism in
every instance, was in the field of military justice and courts-martial
13I Farmer & Wels, Command Control-Or Military Justice?, 24 N.Y.U.LQ.
263, 265 (1949) (citing the War Dep't Advisory Bd. on Clemency Report (1946)).
132White, supra note 127, at 201.
133 White, supra note 127, at 204 nn.20 & 21.
134 The Navy studies included the First Ballantine Report, U.S. Navy (1943);
Naval War-Time Discipline, Report from U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July,
August, October 1944 (headed by Vice Admiral Taussig); the Second Ballantine
Report, U.S. Navy (1945); Report of the McGuire Comm. to the Secretary of the
Navy (1945); Report of General Court-Martial Review Board (1947) (the Keeffe
Board); Report of Colonel James N. Snedeker, USMC to Judge Advocate General
(1946); the White Report, A Study of Five Hundred Naval Prisoners and Naval
Justice (1946).
1-3S. Doc. No. 196, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Doo-
little Report].
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procedure which permitted inequities and injustices to enlisted person-
nel." 116 The board was particularly concerned with the inequities of rank
which appeared even in the court-martial system. 137 It recommended a
sweeping recasting of the military structure which would deemphasize
rank by such reforms as abandoning the requirements of saluting off
base and off duty and removing the prohibitions on social fraternization
between ranks. 138 It concluded:
Americans look with disfavor upon any system which grants unearned
privileges to a particular class of individuals and find distasteful any
tendency to make arbitrary social distinctions between two parts of the
Army . . . .There is need for a new philisophy in the military order,
a policy of treatment of men, especially in the "ranks" in terms of ad-
vanced concepts in social thinking. The present system does not permit
full recognition of the dignities of man. More definite protection from
the arbitrary acts of superiors is essential. 139
The board made few specific recommendations as to the court-martial
system, but called for a "review of the machinery for administering mili-
tary justice and the courts-martial procedure with a view to making all
military personnel subject to the same types of punishment as based upon
infractions of rules and misdemeanors." 140 The Doolittle Report was, as
it now appears in light of the contemporary movement for expanded en-
listed men's rights, ahead of its time. The professional military, faced
with tremendous manpower cuts, stoutly resisted abandonment of the
prerogatives of rank and restructuring of the military. The report at-
1386 Id. at 18.
137 A four-year study of the attitudes of American soldiers in World War II, con-
ducted by a group of sociologists for the Research Branch, Information & Educa-
tion Division, U.S. Army, was published in 1949 and confirmed many of the con-
clusions of the Doolittle committee:
Few aspects of Army life were more alien to the customary folkways of
the average American civilian than the social system which ascribed to
an elite group social privileges from which the non-elite were legally de-
barred and which enforced symbolic deferential behavior toward the elite
off duty as well as on duty . . . . The American enlisted man, with his
democratic civilian background, resented not so much the fact that super-
iors could afford certain privileges as the denial of his own right to enjoy
them. As one enlisted man in the Persian Gulf Command put it, "Back
in the States if a private had the price he could go to the same place that
a general could. I bet the people back home don't know the conditions
here."
1 S. STOUFFER, E. SUCHMAN, L. DEVINNEY, S. STAR & R. WILLIAMS, TnE AMER-
ICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT DURING ARMY LIFE 71, 373 (1949).
138 Doolittle Report, supra note 135, at 20.
139 Id. at 25.
140 Id. at 21.
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tracted the wrath of the services, and few proposals were even seriously
considered for remedial legislation.
The Secretary of War, later in 1946, appointed a committee headed
by Arthur Vanderbilt, a former President of the American Bar Associ-
ation, to advise on changes in the Army court-martial system. The com-
mittee held hearings, examined studies and questionnaires, and con-
cluded that there was an absence of sufficient attention to and emphasis
upon the military justice system and lack of preliminary planning for it;
there was serious deficiency of sufficiently qualified and trained men to
act as members of the court or as officers of the court; the command
frequently dominated the courts in the rendition of their judgment; de-
fense counsel were often ineffective because of (a) lack of experience
and knowledge, or (b) lack of a vigorous defense attitude; the sentences
originally imposed were frequently excessively severe and sometimes
fantastically so; there was some discrimination between officers and en-
listed men, both as to the bringing of charges and as to convictions and
sentences; and investigations, before referring cases to trial, were fre-
quently inefficient or inadequate.141
Similar committees appointed by the Navy proposed changes in the
Navy court-martial system. 142 Meanwhile, support for a drastic reform
of the court-martial system, with particular emphasis upon removing
the commander's control and providing for civilian review, was building
up in bar associations. The Army and Navy both offered bills containing
reforms but making few alterations in the basic court-martial system.
Hearings were held on the Army proposals, resulting in a somewhat
more reformatory draft which was introduced as the Elston Act in the
80th Congress. 43 The Elston Act was passed by the House, but not by
the Senate on account of opposition from several quarters. Advocates of
broad reform opposed the Act because it had rejected the recommen-
dations of the Vanderbilt committee and various bar groups that com-
mand control of courts-martial should be removed. As Arthur E.
Farmer, chairman of the Committee on Military Law of the War Veter-
ans Bar Association, and Richard H. Wels, chairman of the Committee
on Military Justice of the New York County Lawyers Association,
charged:
Despite this uniformity of opinion among those best qualified to pass
judgment, 144 the court-martial reform legislation, as introduced and as
passed, did not contain provisions which would divorce the court-martial
141 REPORT OF WAR DEP'T ADVISORY Comm. ON MILITARY JUSTICE TO TIlE SEC-
RETARY OF WAR 3 (1946).
142 Note 134 supra.
143 Act of June 24, 1948, tit. II, 62 Stat. 604.
144 The Vanderbilt committee had recommended against command control of
courts-martial. A poll taken in 1947 of the members of the Judge Advocates Asso-
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system from command control. It is not without significance that the bill
as introduced had been framed by the War Department, which had
ignored the primary recommendations of its own Advisory Committee
on Military Justice [the Vanderbilt Committee] by retaining the old
method of appointing courts and counsel and placing the initial power
of review in the commanding officer who was vested with appointing
authority.145
There was also opposition from the military establishment since, as
Professor Morgan reported, "there seems to have been some sort of
agreement that nothing should be submitted to the 80th Congress, be-
cause the problems of both services should be considered together." 140
However, a change in strategy was made, and the Elston Act was un-
expectedly offered as an amendment to the National Defense Act of
1948 and was quickly passed into law in June 1948.17 The advocates
of broader reform angrily charged that misrepresentations had been made
during the limited Senate debate that the Act contained all the rec-
ommendations of the Vanderbilt committee. 148 Since the Elston Act ap-
plied only to the Army, and presumably to the Air Force which had just
become a separate service, Secretary of Defense Forrestal, in an attempt
to provide uniform rules for all services, appointed a committee in July
1948, to draft a uniform code of military justice. The struggle for more
extensive reform now shifted to this drafting committee.
The military point of view was heavily represented on the drafting
committee composed of the assistant and under secretaries of the services
with Professor Edmund Morgan of Harvard Law School as chairman.
The choice of Professor Morgan was a fortunate one for the cause of
broader reform since he was not only highly respected as an expert in
evidence and legal procedure (he had served on the drafting committee
for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ten years before), but he had
also served as a major under General Ansell in the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's office in World War I and was sympathetic to many of Ansell's
ideas. A working subcommittee, headed by Assistant General Counsel
of the Secretary of Defense, Felix E. Larkin, was staffed with 15 lawyers
from the services, five of them civilians.
The committee painstakingly compared the Army and Navy codes,
attempting to reconcile their peculiarities and to mold in reforms. 149
ciation, comprised of 2,200 of the 2,700 World War II Judge Advocate General's
officers, showed a high percentage of those answering in favor of removal of com-
mand control over courts-martial and appointing and reviewing authority. Farmer
& Wels, supra note 131, at 269-70.
14 5 Id. at 270.
146 Morgan, supra note 58, at 22.
147 Note 143 supra.
148 Farmer & Wels, supra note 131, at 271.
149 Larkin, Professor Edmund M. Morgan and the Drafting of the Uniform
Code, 28 MiL. L. REv. 7, 8-9 (1965).
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Meanwhile correspondence, particularly from lawyers who had served
in the war, poured in with suggestions. The letters, often critical, covered
most of the traditional court-martial procedures. Governor James E.
Folsom of Alabama called for a court of the same rank as the accused:
When an officer orders a soldier court-martialled, before court-martial
he is automatically convicted. I have one recommendation to make, that
enlisted men try enlisted men and that officers try officers. This is an old
common law which has been handed down for hundreds of years, that
every man is entitled to be tried by his peers. 150
Governor Ernest W. Gibson of Vermont urged that the commander's
power to appoint and rate court members and counsel be terminated,
referring to his experiences as a military lawyer in the war:
[W]e were advised, not once but many times on the Courts that I sat
on, that if we adjudged a person guilty we should afflict the maximum
sentence and leave it to the Commanding General to make any reduc-
tion . . . I was dismissed as a Law Officer and Member of a General
Court Martial because our General Court acquitted a colored man on a
morals charge when the Commanding General wanted him convicted-
yet the evidence didn't warrant it. I was called down and told that if I
didn't convict in a greater number of cases I would be marked down in
my Efficiency Rating; and I squared right off and said that wasn't my
conception of justice and that they had better remove me, which was
done forthwith. 151
An ex-officer who had served in the review section of the Judge Ad-
vocate General's office questioned the fairness of the boards of review:
Boards of Review are mere adjuncts of the Office of the Judge Advocate
General . . . . The failure of Boards of Review to provide a "more ef-
fective appellate review" of convictions by general court martial is due
to several fundamental causes, namely, the members of such Boards are
army officers "under the command" of the [Judge Advocate General].
Their appointment and removal are at the will of the individual who hap-
pens to be the Judge Advocate General.11 2
The letters covered a number of different aspects of the court-martial
system, but most of the stories of unfairness, arbitrariness, misuse of
authority, and inadequate protection of rights could be boiled down to
the criticism that commanders exercised too much control over court-
martial procedures from prosecution through review. It was clear that
the central issue in court-martial reform was the commander's role in
the court-martial.
150 Letter from James E. Folsom to Edmund M. Morgan, Nov. 5, 1948, VI Mor-
gan Papers.
151 Letter from Ernest W. Gibson to Edmund M. Morgan, Nov. 18, 1948, VI
Morgan Papers.
152Letter from Charles M. Dickson to Senator Tom Connally, Jan. 31, 1948
(copy), VI Morgan Papers.
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A number of prominent bar associations were strongly in favor of
court-martial reform which would remove the individual commander's
control of court-martial machinery. 153 The American Bar Association
Journal urged removal of command control in a number of editorials
from 1945 to 1948.1-4 On November 22, 1948, the committees on mili-
tary justice of the American Bar Association, the Association of the Bar
of New Jersey, the New York County Lawyers' Association, and the War
Veterans' Bar Association called on the drafting committee to make
certain reforms in military justice, namely, that the judicial systems of
the Armed Services be removed from command control; that a simple
system of review be adopted; and that in all general courts, and wherever
possible in all other cases, both the trial judge advocate and the assigned
defense counsel be lawyers.155
These committees proposed a plan for removing command control of
courts-martial which went beyond that proposed by General Ansell. A
commander who wanted one of his men court-martialled would have
the power to charge him with the offense and control the prosecution,
but the convening and selection of the court, the handling of the defense,
the administration of the court-martial, and the post-conviction review
would not be under his control or command. The power to convene a
general court-martial would be in a ranking member of the Judge Ad-
vocate General's department who would be attached to high level com-
mands (such as a territorial department, Army group or Army) or,
when empowered by the President, would be attached to lower com-
mands (such as a division or corps). The commander would provide
the convening authority with personnel but would not be in the chain of
command, and the convening authority would be responsible directly to
the Judge Advocate General in Washington. Ordinarily, the convening
authority would select court members from the accused's own division or
corps, except that, in the interests of justice, he could order the accused
to be tried by a court composed of officers and men from a different di-
vision or corps. 156
The military was opposed to any such plan which would limit the indi-
vidual commander's control over the operation of courts-martial. The
153 E.g., American Bar Association; New York County Bar Association; Bar As-
sociation of the City of New York; Association of the Bar of New Jersey; War
Veterans' Bar Association. However, the New York State Bar Association favored
retaining command control, although also favoring civilian review. White, supra
note 127, at 208; Goulet, The United States Court of Military Appeals and Suf-
ficiency of the Evidence, 42 GEO. L.J., 108, 112 (1953).
154 See, e.g., 34 A.B.A.J. 702, 703 (1948).
155 Report from the Chairman of the Committees on Military Justice to Felix
E. Larkin, Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Nov. 22, 1948, VI Morgan Papers
2-3.
156 Id. at 5.
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civilian Secretaries of the services supported the military's position, and
the defense establishment presented solid resistance to attempts to
broaden the Elston Act so as to remove command control of courts-
martial. Secretary of War Patterson had previously expressed the tradi-
tional argument that the military could not operate efficiently if com-
manders could not control courts-martial:
Many of the critics overlook the place of military justice in the army
or the navy. An army is organized to win victory in war and the or-
ganization must be one that will bring success in combat. That means
singleness of command and the responsibility of the field commander
for everything that goes on in the field. The army has other functions
such as feeding, medical care, and justice, but they are subordinate.157
The military undertook an active campaign to counteract the public out-
cry for limiting command control. A number of prominent generals, in-
cluding Generals Bradley and Eisenhower, forcefully defended the tradi-
tional court-martial structure. At a meeting of the New York Lawyers'
Club on November 17, 1948, General Eisenhower said:
I know that groups of lawyers in examining the legal procedures in the
Army have believed that it would be very wise to observe, in the Army
and in the Armed Services in general, that great distinction that is made
in our Governmental organization, of a division of power . . . But I
should like to call your attention to one fact about the Army, about the
Armed Services. It was never set up to insure justice. It is set up as your
servant, a servant, of the civilian population of this country to do a
particular job, to perform a particular function; and that function, in
its successful performance, demands within the Army somewhat, almost
of a violation of the very concepts upon which our government is es-
tablished . . . . So this division of command responsibility and the
responsibility for the adjudication of offenses and of accused offenders
cannot be as separate as it is in our own democratic government.5'5
Although the public debate over court-martial reform centered on re-
moval of command control, there was never much likelihood that the
drafting committee would not uphold the military position. A survey of
the papers and correspondence of the committee, now part of the Mor-
gan papers at the Harvard Law School Library, indicates that none of
the drafts considered by the committee ever contained a provision for
removal of command control of courts-martial. Professor Morgan, how-
ever, was interested in reducing command control. His handwritten notes
indicate that he was attracted by the then recent British court-martial
reforms 5 9 which placed certain court-martial functions in an independent
157 Quoted in Statement of John Kenney, Under Secretary of the Navy, Hearings
on H.R. 2498 Before Subcomm. No. I of the House Comm. on Armed Services,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 780 (1949) in VI Morgan Papers.
158 Quoted in Letter from New York State Bar Association, supra note 127, at 4.
159 Professor Morgan's copy of Report of the Army and Air Force Courts-
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judge advocate's office which was removed from the military structure
and civilianized:
The English do not attempt to interfere with the composition of the
Court. If Congress is prepared to set up a corps of legal specialists to be
assigned by Judicial Council to act as defense counsel and law officers,
that would do the trick.160
His notes also indicate some sympathy for the type of proposal made by
the bar associations that an independent judiciary under the Judge Ad-
vocate General be established to administer all court-martial functions
except those of prosecution:
To make Corps [Judge Advocate General] effective to accomplish elimi-
nation of command control-
1. Impossible to do it so far as court is concerned unless JAG furnishes
it;
2. Same as to defense counsel unless JAG furnishes it-as nowhere
proposed. Any military officer bound to be rated by his commanding
officer;
3. Same as to law officer unless a JAG Corps man.18 1
However, Morgan's sentiments on command control were not shared
by enough members of the committee, and he seems to have worked in-
stead for other reforms, principally for a civilian review court. A month
before the final draft was completed, a memorandum from Executive
Secretary Larkin showed that there was a difference of opinion in the
committee on only four issues: a civilian review body; use of enlisted
men on courts; vesting the law officer with powers similar to those of a
civilian judge; and the right to demand a court-martial in place of non-
judicial punishment. 162 Morgan was in favor of the broader reform on
Martial Committee, Great Britain (Cmd. 7608, 1946) was heavily underlined.
Paragraphs 105-113 of that report recommended the transfer of all functions in-
volving pretrial advice and prosecution (and apparently defense under a legal aid
scheme) from the Judge Advocate General of the Forces to new civilian Director-
ates of Legal Services in the War Office and Air Ministry. This was accomplished
on Oct. 1, 1948. See Wiener, CVILIANS UNDER MiLUTARY JUsTIcE 231 (1967). The
Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act. 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 46 (1951) created a civilian
Courts-Martial Appeal Court which would have direct review over courts-martial.
Subsequent legislation involving further civilianization of military justice included:
Administration of Justice Act, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65 (1960) (permitting court-martial
cases to be appealed to the House of Lords); Criminal Appeal Act 1964, c. 43
(authorizing retrials of criminal cases, including courts-martial, where there is
fresh evidence); Criminal Appeals Act 1966, c. 31 (enlarging scope of appellate
review of courts-martial).
160 Handwritten notes of Professor Morgan, V Morgan Papers, at 6.
161 Id. at 7.
162 Memorandum from Felix E. Larkin to Secretaries of the services concerning
the points of difference within the committee, Jan. 5, 1949, IV Morgan Papers.
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all but the last issue. When the draft of the UCMJ was completed early
in February 1949, and introduced in the Senate and the House, Morgan
contributed his considerable prestige to obtain its passage.le Only later
would he comment somewhat ruefully on the failure of the UCMJ to
remove or limit command control of courts-martial:
[S]o long as the court consists of officers subject to control by the
convening authority or his associates, the possibility of command
interference will persist. If the superior officers in the services are deter-
mined to exercise improper control over the trial, no safeguard will
suffice so long as the trial court is composed of military men. We may
have to come to a system where the trial judge, and the members of the
Board of Review, as well as the Court of Appeals, are civilians.
If experience under the Code shows that the influence of command
control has not been eliminated, it may well be that a new system will
have to be established in which the military will have control only over
the processes of prosecution, and the defense, trial and review be under
the exclusive control of civilians. The services have the opportunity of
demonstrating to Congress that the concessions made in the Code to the
demands for effective discipline do not impair the essentials of a fair,
impartial trial and effective appellate review.164
The advocates of broad court-martial reform vigorously dissented
from the committee's proposed draft of the UCMJ. The chairmen of two
bar association committees which had urged reform observed that
[t]his code embodies further improvements in the system of military
justice, but incredible as it may seem, maintains intact the old system
criticized by Senators Norris and Chamberlain as far back as 1919,
whereby the commanding general appoints from his command the mem-
bers of the court, the trial judge advocate and defense counsel, refers
the case to the court and thereafter reviews the court's findings and sen-
tences. 165
Professor Arthur Keeffe of Cornell Law School and former president of
the Navy's General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board charged that
"in contrast with the Chamberlain bill of 1920, for which Professor Mor-
gan once fought so hard, this proposed uniform Code, however, is a
sorry substitute."' 6 Arthur E. Farmer, chairman of the War Veterans
Bar Association committee, testified:
[tihe basic reform which the court-martial system requires and with-
out which no real reform is possible-the elimination of command con-
trol from the courts-is conspiciously lacking [in the new Code]. Under
the Uniform Code the commanding general will still appoint the members
163See Letter to Edmund M. Morgan from Felix E. Larkin, Feb. 2, 1949,
II Morgan Papers. "In connection with your appearances before Congressional
committees, you appear as a member of the staff of the Secretary of Defense." Id.
164 Morgan, supra note 58, at 34-35.
165 Farmer & Wels, supra note 131, at 273.
166 Statement of Professor Keeffe, supra note 129, at 1.
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of the court, the trial counsel and the defense counsel from members of
his command, and will review the findings and sentence. We will still
have the same old story of a court and counsel, all of whom are de-
pendent upon the appointing and reviewing authority for their efficiency
ratings, their promotions, their duties, and their leaves. 167
But however long and hard they talked, the reformers had been out-
maneuvered and unless there was substantial popular support for
broader court-martial reform forthcoming, it was unlikely that they
could obtain amendments of the UCMJ by Congress. Their main prob-
lem in marshalling popular support was the timing. Four years had
passed since World War II, and even those raw wounds of servicemen
who felt that they had received unjust treatment in courts-martial had
begun to mend. Besides the country was now caught up in a struggle
with a new enemy and aggressor. The anger at the "brass hats" had al-
ready been converted into the respect for military might and technology
which would characterize the cold war era.168 The military used the
threat that the Armed Forces would be weakened to offset effectively
the attacks on command control. Military representatives continued to
emphasize that the old court-martial system was tried and true and any
changes uncertain, that any new system was unworkable on a practical
basis and, most of all, that highly respected military men felt command
control was needed to preserve military efficiency. 169 This potpourri was
remarkably effective with the public and Congress. Hearings were held
on the UCMJ in March and April 1949, and the committee's draft was
passed without substantial change. The UCMJ was signed into law by
President Truman on May 5, 1950, and took effect on May 31, 1951.170
Despite the failure of the UCMJ to make basic changes in the court-
martial structure, this was the most far-reaching change in military law
in the country's history, providing, for the first time, one criminal code
applicable to all the services. The provisions of the UCMJ 171 will be dis-
cussed in relation to the categories already used to analyze prior military
codes:
1. Statement of Crimes and Punishments-The UCMJ did not make
167 Statement of Arthur E. Farmer, Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before Subcomm.
No. 1 of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Con., 1st Sess. (1949) in VII
Morgan Papers.
168 See generally SWOMLEY, THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 38-90 (1964); NEB-
LETT, PENTAGON POLITICS 1-30 (1953).
169 See, e.g., Transcript of "On Trial", American Broadcasting Co. broadcast,
Feb. 14, 1949 at 7, V Morgan Papers.
170 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of May 5, 1950, ch.
169, 64 Stat. 107).
171 Some of the changes in the UCMJ had already been passed as part of the
Elston Act, supra note 143. For a more detailed discussion of the provisions of the
Elston Act see Morgan, supra note 58.
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substantial changes in the wording of military-type crimes from the 1920
code. It tended to follow the Army code, making changes where appro-
priate for special Navy situations. It did not remove certain traditional
military crimes imposing particularly authoritarian limitations on ser-
vicemen, such as "contemptuous words against the President" (article
88), and "provoking or reproachful words or gestures towards any
other person" (article 117). It also left intact the two open-ended
crimes: "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" (article 133);
and "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and dis-
cipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit
upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which
persons subject to this code may be guilty" (article 134, the general
article).
The UCMJ completed the extension of court-martial jurisdiction over
all civilian-type crimes. Until 1863, civilian-type crimes were not in-
cluded in the Articles of War, and from 1863 to 1916, they could only
be tried by court-martial "in time of war, insurrection or rebellion." 1 2
After 1916, a court-martial could not try individuals for murder and
rape "committed within the geographical limits of the States of the Union
and the District of Columbia in time of peace," 173 but trial by court-
martial was permitted for manslaughter, mayhem, arson, burglary,
housebreaking, robbery, larceny, perjury, forgery, sodomy, and various
assaults.174 The UCMJ removed the limitations of time and place for
murder and rape and defined each of the other civilian crimes in a sep-
arate article (adding the crimes of extortion and perjury) .17 This was
consistent with the drafters' belief that military law should be a total
criminal law system empowered to try servicemen for all crimes com-
mitted at any place, a proposition the constitutionality of which has re-
cently been rejected by the Supreme Court in O'Callahan v. Parker.""0
The UCMJ also retained the phrase in article 134 (the general article)
relating to "crimes and offenses not capital," thus continuing to assim-
ilate all federal crimes into the military code.
The UCMJ did not contain maximum punishments for crimes but
provided that the President could, by Executive Order, prescribe a table
of maximum punishments. When the UCMJ took effect the President
promulgated such a table which has continued, with minor changes,
since that time.177 However, the President has the power to suspend the
172 Note 42 supra.
173 Articles of War, 1920, art. 92.
174 Id. art. 93.
175 10 U.S.C. §§ 918-31 (1964) (arts. 118-31 of the UCMJ).
176 United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968),
rev'd, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
177 Exec. Order No. 10214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303 (1951); MANUAL FoR CoURTS-
MARTMAL, UNTrrED STATES i 127c (1951) [hereinafter cited as MNuAL].
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table at any time or for any particular area or crime, and has done so
several times. 178
2. Pretrial Proceedings-The UCMJ provided that any person sub-
ject to the Code could prefer charges against another person subject to
the Code even though he himself was under charges, in arrest, or in con-
finement.179 Thus, the preferral of charges was made similar to a com-
plaint in civilian courts. Essentially the same levels of command as be-
fore were permitted to convene summary, special, and general courts-
martial, with the power to convene a general court-martial still delegable
far down the line. 180 The commander with authority to convene a court
was called the "convening authority" rather than the "appointing au-
thority" as under the old Articles of War.
Charges could be referred to a special court-martial without a formal
investigation, but before charges could be referred to a general court-
martial, the convening authority would have to appoint an investigating
officer to make "a thorough and impartial investigation" at which the
accused would be afforded an opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses, and would have to refer the charge to his staff judge
advocate "for consideration and advice." 181 The commander would not
be bound by the recommendation of either the investigating officer or
the staff judge advocate, but would make his own determination "that the
charge alleges an offense under this Code and is warranted by evidence
indicated in the report of investigation."
Especially noteworthy were the revolutionary provisions under article
31 which prohibited interrogation without warning the accused (1) of
the nature of the accusation, (2) that he had the right to remain silent,
and (3) that any statement which he would make might be used against
him. Arthur Farmer, in his congressional testimony, had recommended
that the accused should also be advised of his right to counsel. 82 His
recommendation was not followed, but the Court of Military Appeals in
1967 held that this additional warning was constitutionally required.18
178 The table was suspended during the Korean War for certain offenses, in-
cluding desertion and absence without leave, in the Far East theatre. Exec. Order
No. 10247, 3 C.F.R. 754 (1953). On December 3, 1966, the President increased
the authorized maximum punishment for misbehavior of sentinels in combat
zones, namely Vietnam. Exec. Order No. 11317, 3 C.F.R. 170 (1966). The table
established under the MANUAL, 1920, was also subject to suspensions during World
War II. See MANUAL, IT 127c (1951), at 217 n.1. For a discussion of a case involv-
ing the "time of war" exception in the statute of limitations and related issues con-
cerning the table of maximum punishments see Note, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 483
(1968).
179 10 U.S.C. § 830 (1964) (art. 30 of the UCMJ).
180 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-24 (1964) (arts. 22-24 of the UCMJ).
181 10 U.S.C. §§ 832, 843 (1964) (arts. 32, 43 of the UCMJ).
182 Statement of Arthur E. Farmer, supra note 167, at 3.
183 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
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The UCMJ made no provision for release or bail from pretrial con-
finement, although a commander could release a man pending trial if he
so desired. In an attempt to encourage speedy trials, it was provided that
a commanding officer would have to forward charges to the officer ex-
ercising general court-martial jurisdiction within eight days after an ac-
cused had been ordered into arrest or confinement "if practicable," and
if not, reasons would have to be given in writing.184 However, there were
no express time limitations on the convening authority regarding the
referral of charges to a court-martial and the commencement of the trial.
3. Role of the Commander-The UCMJ, although placing some ad-
ditional limitations on the commander, left him essentially in control of
court-martial machinery. The commander would still determine whether
to prosecute and, although he would be required in general courts-martial
to consider the recommendations of an investigating officer and his staff
judge advocate, he would not be required to follow such recommenda-
tions. He would still have the power to appoint (either by himself or
through his subordinates) the investigating officer, the members of the
court, both counsel, the law officer (or president in a special court-
martial), and the court personnel. Finally, he retained the power to
review the conviction and sentence, a practice which had been scored
by reformers as the principal reason for unduly severe court-martial
sentences.18 5
Provisions were added, however, which were intended to prevent the
commander from influencing the trial improperly. A commander would
be disqualified from appointing a special or general court-martial if he
had a "personal interest" in the case, a limitation which was later strict-
ly applied to cases where the commander had some monetary interest
or personal contact with the case, but which was not applied to the usual
case where the commander's contacts had been in an official capacity.186
The UCMJ also disqualified the commander from being "the accuser"
who preferred the charges.18 7 This technicality, however, could easily be
avoided, as described by George A. Spiegelberg in a 1949 American Bar
Association Journal article:
The fact is that when the convening authority desires to make an
example of an officer or an enlisted man, the practice is for him to direct
an officer in his command to prefer the charges. The result in such in-
stances is that the convening authority, although in reality the accuser,
184 10 U.S.C. § 833 (1964) (art. 33 of the UCMJ).
185 See, e.g., text accompanying note 151 supra.
186 United States v. Noonan, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 297, 15 C.M.R. 297 (1954); United
States v. Teel, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 39, 15 C.M.R. 39 (1954); United States v. Keith, 3
U.S.C.M.A. 48, 11 C.M.R. 48 (1953); United States v. Marsh, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 48,
11 C.M.R. 48 (1953); United States v. Gordon, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 255, 2 C.M.R. 161
(1952).
187 10 U.S.C. §§ 822(b), 823(b) (1964) (arts. 22(b), 23(b), of the UCMJ).
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retains the power to appoint the court because he is not the accuser of
the record.' 88
The most important provision, intended to prevent improper command
influence, was article 37. It prohibited the convening authority of any
court-martial, first, from censuring, reprimanding, or admonishing any
court member, law officer, or counsel with respect to the findings or
sentence; and second, from attempting to coerce or, by any unlawful
means, influence the action of a court-martial or any member thereof.
Violation of this provision would be a crime. Thus, overt command in-
fluence was forbidden, as described by Robinson 0. Everett:
Thus, a commanding officer is not allowed to express to court members
an opinion that the accused is guilty of a charge on which he is about
to be tried. Nor can he reprimand, "chew out," the court members for
having acquitted someone the commander thinks was guilty or for their
having given only a token sentence to one, who, in the commander's
eyes, deserved hanging. He cannot write the court members "skin letters"
telling them what poor jobs he thinks they have done in their court work
and that he proposes to make his low view of their efficiency a part of
their official military records, ultimately to be considered for promotion
purposes. 189
The reformers attacked these provisions as inadequate to prevent the
commander from influencing the court if he desired. The commander
would still be permitted to write efficiency reports on and rate court
members and other court personnel and to control their job assignments,
leaves, etc. It would be easy enough for him to indicate his feelings,
which tend to be known by most junior officers anyway, about types of
cases, sentences, and discipline. 190 Furthermore, he would be permitted
to hold general "informational" lectures which could be used to subtly
indicate his feelings about the conduct of courts-martial to his officers. 1 '
Arthur Farmer summed up the doubts of the reformers over the efficacy
of article 37 in preventing command influence:
The provisions of Article 37 which prohibit the censure of the court and
counsel and any attempt to coerce the court's actions, will be valueless in
a situation where the commanding general desires to circumvent them.
It is naive to suppose that it will be necessary for the commanding general
to use such direct means of influencing the court that they could form
the basis for prosecution under Article 37. And no one who served in
any branch of the armed forces would under-estimate the difficulty of ob-
taining an accuser of the commanding general, or a trial of the charges if
188 Spiegelberg, Reform of Courts Martial: A Reply to Colonel Archibald King,
35 A.B.A.J. 29 (1949).
189 EVERETT, supra note 126, at 12.
10 0 See Keeffe, JAG Justice in Korea, 6 CATI. U.L. REV. 1, 16-18 (1957).
191 United States v. Albert, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 111, 36 C.M.R. 267 (1966); United
States v. Davis, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 576, 31 C.M.R. 162 (1961); United States v. Litt-
rice, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 13 C.M.R. 43 (1953).
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an accuser could be found. The only method of making effective the pro-
hibitions of Article 37 is to remove from commanders the power to in-
fluence the court.19 2
4. Membership and Selection of the Court-The UCMJ provided
for the first time in the history of American military law that enlisted
men could serve on courts-martial. Upon request, an accused enlisted
man would be entitled to be tried by a court made up of one-third en-
listed men.193 However, the convening authority still had the power to
appoint those enlisted men whom he believed were "best qualified for
the duty by reason of age, education, training, experience, length of
service, and judicial temperament." 194 "Since non-commissioned officers
are enlisted personnel," wrote Professor Morgan later, "they may be
selected for the trial of privates. And it seems to be the practice for the
appointing authority always to select them. Reported experience shows
this provision has not worked to the benefit of the soldier." 195 Not only
has it not worked to the benefit of the soldier; it has hardly worked at
all. High ranking noncommissioned officers have invariably been select-
ed by commanders when there was a request for enlisted men, and since
noncommissioned officers are considered more severe than officers, en-
listed men have rarely exercised the right to have other enlisted men on
their court.19 6
The right to be tried by a jury made up, at least in part, of an enlisted
man's peers has been one of the cherished objectives of reformers for
50 years. General Ansell's proposal that three-eighths of the court
must be of the same rank as the accused (plus his proposal that a three-
quarters vote be required for conviction rather than the two-thirds which
was retained by the UCMJ) would have provided a genuine right to a
jury made up in part of an enlisted man's peers. Some of the rhetoric
praising the UCMJ gave the impression that it provided a genuine ex-
tension of the right to trial by one's peers. However, it was clear from
the very beginning, that the provision for one-third enlisted men was a
hollow right. As expressed by Congressman Paul J. Kilday, later a Court
of Military Appeals judge, during the debate on the Elston Act:
Of course, the enlisted men will now have the right to have [enlisted]
members sit on their courts. I believe our report states that we doubt
whether that will be resorted to very frequently. I believe it will be de-
veloped as time goes on that it was something that was desired in the
192Statement of Arthur E. Farmer, supra note 167, at 2.
193 10 U.S.C. § 825(c)(1) (Supp. IV, 1968) (art. 25(c)(1) of the UCMJ).
194 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (Supp. IV, 1968) (art. 25(d)(2) of the UCMJ).
195 Morgan, supra note 58, at 25.
196 Hearings on H.R. 2575 Before Subcomm. No. 11 of the House Comm. on
Armed Services, 80th Cong.. 1st Sess. 19 (1947).
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abstract more than something that would be desired when an enlisted man
is facing trial before a court martial. 197
In 1964 the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Crawford,108
approved the practice of selecting only senior noncommissioned officers
as court members, and rejected the argument that statutory intent and
constitutional standards were thereby frustrated. The court did add that
the convening authority may not deliberately exclude any group of qual-
ified jurors on "irrelevant, irrational, or prohibited grounds." 100 Thus,
under the UCMJ the right to a court composed of at least one-third en-
listed men still remains in practice only a right to a court composed of
one-third noncommissioned officers selected by the commander, and
there are virtually no limitations on the convening authority's method of
selection of both enlisted men and officers for court-martial.
5. Judicial Functions-The UCMJ provided that every general
court-martial would have a law officer appointed by the convening au-
thority (usually from the office of his staff judge advocate) who would
not be a member of the court200 (law officers would not be provided in
special courts where the president, who was not required to be a lawyer,
would carry out those functions). The law officer would have to be a
member of the bar or highest court of a state and certified as legally
qualified by the Judge Advocate General. He would instruct the court
as to the elements of the offense, the presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proof, and would rule on interlocutory questions of law. How-
ever, the members of the court would continue to determine, by secret
vote, challenges for cause against a member, and if any member objected
to the law officer's rulings on a motion for finding of not guilty or on a
question of accused's sanity, the court would make the determination.
The senior officer, called the president, would continue to preside at the
trial and carry out many administrative and judicial functions. For ex-
ample, he would set the time and place of trial and uniform to be worn,
conduct the trial and preserve order, administer oaths to counsel, recess
or adjourn the court,20' preside over closed sessions, speak for the court
in announcing findings and sentence and in conferring with the law offi-
cer. Likewise, the prosecutor, called the trial counsel, would continue to
perform administrative duties, such as notifying court members and per-
sonnel as to the date, time, and place of trial, preparing the court room
for trial, insuring that members and personnel were properly cared for,
opening the trial and administering certain oaths.
Reformers objected that the law officer, although he would perform
197 94 CONG. REC. 161 (1947) (remarks of Congressman Kilday).
198 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 35 C.M.R. 3 (1964).
199 15 U.S.C.M.A. at 40, 35 C.M.R. at 12 (1964).
200 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1964) (art. 26 of the UCMJ).
201 MANUAL fs 40 (1951).
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many judicial functions, was not equivalent to a civilian judge, and that
his independence was in question since he would be subject to the com-
mand of the convening authority. Professor Mullally, writing after the
Code took effect, objected that "[t]he law officer of the general court,
while he is entrusted with the conduct of the trial and given the authority
to make final rulings, is generally an officer on duty with the staff judge
advocate of the convening authority. As such, he is inevitably subject to
the pressures of command control." 202
6. Defense Counsel-A significant reform of the UCMJ was the
grant to an accused of the right to be represented by a lawyer. The con-
vening authority would appoint as defense counsel a military lawyer cer-
tified by the Judge Advocate General as legally qualified (again usually
from the office of his staff judge advocate) .23 The accused in a special
court-martial could be represented by his own civilian lawyer (as could
an accused in a general court) ,2" or by a military lawyer of his own
selection "if reasonably available" 205 or, if he did not hire a lawyer and
a requested military lawyer was not provided, by a nonlawyer officer
who would serve as defense counsel. In practice, few of those accused
have requested military lawyers, and when they have, lawyers have
usually been refused as not reasonably available..
2 1
7. Nature of the Trial-UCMJ provisions requiring the law officer
and counsel to be lawyers, and guaranteeing such due process rights as
the right against self-incrimination, contributed to a more judicial pro-
ceeding in the general court-martial. The 1951 Manual also adopted
more of the trappings of civilian court procedure. However, the basic
court-martial format retained certain distinctively military overtones. The
prosecutor trial counsel still carried out administrative functions for the
court, and the trial was conducted not by the law officer but by the presi-
dent.20- The court itself still voted on a number of questions normally
determined by a judge.
Special courts-martial, which were generally administered without
lawyers, did not usually measure up to the judicial standards followed in
202 Mullally, Military Justice: The Uniform Code in Action, 53 COLUm. L. REV.
1, 5 (1953).
203 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964) (art. 27 of the UCMJ).
20410 U.S.C. § 838(b) (1964) (art. 38(b) of the UCMJ).
205 Id.
200The Army testified in 1966 that "requests for appointment of legally qualified
counsel at a special court martial are rarely granted in the Army because these
counsel are in fact not often reasonably available from their required duties." Joint
Hearings on S. 745-62, S. 2906-7 Before the Subcomn. or Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 912 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Joint Hearings].
207 See, e.g., Dep't of the Army Pamphlet No. 27-15, Military Justice Handbook:
Trial Guide for the Special Court-Martial President, September 1962.
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general courts. Although the Manual and service regulations attempted
to provide guidelines and even a script for the nonlawyer participants,
the result was often less than judicial. As described by this author else-
where:
The actual special court-martial trial runs according to the script in the
back of the Manual. The script is helpful to the nonlawyer participants
in insuring that they do not forget any of the necessary elements of the
trial, but it has the disadvantage of formalizing what should be an ad-
versary proceeding into a static ritual. Thus, it is not uncommon for a
special court martial to be reduced to a recitation from the script, the
president and counsel reading back and forth to each other, garbling the
unfamiliar legal terms, mistakenly reading beyond their appropriate sec-
tions and missing the cues for raising objections and defenses.2 08
The summary court-martial which was conducted by a single officer act-
ing as judge, jury, and counsel did not attempt to follow a judicial format,
except for the purposes of orderly presentation, and since its maximum
penalty was limited (one month's confinement plus demotion and fines),
it will not be considered to any extent in this article.2 9
8. Post-Trial Proceedings-General Ansell's desire for civilian re-
view of courts-martial was finally met by the UCMJ's provision for the
United States Court of Military Appeals composed of three civilians ap-
pointed by the President to fifteen year terms.210 The Court of Military
Appeals would stand at the top of a hierarchy of three types of reviews,
first, administrative reviews by commanders and legal officers, second,
appeal to a board of review, and third, appeal to the Court of Military
Appeals.
The lowest type of review would still be performed by the convening
authority, called the reviewing authority for this purpose. He would be
required to refer the record of general courts-martial to his staff judge
advocate or legal officer for a written opinion, but he would not be bound
by the opinion. He would then approve those findings and the sentence
which he had found "correct in law and fact and as he in his discretion
determines should be approved" with the power to remit or reduce, but
not to increase, any sentence. 21' As for special courts-martial, he would
make his decision without an opinion from his staff judge advocate. If
the sentence did not include a bad conduct discharge, it would also have
to be reviewed by a judge advocate officer (usually in the office of the
commander's staff judge advocate), but there would be no further right
to review or appeal. If the sentence did include a bad conduct discharge,
208 Sherman, The Right to Competent Counsel in Special Courts Martial, 54
A.B.A.J. 866, 869 (1968).
209 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964) (art. 20 of the UCMJ).
210 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964) (art. 67 of the UCMJ).
211 10 U.S.C. § 864 (1964) (art. 64 of the UCMJ).
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there would be a further review by the officer exercising general court-
martial jurisdiction.
The principal objection of the reformers to the continuation of the
commander's power to review findings and sentences was that it would
still encourage the courts to give the maximum sentence so that the com-
mander would have the option of reducing it. Thus, court members would
still be encouraged not to perform their duty of assessing a reasonable
and fair sentence. The Vanderbilt committee had criticized this practice:
The Committee is convinced that in many instances the commanding
officer who selects the members of the court made a deliberate attempt
to influence their decisions . . . . Not infrequently the members of the
court were given to understand that in case of a conviction, they should
impose the maximum sentence provided in the statute, so that the general
who had no power to increase a sentence might fix it to suit his own
ideas.2 1
Reformers also questioned the impartiality of reviews and opinions
rendered by the commander's staff judge advocate. Since the staff judge
advocate would still act as the commander's lawyer in advising him as
to court-martial cases, they questioned the independence and disinterest-
edness of his review. "To all intents and purposes," objected Professor
Keeffe, "there is no difference between the judge advocate general and
a district attorney in civilian life." 213
The next level of review would be conducted by boards of review. The
Judge Advocate General of each service was directed to constitute boards
of review in his office, each composed of three military or civilian
lawyers.2 14 Since 1920 the Army had boards of review within the office
of the Judge Advocate General, but boards would be new for the Navy.
All cases would be reviewed by a board where the sentence approved
by the convening authority affected a general or flag officer, or extended
to death, dismissal, dishonorable or bad conduct discharge, or confine-
ment of a year or more. The board would consider the whole record, and
could weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and deter-
mine controverted questions of fact. It would affirm only those findings
and sentences which it found correct in law and fact, and could set aside
findings or sentence, order a rehearing or, where it found the evidence
insufficient, order the charges dismissed. Its determination would be final
and binding on the Judge Advocate General who would not have the
power, as under the previous law, to disagree and send the case on to the
President.
2 1 2 
REPORT OF WAR DEP'T ADvISORY COMM. ON MILrTARY JusTICE TO THE SEC-
RETARY OF WAR 61 (1946).
213 Statement of Professor Keeffe, supra note 129, at 13. See also Keeffe, supra
note 190, at 18-19.
214 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964) (arL 66 of the UCMJ).
MAINE LAW REVIEW
Reformers were not entirely satisfied with the boards. The members
would have no tenure and would be subject to rating and job assign-
ments by the Judge Advocate General. If the Judge Advocate General
should not like the way a particular member was voting, he could remove
him from the board assignment. Professor Keeffe objected that "like the
trial court, under the domination of the convening authority, the boards
of review will be under the domination of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral." 215 Reformers also objected that the boards would continue to re-
semble administrative bodies more than appellate courts, and that their
subservient position under the Judge Advocate General would not be
consistent with civilian standards for independent appellate courts.210
The highest review available would be to the Court of Military Ap-
peals. The court would be required to review all cases in which the sen-
tence affirmed by a board affected a general or flag officer or involved
the death penalty and all cases reviewed by a board which the Judge Ad-
vocate General decided to forward for review.217 Any other case would
be reviewed only if the accused petitioned for review and the court de-
cided to grant review. Reformers were unhappy with the limitations
placed on the availability of review. Professor Keeffe observed that one
could be assured of review by the Court of Military Appeals only if he
were a general or admiral or had been sentenced to death, unlike the pro-
visions of the Chamberlain bill that "the case of every man was reviewed
automatically before a court of judges appointed by the President." 218
He was also skeptical of the provision which permitted the Judge Advo-
cate General, but not the accused, to obtain review:
The Judge Advocate General is not, and by the nature of his office and
appointment, cannot be an impartial judicial officer. He is in as incon-
sistent a position as a commanding officer or convening authority. He is
to enforce discipline and he is to give defense. It is for this reason that the
English in their reforms have provided that the Judge Advocate General
be a civilian appointed on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor
and be responsible to him. Significantly, in order to reduce this conflict
the English have removed the Judge Advocate General from the control
of the Secretaries for State and Air.21 9
Limitations were also placed on the scope of review of the Court of
Military Appeals. The court would be limited to acting on appeals from
215 Statement of Professor Keeffe, supra note 129, at 9. See also Keeffe, supra
note 190, at 20-21.216See, e.g., ACM 20016, Dunn, 38 C.M.R. 917 (1968) in which an Army
board of review disclaimed power in military tribunals to review administrative de-
terminations as to a discharge on grounds of conscientious objection.
217 10 U.S.C. § 867(b) (1964) (art. 67(b) of the UCMJ).
218 Statement of Professor Keeffe, supra note 129, at 9. See also Keeffe, supra
note 190, at 21-25.
219 Statement of Professor Keeffe, supra note 129, at 13. See also Keeffe, supra
note 190, at 18-20.
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court-martial convictions, and therefore would lack the traditional writ
powers of appellate courts, a limitation which only recently has been re-
jected by the court.220 The court also would be limited to reviewing ques-
tions of law, a result of a compromise by the drafters. Some reformers
had opposed establishing an appellate court within the military system,
urging instead that federal courts should be empowered to review court-
martial determinations.221 Others urged that an appellate court staffed
by civilians should review a wider category of cases both as to questions
of law and fact.' In opposition to these views, the military argued that
civilian review of any kind was a threat to military order as civilians
would lack the background necessary for understanding disciplinary
matters and undercut the authority of the commander "3 As a compro-
mise, the drafters established the civilian Court of Military Appeals but
limited its review to questions of law in the belief that the court should
not overrule a court-martial's determinations of factual questions or chal-
lenge convictions on the evidence. However, the Court of Military Ap-
peals, by judicial decision, has placed a wide variety of fact questions in
the category of questions of law, so that, in effect, its scope of review is
no longer limited to questions of law.2-- The UCMJ also provided for
the appointment of legally qualified counsel to represent the accused,
upon request, before boards or the Court of Military Appeals.-- No pro-
vision was made for post-conviction release or bail pending appeal.
V. THE MOVEMENT FOR CIVILIANIZATION SINCE
THE UCMJ AND THE PASSAGE OF THE
1968 MILITARY JUSTICE ACT
The UCMJ took effect on May 31, 1951, during the Korean War.
The military warnings of manpower difficulties in providing lawyers in
all general courts-martial, and breakdowns of discipline due to the new
220 United States v. Bevilacqua, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 10, 39 C.M.R. 10 (1968); Jones
v. Ignatius, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 7, 39 C.M.R. 7 (1968); Gale v. United States, 17
U.S.C.M.A. 40, 37 C.M.R. 304 (1967); United States v. Frischholz, 16 U.S.C.M.A.
150, 36 C.M.R. 306 (1966).
221 See Letter from Senator Patrick McCarran, Joint Hearings on S. 857 and H-R.
4080 Before a Subcomm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1949).
See also Goulet. supra note 153, at 112.
'See Goulet, supra note 153, at 112.
2MId.
2 24United States v. O'Neal, I U.S.C.M.A. 138, 2 C.M.R. 44 (1952). See gener-
ally Goulet, supra note 153.
= 10 U.S.C. § 870 (1964) (art. 70 of the UCMJ).
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availability of review by a civilian court did not materialize. The tran-
sition into lawyer-conducted general courts was smooth, and there was
no noticeable adverse effect upon military discipline or effectiveness.
Perhaps the most revolutionary provision of the UCMJ turned out to
be the creation of the Court of Military Appeals. The court quickly indi-
cated that it intended to act like an independent appellate court and that,
as the supreme court of the military, it was the highest authority as to
interpretation and application of the UCMJ. It considered itself bound
by the standards of due process provided in the UCMJ and originally
took the position that courts-martial were not subject to constitutional
limitations. In an early case, United States v. Clay,26 it coined the term
"military due process" to describe those due process rights, derived not
from the Bill of Rights but from Congress in its enactments concerning
the military, which were considered requisite to fundamental fairness in
a court-martial. However, this attempt to avoid direct application of the
Constitution to military trials was not satisfactory, particularly after the
Supreme Court's 1953 decision in Burns v. Wilson22 7 upholding the right
of federal courts on habeas corpus to consider denials of constitutional
rights which the military had manifestly refused to consider. In 1960 in
United States v. Jacoby, the Court of Military Appeals stated that "the
protections in the Bill of Rights, except those which are expressly or by
necessary implication inapplicable, are available to members of our
armed forces." 2 The list of those rights which have been found to be
applicable to the military has grown steadily from decisions of the Court
of Military Appeals over the last 18 years, so that most procedural due
process rights which are constitutionally required in civilian courts have
now been applied to courts-martial.229
An important by-product of the creation of the Court of Military
Appeals has been the development, for the first time, of a judicial process
in military criminal law. The only available appeals from court-martial
convictions prior to the Court of Military Appeals were appeals to mili-
226 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951).
227346 U.S. 137 (1953).
228 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960).
229 The Court of Military Appeals has extended to servicemen such due process
rights as the right to a speedy trial, United States v. Schalck, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 371,
34 C.M.R. 151 (1964); right to confront witnesses, United States v. Jacoby, I1
U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960); right of protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, United States v. Vierra, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 33 C.M.R. 260
(1963); United States v. Nowling, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 100, 25 C.M.R. 362 (1958);
privilege against self-incrimination, United States v. Kemp, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 89,
32 C.M.R. 89 (1962); right to a public trial, United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.M.A.
251, 22 C.M.R. 41 (1956); right to compulsory process, United States v. Sweeney,
14 U.S.C.M.A. 599, 34 C.M.R. 379 (1964); and the right to preinterrogation warn-
ings, United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). See
generally Quinn, supra note 15.
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tary officers, and in certain limited cases, to boards of review, to the
Judge Advocate General, to the Secretary of the particular service, or
to the President for clemency. Some of the opinions and rulings were
published, but since they were of questionable precedential value and
courts-martial were generally administered by nonlawyers, they never
had the effect of a body of case law. Since 1951, the decisions of the
Court of Military Appeals, supplemented by the boards of review, have
created a body of military "common law" interpreting and applying the
statutory commands of the UCMJ and increasingly accepting civilian
constitutional law standards. The expansion of habeas corpus and other
extraordinary relief by federal courts to servicemen claiming that their
constitutional rights have been violated by the military has provided an
added impetus for the Court of Military Appeals to provide relief for
servicemen against wrongful and arbitrary military actions.2 3 0 Thus, the
court has recently proclaimed that it possesses the all writs power, al-
though it has yet to provide meaningful relief thereunder.23 ' The Court
of Military Appeals has felt its way carefully and, due to its small mem-
bership, the attitudes of individual judges have particularly affected its
willingness to expand due process rights and grant relief. It still provides
only a limited remedy for servicemen, but it has accomplished more
reform in the field of procedural due process than all the prior con-
gressional military codes put together.
The UCMJ established a committee, composed of the Judge Advocate
Generals of the services and the judges of the Court of Military Appeals,
which was required to make annual reports to Congress concerning the
workability of the UCMJ and suggested amendments. The committee
has never shown much interest in considering changes in the basic struc-
ture of the court-martial as provided by the UCMJ, such as removal of
command control of courts-martial or broadening of the personnel for
courts. However, it has recommended increasing the judicial features
and, therefore, reducing the disciplinary features of the court-martial. In
1953 it proposed 17 changes in the UCMJ, including an expanded role
for the law officer, and more judicial aspects. 2 - These proposals were
worked over by various congressional committees in the 1950's and
1960's and served as the basis for the reforms which were finally passed
in the Military Justice Act of 1968.
230 See Sherman, supra note 16, at 526-40; Comment, God, the Army, and
Judicial Review, supra note 16; Katz & Nelson, The Need for Clarification in Mili-
tary Habeas Corpus, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 193 (1966); Quinn, supra note 15.
231 See note 222 supra. For survey of the court's action on suits seeking extra-
ordinary relief see Sherman, supra note 16, at 532 n.228.
232 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS & THE JUDGE
ADvoCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES & THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION PURSUANT TO THE UCMJ, 3-11 (June 1, 1952-Dec. 31,
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By the late 1950's, when the passage of time had allowed evaluation
of the UCMJ, criticism of military justice began to increase again. In
1959, the American Legion proposed a bill which addressed itself par-
ticularly to the problem of command influence.233 It indicated that the
UCMJ compromise had not removed the pall of improper command
influence over courts-martial and that the only way to achieve this end
was to reduce significantly the commander's control over court-martial
operations. It proposed that lawyers be required in inferior courts as
well as in general courts and be placed under the rating authority and
command of the Judge Advocate General rather than the commander;
that law officers be granted the status of judge; that boards of review be
taken from the control of the Judge Advocate General and put under
the civilian Secretary of Defense; that the Court of Military Appeals be
authorized to prescribe rules of procedure for courts-martial so that
needed changes could be made without having to go to Congress; and
that jurisdiction over civilian-type felonies in time of peace be removed
from courts-martial. The military reacted unfavorably to these proposals,
saying they proposed "sweeping changes to correct a relatively minor
evil," 2-4 and the bill languished in Congress.
The next piece of legislation was proposed by an official committee,
called the Powell committee, appointed by the Secretary of the Army in
1959 to study problems of order and discipline in the Army. 5 The com-
mittee, composed of one lieutenant general, six major generals, and two
brigadier generals, offered a number of changes, indicating a distinctly
disciplinarian philosophy and a predisposition for "decentralization" of
military justice to lower command levels. Command influence, it sug-
gested, was only objectionable if it was "wrongful," and the UCMJ and
subsequent Court of Military Appeals decisions, far from permitting too
much command influence, were reaching the point of allowing too
little:
Even some of our senior commanders have formed the opinion that rules
against illegal command influence prevent proper training, particularly
of the officers of their command. The danger of this belief is that it can
lead to failure on the part of a commander to carry out his responsibilities
to develop the highest possible standards of conduct among officers and
enlisted men. It can lead to a feeling that disciplinary matters are purely
a judicial problem rather than a command problem.
A program should be begun at once to counteract the confusion and
frustration that is becoming evident. This program should emphasize the
1953). See also Mott, An Appraisal of Proposed Changes in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 35 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 300, 301 (1961).
3 H.R. 3455, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
24 Mott, supra note 232, at 302.
235 COMM. ON THE UCMJ, GOOD ORDER AND DIscIPLINE IN THE ARMY (1960)
(report to W. M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army).
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importance and value of command influence of the right type. It should
emphasize the responsibility of command for the proper handling of dis-
ciplinary problems and clear up in the mind of commanders any idea
that the courts have condemned this kind of command activity.2 30
The committee recommended: (1) expansion of a commander's non-
judicial punishment powers so that he could impose ninety days cor-
rectional custody (usually stockade confinement) and a one-half pay
forfeiture without court-martial; (2) abolition of all courts but general
courts, and the streamlining of certain court procedures; (3) removal
of the convening authority's power to act on findings; (4) removal of
the boards of review's power to act on sentences; (5) an increase in the
number of Court of Military Appeals judges to five; and (6) creation of
a "sentence control board" for review. Although the committee's phi-
losophy was weighted in favor of command control and, as such, repre-
sented an undesirable regression, its proposals for expanding nonju-
dicial punishment were not necessarily opposed to those of reformers.
Reformers generally admitted the need for a commander to maintain
discipline through the use of minor punishments which could be dis-
pensed without the necessity of a formal court-martial under article
15.3 7 Most reformers would have objected to giving the commander
power to apply sentences as high as 90 days without a court-martial
and, in fact, when this proposal of the Powell committee was passed as
an amendment to the UCMJ in 1962, nonjudicial punishment authority
was extended to only 30 days correctional custody plus forfeiture of
one-half pay for two months and demotion.?3 However, this increase
in a commander's nonjudicial punishment power has established a use-
ful line which might now be drawn between "discipline" where judicial
procedures need not be followed and "court-martial" where they should
be followed. Some of the other Powell committee proposals, such as
streamlining court-martial proceedings by permitting trial by a law of-
ficer alone, if requested, were incorporated into the Military Justice Act
of 1968.
A third proposal for legislation was contained in the report of the
Special Committee on Military Justice of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York in 1961.23 It agreed with many of the sentiments
expressed by the American Legion bill but suggested that the basic
court-martial structure need not be altered. It proposed that the role of
law officers be increased so that they more closely resembled civilian
36 id. at 13.
237 See Sherman, Military Injustice. 73 CASE & CoM., July-August 1968. at 40,
42-43.
238 For a discussion of the effect of the amendment see Miller, .4 Long Look at
Article 15, 28 MrL. L. REV. 37 (1965).
2aSee Mott, supra note 232, at 304-05.
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judges; that the special court-martial not be empowered to adjudge a
bad conduct discharge; that trial be permitted, on request, by a single
officer-lawyer in a special court-martial; and that summary courts-
martial be abolished.
These three proposals, the 17 changes recommended by the UCMJ
committee, and the many suggestions which had been made to Con-
gressmen and Senators were worked over by congressional committees
in the late 1950's and 1960's. Hearings were held by the Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
headed by Senator Sam J. Ervin (D. N.C.) in 1962 and 1965.240 How-
ever, there was no significant support in Congress for broad reforms
which would alter the basic UCMJ court-martial structure, and most
of those asked to testify were interested only in such limited reforms as
the UCMJ committee's 17 proposed changes. The reform movement
had never really recovered from its defeat on the UCMJ and, at least
in the peaceful late 1950's and early 1960's, there was little public
interest in court-martial reform. Thus, the American Legion bill and
such broad proposals for civilianization of court-martial juries as had
been accomplished by recent English reforms were never seriously con-
sidered.2 1 The bill which finally passed Congress, known as the Military
Justice Act of 1968, left out the provisions for reform of administrative
discharge procedures and made no basic changes in court-martial struc-
ture, but embodied many of the proposals of the UCMJ committee, the
Powell committee, and the Bar of the City of New York committee. The
Act, which took effect on August 1, 1969,242 contained changes affecting
three of the categories under which prior laws have already been dis-
cussed-judicial functions, defense counsel, and post-trial proceedings,
and made minor changes as regards the role of the commander.
1. Judicial Functions-The Act replaced the law officer with a mili-
tary judge who is given a number of new duties and powers making him
more comparable to a civilian judge. First, he has the power to try the
case by himself if "before the court is assembled the accused, knowing the
identity of the military judge and after consultation with defense counsel,
requests in writing a court composed only of a military judge and the
military judge approves .. .. " 243 Trial may be by a military judge
alone in both general and special courts-martial (the convening authority
may detail a judge to a special court if he feels the legal issues are particu-
240 Hearings on the Rights of Military Personnel Before the Subcomm. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963) (a summary report); Joint Hearings, supra note 206.
241 Note 159 supra.
242 Pub. L. No. 90-632 (Oct. 24, 1968).
243 10 U.S.C. § 816(1)(b) (1964) (art. 16(l)(b) of the UCMJ).
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larly complicated). The report of the Senate Committee on Armed Serv-
ices estimated that "the vast majority of the cases in which an accused
pleads guilty would probably be tried by a military judge alone." "I It
also appears likely that many servicemen pleading not guilty, particularly
in cases such as AWOL where their defenses may be weak, will desire to
submit their cases to a single judge rather than to a court of officers
who may be less understanding and harsher in sentencing. Servicemen
in cases involving complicated legal issues may also feel it to their ad-
vantage to submit their cases to a trial by a single judge. Trial by a mili-
tary judge alone is made more attractive due to the fact that, in a high
percentage of cases, court-martial members are chosen by the com-
mander from officers who, as a class, tend to view a court-martial in the
context of the overall disciplinary needs of the unit. Until Congress is
willing to extend to servicemen some right to trial by jury of peers chosen
on some kind of random basis, it may be that in many cases an accused
will be wiser to request court-martial by a military judge alone.
The act transferred to the military judge a number of functions which,
under the UCMJ, were performed by the court. The military judge may
now call the court into session without the attendance of the members
for the purpose of disposing of interlocutory motions raising defenses
and objections, ruling on pertinent legal matters, and arraigning the
accused and receiving his plea.2 45 He, rather than the court, determines
the relevancy and validity of challenges for cause against court members,
removing the undesirable practice of having the court (minus the chal-
lenged member) vote on challenges to its members. The military judge's
rulings on all questions of law and all interlocutory questions, other than
the factual issues of the accused's mental responsibility, are final. The
rulings of the president of a special court-martial without a military
judge upon any question of law, other than a motion for a finding of not
guilty, are also final.2 6
Another provision of the Act contributing to the independence of
military judges is the requirement that the Judge Advocate General of
each service establish a field judiciary from which military judges will
be assigned for court-martial cases.2 47 The significance of this provision
is that military judges are appointed from a field judiciary under the
command of the Judge Advocate General rather than from the com-
mander's staff judge advocate office, and so they are not subject to
rating, assignment or other controls by the commander convening au-
thority. The Army and Navy already had established field judiciaries by
24 4 INCREASING THE PARTICIPATION OF LAw OFFICERS AND COUNSEL ON COURTS-
MARTIAL, S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968).
245 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (1964) (art. 39(a) of the UCMJ).
246 10 U.S.C. § 851(b) (1964) (art. 51(b) of the UCMJ).
27 10 U.S.C. § 826(c) (1964) (art. 26(c) of the UCMJ).
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regulation,245 but this provision insures that military judges of all services
will be drawn from a field judiciary for all courts-martial. Thus, the Act
has approximated the objective of General Ansell in making the presiding
judge independent of the convening authority. Of course, military judges
will still be subject to the command control of the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral.
2. Defense Counsel-The UCMJ did not require that special court-
martial counsel be lawyers, and although the Air Force voluntarily pro-
vided lawyers in all special courts, the Army and Navy did not.249 The
Military Justice Act of 1968 provided that the accused "shall be afforded
the opportunity to be represented at the trial" of special courts-martial
by a lawyer "unless counsel having such qualifications cannot be ob-
tained on account of physical conditions or military exigencies." 250 If a
lawyer cannot be obtained, the convening authority must make "a de-
tailed written statement, to be appended to the record, stating why coun-
sel with such qualifications could not be obtained." 251 The Act also pro-
vided that a bad conduct discharge may not be adjudged unless a com-
plete record of the proceedings and testimony has been made, lawyer
counsel has been detailed to represent the accused, and a military judge
has been detailed to the trial (except in a case in which the military
judge could not be detailed to the trial because of physical conditions or
military exigencies) .252
3. Post-Trial Proceedings-In keeping with the attempt to upgrade
the status of the law officer by calling him a judge and giving him addi-
tional judicial powers, the Act also changed the name of the boards of re-
view to courts of military review and called the members judges. 25 The
courts of military review are still constituted under the Judge Advocate
Generals of each service, but there is a chief justice who divides the judges
248 See Wiener, The Army's Field Judiciary System: A Notable Advance, 46
A.B.A.J. 1178 (1960); Joint Hearings, supra note 208, at 908-11, 935-36.
249Joint Hearings, supra note 208, at 916-18, 940-43, 965-66. However, Army
special courts cannot adjudge bad conduct discharges since article 19 of the UCMJ
requires a verbatim transcript for such a discharge, and Army regulations provide
that reporters will not be used in special courts without authority from the Secre-
tary of the Army. Army Reg. 27-145.
250 A similar exception under article 38(b) of the UCMJ which provides that an
accused's choice of counsel must be provided only if "reasonably available" has
been subject to abuse. A Senate subcommittee concluded that "few commanders
could fail to justify the unavailability of a lawyer to aid the accused if the com-
mander did not wish to provide him with legally trained counsel." Hearings on the
Rights of Military Personnel Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1963) (a summary re-
port).
251 10 U.S.C. § 827(c) (1964) (art. 27(c) of the UCMJ).
252 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964) (art. 19 of the UCMJ).
253 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964) (art. 66 of the UCMJ).
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into panels of not less than three and appoints a senior judge to preside.
The court may sit en banc or in panels. The fact that there is only one
court with a number of panels rather than a number of separate boards
as under the original UCMJ, should provide for more consistency and,
hopefully, a higher quality of legal decision. However, it is doubtful that
these provisions are going to make the courts of military review any more
independent than they were before the change of name. The members still
have no tenure and are subject to be transferred at any time. They are still
under the command of the Judge Advocate General and dependent upon
him for ratings and assignments. At least they are not subject to the con-
trol of the convening authority, but the many roles of the Judge Ad-
vocate General hardly make his office the ideal location for an inde-
pendent appellate court.
The Act also made some improvement in the availability of post-trial
review by the Judge Advocate General. The Judge Advocate General is
authorized in any court-martial case that has been finally reviewed to
vacate or modify the findings and sentence because of newly discovered
evidence, fraud on the court, lack of jurisdiction over the accused or
offense, or error prejudicial to the substantive rights of the accused. - '4
The last ground-error prejudicial to the substantive rights of the
accused-is important, for this means that, for the first time, a person
convicted in a special court-martial who did not receive a bad conduct
discharge (this type of case accounts for almost two-thirds of the total
military courts-martial) can obtain a review of prejudicial errors by
someone other than the convening authority and his staff judge advocate's
office. However, this is not a very satisfactory type of review. No stand-
ards are provided as to how the Judge Advocate General will conduct
it; the term "error prejudicial" is unclear; and it provides only another
administrative review rather than an appeal to an independent court.
However, at least a serviceman, who might have received six months
confinement plus forfeitures and demotion in a special court-martial, can
now seek review apart from the review of the commander who tried him
and the commander's lawyer. The Act also extended to all cases the
right to petition for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence
or fraud (not just those involving sentences of death, dismissal, punitive
discharge, or a year or more confinement as under the original UCMJ),
and the time within which the accused may petition was extended from
one to two years .55
Perhaps the most significant new due process right provided by the
Act was a provision for post-conviction release or bail pending appeal.
The military practice has been to require convicted servicemen to begin
25410 U.S.C. § 869 (1964) (arm 69 of the UCMJ).
255 10 U.S.C. § 873 (1964) (art. 73 of the UCMJ).
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serving their sentences immediately after conviction. 2 5 Thus, it is not
uncommon for servicemen to have served their entire sentence before
their appeal has been decided by a board of review and the Court of
Military Appeals. A reversal of conviction is slim consolation to one who
has already served his sentence. The Act gave the convening authority
or the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the
accused, if he has been moved, power to defer the serving of the sentence
until the appeals have been completed. 257 However, no standards were
provided to insure uniformity of application and preclude discrimination,
and the convening authority was given absolute discretion as to the
granting of a release pending appeal. It is hoped that regulations will es-
tablish definite guidelines which will guarantee a general right to release
pending appeal.
4. Role of the Commander-The issue of command control and in-
fluence which had dominated the debates over the UCMJ was, in effect,
ignored by the Military Justice Act of 1968. This was not because ex-
perience with the UCMJ had shown that unlawful command influence
was no longer a problem. Indeed, the most serious case of command in-
fluence in years arose in 1967 when the commanding general of Fort
Leonard Wood, Major General Thomas Lipscomb, was charged with at-
tempting to influence courts-martial, resulting in the reversal of almost
100 court-martial convictions and the adoption of a new procedure by
the Court of Military Appeals for raising complaints of command in-
fluence.258 However, throughout most of the 1950's and 1960's while the
Military Justice Act of 1968 was gestating, no one really knew one way
or the other about the extent of improper command influence and, since
it was a period of reduced conscription, there was little public outcry
against such influence. Therefore, the Act made only two minor changes
affecting the role of the commander, one of them urged by reformers and
one by the military. It provided that performance as a member of a
court-martial or defense counsel cannot be considered in the preparation
of an effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency report or in the report used in
2-56 Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969). The lower court granted a writ of
habeas corpus directing that petitioner, who had been convicted in a court-martial,
not be transferred to the disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth to begin serving
his sentence because such order violated article 71(c) of the UCMJ which provides
that no sentence of a punitive discharge or one year confinement may be exe-
cuted until affirmed by a board of review. The tenth circuit and the Supreme
Court reversed on grounds of failure to exhaust remedies and so did not reach the
merits.
257 10 U.S.C. § 871 (1964) (art. 71 of the UCMJ).
258 See United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967). See
also N.Y. Times, July 22, 1967, at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, June 25, 1968, at 3,
col. 3.
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determining promotion, retention, or assignment219 This added little to
the caveats already telling commanders not to attempt overtly to affect
court-martial decisions. The Act also provided that the prohibition
against attempting to influence the action of a court-martial would not
apply to general instructional or information courses in military justice .2-'
This provision was recommended by the Powell committee and sought
by the military in order to reverse a Court of Military Appeals de-
cision. 261 Unfortunately, no standards or limitations were provided re-
garding the type of courses and lectures which are permissible, and so
a broad area of potential command abuse has been opened up.
VI. CONCLUSION
Major military justice reform acts were passed in 1920, 1950, and
1968 in response to the demands for increased civilianization of military
justice. However, the basic court structure, the method of selection of
the court, the commander's control of the court machinery, the state-
ment of certain crimes, and the heavy reliance on administrative reviews
rather than judicial appeals have not been substantially altered. The
second portion of this article will consider what further civilianization of
military justice is desirable and will offer suggestions for accomplishing
such results by statutory changes and judicial development.
PART II
I. INTRODUCTION
The movement for reform of 17 years' duration which finally re-
sulted in the Military Justice Act of 1968 brought valuable changes and
additions to military justice. However, the Act did not affect the basic
structure of the court-martial system. When President Johnson signed the
Act, he stated: "We have always prided ourselves on giving our men and
women in uniform excellent medical service, superb training, the best
equipment. Now, with this, we're going to give them first-class legal
service as well." 262 To those who knew that the Act had made only a
few reforms of a relatively uncontroversial nature2- and had not ad-
259 10 U.S.C. § 837(b) (1964) (art. 37(b) of the UCMJ).
260 10 U.S.C. § 837(a) (1964) (art. 37(a) of the UCMJ).
261 S. REP. No. 1601, supra note 244, at 9.
262 N. Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1968, at 4. col. 1; 115 CONG. REC. 12,630 (daily ed.
Oct. 15, 1969) (remarks made at creation of the United States Navy Court of
Military Review, Washington, D. C., Aug. 1, 1969).
263The committee report stated:
The bill is not intended to be an overall revision of the court-martial
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dressed itself to the most highly criticized areas such as command con-
trol, court-martial structure, and administrative discharges, this state-
ment was passed off as no more than the usual political puffing attendant
to the passage of a legislative enactment. However, the military has not
been so quick to drop the hyperbole. Within months, articles began to
appear in legal magazines referring to the "sweeping reforms" of the
Military Justice Act of 1968 and concluding that the military justice
system had now achieved a state of virtual perfection.2 4
There has always been a tendency within the military to exalt the
virtues of the present military justice system and to discount the need
for reform. In 1919, when "drum head justice" was still a reality,
Colonel Howard Thayer Kingsbury wrote that "there is no occasion for
any drastic or revolutionary changes in the existing system of military
justice." 265 In 1943, when there was no right to review beyond the com-
mander for summary and special courts-martial and only to a further re-
view by the Judge Advocate General (and, in some limited cases, to a
board of officers whose opinion could be rendered advisory by the Judge
Advocate General) for a general court-martial, Lieutenant Colonel
Frederick Bernays Wiener wrote that "it is virtually impossible for an
innocent man to be finally convicted by court-martial. The system of
automatic appellate review . . . makes the court-martial system in this
respect as nearly foolproof as any human institution can be." 260 Even
as recently as 1968 the military maintained that a requirement for
legally trained counsel in special courts (finally incorporated in the Mili-
tary Justice Act of 1968) was unnecessary and probably impossible to
accomplish. 267
The fact that the military has often failed to recognize the need for
reform within the military legal system does not, of course, prove that
further reform is needed today. The burden must be on the critics to
prove the need and the workability of further reforms. However, the
failure of members of the military to recognize and admit flaws in their
system of justice should serve as a warning against accepting official
system. Rather it is an attempt to make a few changes that can ba agreed
upon by the Congress and the armed services in an attempt to improve
some of the procedures and increase the substantive safeguards in courts-
martial.
S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968).
264 Mounts & Sugarman, The Military Justice Act of 1968, 55 A.B.A.J. 470
(1969); O'Malley, Broader Justice for Military Personnel, 5 T'RIAL, December
1968-January 1969, at 45.
265 Kingsbury, Courts-Martial and Military Justice, 5 NATIONAL SERVICE WITI
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY DIGEST 280 (1919).
266 WIENER, MILITARY JUSTICE FOR THE FIELD SOLDIER 24 (1943).
267 Joint Hearings in S. 745, supra note 206, at pt. 1, 16-17, 50-51, 357; pt. 2,
524-26.
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pronouncements without question. The military, like any ingrown, high-
ly traditional bureaucracy, displays tremendous resistance to change.
This resistance has been particularly strong in the area of military
justice because of the importance which the military places on sanctions
intended to preserve the system of discipline under which the military
continues to operate. Since the military is in control of most of the
information concerning the operation of military law and, like any large
and powerful agency, possesses the resources and manpower to present
that information in a manner favorable to its official position, it has
been at a decided advantage in turning back attempts to alter its
system.
Two questions come to mind in considering whether further civiliani-
zation of military justice is desirable: Does the military justice system
now provide as fair and just a system of criminal law as it should and,
if not, what reforms can be made without endangering the effectiveness
of the military forces? Very little analysis has been made as to what
standards of justice should be required of a military law system and as
to what the actual effects on the military would be of adapting to civilian
standards. Most of the writing on military justice, both by the military
and its critics, has focused on a comparison of the military and civilian
systems. In those instances in which military law differs from civilian
criminal law, little attention has been given to the reasons behind the
differences. Military apologists have tended to either ignore the short-
comings of military procedures or simply to justify them as required by
"military necessity," and the critics have tended to concentrate solely
on the shortcomings without considering the reasons for the particular
procedure.
One difficulty encountered in speculating on the policy considerations
behind the differences between military and civilian justice is that there
are often valid policy reasons for both the military and the civilian posi-
tions. As in so many other legal problems, one is often forced to weigh
competing policy considerations in attempting to determine whether a
particular military procedure should be made to conform with a civilian
procedure. For example, the policy justification for maintaining com-
mand control of court-martial machinery and appointments relates to
the traditional military concept of singleness of command and the neces-
sity for a commander to exercise plenary powers over all operations
within his command. This policy is quite different from the policy be-
hind the civilian court emphasis on dividing up various administrative
and judicial functions in a criminal prosecution among different and in-
dependent individuals to limit the possibility of arbitrariness and abuse
of power. Whenever possible, this article will attempt to raise the
competing policy considerations behind different procedures in military
and civilian law and, in those situations where the article recommends
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that the military procedure be civilianized, the considerations which led
to that viewpoint will be indicated.
Once the different policy considerations are identified, it is necessary
to determine if, in fact, they are competing or can be reconciled by
compromise and, if not, whether the military system can still function
effectively by adopting the civilian model. Obviously this analysis may
be affected by one's basic philosophy as to the proper function of a
criminal law system in the military and the role the military should
play in contemporary American society. There has been an unfortu-
nate tendency in the Vietnam War period for "hawks" to equate
military justice reform with anti-war and anti-military sentiments and
for "doves" to view military justice in overly critical terms as simply a
tool of the "military industrial complex." 268 However, there have also
been hopeful signs that the issue of military justice reform will not be
polarized into an ideological controversy. The Pueblo and Green Beret
cases, both arising in 1969, displayed weaknesses in the court-martial
structure in a nonideological context.269 Those interested in military
justice reform represent a wide spectrum of political and ideological
views, including such diverse individuals as George Spiegelberg, a Wall
who served on the Court of Military Appeals from 1951 to 1961, and is
Street attorney who has argued for broad court-martial reform for more
than 20 years270 and George W. Latimer, a Salt Lake City lawyer who
served on the Court of Military Appeals from 1951 to 1961, and is chair-
man of the A.B.A. military justice committee; Victor Rabinowitz, who
served as counsel in the case of O'Callahan v. Parker;2 1 Senator Sam J.
Irvin, Jr. (D. N.C.) and Congressman Charles E. Bennett (R. Fla) who
were primarily responsible for the passage of the Military Justice Act of
1968272 and Senator Mark Hatfield (R. Ore.) who has recently proposed
changes in the UCMJ; 273 Melvin Wulf,27 4 Charles Morgan,275 and Marvin
26s See generally Shoup, The New American Militarism, 223 ATLANTIC, April
1969, at 51, 54.
269 See Finer, The Second Ordeal of the Pueblo Crew, 55 A.B.A.J. 1029 (1969);
Sherman, Military Justice: Learning from the Green Berets, 209 THE NATION, Oct.
20, 1969, at 399.
270 See Spiegelberg, Reform of Courts Martial: A Reply to Colonel Archibald
King, 35 A.B.A.J. 29 (1949).
271395 U.S. 258 (1969).
272 See Ross, The Military Justice Act of 1968: Historical Background, 23 JAG
J. 125 (1969).
273 Statement by Senator Mark Hatfield, Sept. 9, 1969.
The basic structure of the UCMJ was instituted in 1951, its latest re-
vision being in 1968. There have been steps taken to improve due process,
but this and other deficiencies are in need of structural change. Among
them are: command influence in courts martial, the need for standards
for sentencing uniformity, the lack of a randomly chosen jury, and lim-
ited right to appeal and the acceptance of vaguely worded crimes.
274 Mr. Melvin Wulf, Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union
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Karpatkin -2 7 6 of the American Civil Liberties Union, whose representation
of servicemen in conflict with the military has raised significant questions
concerning the administration of military justice; Judges Robert E.
Quinn, Homer Ferguson, and William H. Darden of the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals whose court has been responsible for the bulk of military
justice reform since the UCMJ was passed; and members of the military
itself, both high ranking and lower ranking officers of the Judge Ad-
vocate General Corps, who have quietly made administrative improve-
ments and worked for broader reforms. Although they represent a wide
variety of views about the Vietnam War and the military establishment,
they are fundamentally in agreement on the need for judicialization of
military justice, that is, that military justice must function as a judicial
system which provides a fair and impartial trial to servicemen. They
would, no doubt, differ on the specifics for further reform of military
justice, but they all have a basic sympathy for continued attempts to in-
sure that military justice functions primarily as a judicial system. If, in-
deed, the current public sentiment in favor of a reexamination of our mili-
tary justice system does develop into a genuine movement for reform,
these types of individuals will play an important role in weighing the
competing policy considerations behind the military and civilian systems
of justice, and in working out the compromises necessary for achieving
legislative reform. The process of judicialization of military justice,
which was only partially achieved with the passage of the UCMJ in 1950,
appears to be in motion once again, and the military justice system, still
possessing certain of its traditional nonjudicial trappings, will have to be
assessed in light of the legal and judicial standards of contemporary
American society.
(ACLU), has served as counsel in a number of military cases, including those of
Lieutenant Henry Howe (court-martialed for carrying a sign derogatory to the
President in an off-post rally while wearing civilian clothes), Private David Brown
(court-martialed for challenging military refusal to grant a conscientious objector
discharge), Corporal William Harvey and Private George Daniels (court-mar-
tialed for making anti-war statements in an informal discussion and encouraging
other black marines to request mast), Private First Class Ken Stolte and Private
Dan Amick (court-martialed for distributing anti-war leaflets on post), and
Corporal Thomas Met and Private Claude Gray (court-martialed, inter alia, for
statements made while absent without leave in a sanctuary).
'75 Mr. Charles Morgan, Southern Director of the ACLU, served as chief coun-
sel for Captain Howard Levy in his court-martial and collateral proceedings. Levy
was court-martialed for making anti-war statements and refusing to teach medi-
cine to Green Berets.
276 Mr. Marvin Karpatkin, General Counsel of the ACLU, served as chief coun-
sel for Captain Dale Noyd in his court-martial and collateral proceedings. Noyd
unsuccessfully challenged the Air Force's refusal to grant him a conscientious ob-
jector discharge, was court-martialed for refusing to obey an order to train pilots
for Vietnam, and challenged the military's policy of not granting release pending
appeal.
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II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE
In focusing on the two questions previously stated (whether mili-
tary justice provides as fair and just a system of criminal law as it
should and, if not, what reforms are feasible) it may be helpful to
distinguish, for purposes of orderly discussion, between what might be
classified as procedural due process and substantive due process under
the court-martial system. By procedural due process the author means
those procedural guarantees such as the right against self-incrimination,
double jeopardy, and other rights guaranteed to an accused pursuant
to criminal prosecution. By substantive due process is meant those
aspects of the general structure of the court-martial which particularly
affect the determination of the court as to the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
2 77
Although there are some differences between the procedural due
process rights guaranteed in military and civilian trials, 278 they are to-
day very similar, and therefore this is not the principal area in which
the court-martial system is vulnerable to attack. In fact, the UCMJ
provided a number of due process guarantees which were not available
in most civilian courts at the time it was enacted. However, the Warren
Court's revolution of criminal due process in the 1950's and 1960's
brought civilian court standards generally into line with the UCMJ
and, in some areas, instituted more demanding due process require-
ments. Military spokesmen, rightly proud of the fact that the UCMJ
provided servicemen certain rights before civilian courts did and proud
that it played a pioneering role in criminal due process, still claim
that military due process guarantees are ahead of those provided in
civilian courts.27 9 There is a list of due process guarantees which mili-
277 These categories are not exact terms of art and may overlap. They are used
in this article only to provide a means of discussing fifth amendment due process
rights separately from rights relating to the basic structure of the court-martial
system.
278 Although differences exist among state jurisdictions, differences in criminal
procedure have diminished in recent years as a result of decisions by the Supreme
Court imposing federal constitutional standards on the states. Thus, it is often mis-
leading to select specific cases from state jurisdictions, tried prior to the imposition
of these standards, which show weak procedures without indicating whether there
would be a similar result under current due process standards. The procedure fol-
lowed in federal courts will usually be referred to in this article for purposes of
comparison with military law.
279 Virtually every article on military justice written by a military man since
1951 has made this claim. See, e.g., Symposium, 15 FED. B.J. 275 (1955); A Sym-
posium on Military Justice, 12 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1961); Symposium-The Uniform
Code of Military Justice-Its Promise and Performance (The First Decade: 1951-
1961), 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 197 (1961); Symposium-Is There Justice in the
Armed Forces?, 4 TRIAL, February-March 1968, at 10; Symposium, 11 U.S.A.F.
JAG L. REv. 175 (1969).
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tary justice enthusiasts have been reeling off for years to show that mili-
tary law provides broader guarantees than do civilian courts. A typical
example is taken from the remarks of Captain Richard J. Selman,
Judge Advocate General Corps, United States Navy, at the swearing-in
of the new Navy Court of Military Review in Washington, D.C. on Oc-
tober 15, 1969:
[1] Courts-martial were excluding evidence obtained by unreasonable
search and seizure or by wiretapping long before the Supreme Court
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
[21 In courts-martial qualified military lawyers were provided with-
out cost to defend service personnel indigent or otherwise in all gen-
eral courts-martial long before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 336
(1963).
[3] Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice enacted a
warning requirement to military investigators long before the Supreme
Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Indeed
Chief Justice Warren relied on the military practice in justifying the
warning requirement.
[4] Defense counsel in courts-martial are in far better position to ob-
tain pretrial discovery of the prosecution's case than would be true in
Federal District Courts under Rule 16 or in most all State Courts.
[5] Verbatim records of trial by courts-martial were provided as a
matter of course and without cost to the accused long before Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) imposed this burden on State Courts.
[6] Appellate review of appropriateness of sentence takes place in the
military justice system but is still unavailable in the Federal Courts and
in almost all State Courts.
[7] The Court of Military Appeals has made clear that most consti-
tutional safeguards are fully applicable to service personnel even though
admittedly courts-martial do not proceed on the basis of indictment
by grand jury.
I think it fair to say that for an accused in the military today, many of
his rights exceed those of his civilian counterpart.28 0
Like much of what has been written and said about military justice,
these statements, if taken on their face, are rather misleading. The lead
of the military in relation to the first three and the fifth claim has long
since been lost and, in fact, the military rule is now slightly inferior
to the federal court rule in all but one case (article 31 is, in some
respects, broader than the Miranda rule).281 The other three claims are
exaggerated and again, in a comparison between the military and
civilian guarantees concerning pretrial discovery, appellate review, and
other constitutional safeguards, the civilian courts come out slightly
ahead.28 2 Probably the most objective assessment of military and
civilian court procedural due process rights would find them roughly
280 115 CONG. REC. 12,632 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1969) (paragraph numbers added).
2,81 See note 302 and accompanying text inIra.
282 Section III infra.
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equal, with perhaps a slight edge for the civilian procedures, primarily
because of the command control aspect which still affects certain mili-
tary rights.
A. Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The Executive Order implementing the UCMJ directed that the fed-
eral exclusionary rules respecting evidence obtained from an unreason-
able search and seizure would apply in courts-martial. 28 3 Since the ex-
clusionary rule was not applied to the states until 1961 in Mapp v.
Ohio,284 the military, which had the rule as far back as 1924 for the
Army and 1929 for the Navy, was in advance of most state juris-
dictions.285 However, the power to authorize the search of military
persons or property on a military installation is exercised by the com-
manding officer (or one of his subordinates if he delegates the au-
thority), rather than by an independent magistrate as in a civilian
situation. Thus, the commanding officer who suspects an individual of
a crime, determines whether to prosecute, controls the court-martial
machinery, and reviews the findings and sentence, has the power to
authorize a search. For years no one ever questioned the impartiality
of an authorization to search by a commanding officer who is frequent-
ly directing the search for the wrongdoer. The military apologists have
made glowing statements about the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures without mentioning that the commander, rather
than an independent magistrate, authorizes the search. However, an
Army publication has recently raised the question:
The traditional view of the commanding officer as a person em-
powered to authorize and conduct searches, Para. 152, MCM; U.S. v.
Hartsook, 15 USCMA 291, 35 CMR 263 (1965), seems constitutionally
questionable. The procedure of antecedent justification for a search be-
fore a magistrate has been categorized as "central to the Fourth Amend-
ment.". . . Whether a commanding officer in pursuit of criminal ac-
tivity satisfies the constitutional criterion is highly questionable. Since
1 August 1969, most commands have military judges readily accessible
who may be proper persons to authorize searches based upon probable
cause. . . . We encourage defense counsel to explore this method of in-
suring their client's rights have been fully protected. 288
There is no direct authority for the new military judges to issue war-
rants, but this suggestion deserves consideration since until the power
to authorize searches is taken out of the commander's hands, the im-
partiality of the warrant process will continue to be subject to question.
In defense of the military procedure it should be noted that the com-
283 Exec. Order No. 10214, 3 C.F.R. 90 (Supp. 1951).
284367 U.S. 643 (1961).
285 See O'Malley, Mapp, Miranda, and the Accused, 4 TRIAL, February-March
1968, at 10, 11.
286 1 THE ADVOCATE, August 1969, at 8.
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mander must have probable cause to issue a warrant, and the standards
established by the Court of Military Appeals have been especially de-
manding, exceeding in some respects the requirements of civilian
courts 87 However, the military procedure does not require that a re-
quest to the commander for authorization to search be in writing or be
upon oath or affirmation, as is required in civilian courts. "As a result
of these differences," Chief Judge Quinn of the Court of Military Ap-
peals has written,
a defense challenge to the sufficiency of the showing of probable cause
is complicated. While the accused in the civilian community can look to
the affidavits submitted to the officer issuing the warrant to determine
whether sufficient evidence of probable cause was presented to justify
issuance of the warrant, no such convenient reference is available in the
military. Instead, defense counsel must consult the officer authorizing
the search and the agent applying for the authority to search.2 m-
One aspect of military search and seizure which causes unfavorable
comparison with civilian law arises from the power of commanders to
conduct administrative searches, such as routine inspections and "shake-
downs," which are not considered to be searches subject to the fourth
amendment3 s9 A "shakedown" may be conducted when a crime has
been committed but the identity of the criminal is not known, and
"every person assigned to the room or barracks to be searched is di-
rected to place his effects on his bunk and to stand alongside, or to open
his locker and stand by it." 290 Obviously, this is an effective means for
the commander to search and seize, and thieves are often detected in
this way. The need for a commander to make a quick response to morale-
endangering barracks thefts is a strong policy reason for immunizing
"shakedowns" from the requirements of the fourth amendment. How-
ever, it is a power which can be abused. In United States v. Kazinier-
czak,291 Judge Ferguson of the Court of Military Appeals dissented from
a decision that an inventory of accused's belongings in his room after his
arrest, which resulted in the finding of evidence of a new crime, was
merely an administrative inspection. He objected that a commanding
87 United States v. Britt, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 617, 38 C.M.R. 415 (1968); United
States v. Price, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 566, 38 C.M.R. 364 (1968); United States v. Brown,
10 U.S.C.M.A. 482, 28 C.M.R. 48 (1959). See generally Quinn, Some Compari-
sons between Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1240,
1353-58 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Quinn, Comparisons].
2 8 See Quinn, Comparisons, supra note 287, at 1254.
28 See David, The "Mere Evidence" Rule in Search and Seizure, 35 MIL. L.
REV. 101 (1967); Hamel, Probable Cause in Military Search and Seizure, 39 MIL.
L. REV. 41 (1968).
290United States v. Harman, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 180, 187, 30 C.M.R. 180, 187
(1961).
291 United States v. Kazmierczak. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 594, 37 C.M.R. 214 (1967).
MAINE LAW REVIEW
officer could exercise his undoubted authority to confine the accused
so that he could search wherever he pleased with or without probable
cause, and he argued that this search should be subject to the fourth
amendment.
The search and seizure area is an example of how recent Supreme
Court decisions have erased early military superiority in due process
rights. In June 1969, the Supreme Court decided in Chimel v. Cali-
fornia292 that, in the absence of a search warrant, a search cannot extend
beyond the person of the individual searched and the area in which he
might obtain a weapon or an object which could be used as evidence
against him. The Court of Military Appeals had previously approved the
search of another room as incident to arrest 29 3 and, over the dissent of
Judge Ferguson, the court rejected reconsideration of its ruling after
Chimel.2  The Court of Military Appeals has also adopted the less re-
strictive rule concerning consent to search by a person living with the
accused,295 and its finding that search by foreign authorities is not cov-
ered by the requirements of the Constitution, 296 although sound, means
that the substantial number of American troops abroad lack the protec-
tions of the fourth amendment in relation to searches by foreign author-
ities.
B. Right Against Self-Incrimination
In the area of self-incrimination the UCMJ was also in advance of the
civilian courts. Article 31 requires that any person suspected or accused
of a crime be warned before interrogation as to the nature of the accusa-
tion against him, that he does not have to make any statement, and that
any statement he make may be used against him in the event of a court-
martial. It was not until 1966 that the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Ari-
zona297 specifically held these warnings constitutionally required in civil-
ian courts as a prerequisite to custodial interrogation. However, Miranda
also required that the accused be informed of his right to consult with
counsel, to have counsel appointed if he cannot afford to hire one, and to
have counsel present during interrogation. These warnings were not re-
quired by article 31, although military law provided that a serviceman
could consult with a legal advisor before being subjected to interroga-
292395 U.S. 752 (1969).
293 United States v. Goldman, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 389, 40 C.M.R. 101 (1969).
294 Id. at 395 (Ferguson, J., amending concurring opinion).
295 United States v. Mathis, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 522, 37 C.M.R. 142 (1967); United
States v. Garlich, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 362, 35 C.M.R. 334 (1965); United States v.
Conlon, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 84, 33 C.M.R. 296 (1963). See ACM 19607, Mathis, 37
C.M.R. 797 (1966) (interpreting Garlich and Conlon, supra, as adopting the less
restrictive rule in the split between the federal circuits).
296United States v. DeLeo, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 148, 17 C.M.R. 148 (1954).
297 384 U.S. 437 (1966).
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tion29 s and provided for appointment of free military counsel (who had to
be a lawyer in a general but not in a special court-martial) in the investi-
gative stage.2" Ten months after Miranda, the Court of Military Appeals
in U.S. v. Tempid300 held the Miranda requirements also applied to mili-
tary law, retroactive to the date the civilian case was decided. However,
servicemen were not entitled to a lawyer counsel in a special court-
martial trial until the Military Justice Act of 1968 took effect on August
1, 1969.301
Even after Miranda, article 31 is still broader in certain aspects than
the civilian court rule. The obligation to give warnings under article 31
is not limited to a custodial or coercive situation or to interrogation by
police. Thus, incriminatory statements have been excluded in military
courts although made while the accused was clearly not in custody,3 -
and interrogation by any person subject to the UCMJ must meet the re-
quirements of article 31. However, the Court of Military Appeals has
considerably limited the applicability of article 31 by holding that it does
not apply to one not engaged in gathering evidence for prosecution or
to one not purporting to exercise disciplinary authority over the accused
at the time of questioning. 30 3
The particular circumstances under which the right against self-
incrimination is recognized vary somewhat between the military and
civilian courts. In at least three situations the military rule has been
broader in excluding real evidence as incriminating "statements": voice
identifications, 3°4 blood samples, 305 and handwriting exemplars. 0 0 How-
ever, in recent decisions the Court of Military Appeals has weakened the
protection given handwriting exemplars by holding that exemplars taken
298 United States v. Gunnels, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957).
299 10 U.S.C. § 832(b) (1964) (art. 32(b) of the UCMJ).
300 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
301 Act of Oct. 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335, amending 10 U.S.C.
§§ 819, 827(c) (1964) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 819, 827(c) (Supp. IV, 1968))
(arts. 19, 27(c) of the UCMJ).
302 See United States v. Wilson, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 248, 8 C.M.R. 48 (1953).
303 See Quinn, Comparisons, supra note 287, at 1245-46.
304 United States v. Mewborn, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 431, 38 C.M.R. 229 (1968);
United States v. Greer, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 576, 13 C.M.R. 132 (1953).
305 Compare United States v. Musquire, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 25 C.M.R. 329 (1958)
with Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood sample drawn over
objection of accused held admissible under fifth amendment self-incrimination
clause and fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures).
206 Compare Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (finding no violation of
accused's right against self-incrimination by taking handwriting exemplar before
indictment and appointment of counsel), with United States v. White, 17
U.S.C.M.A. 211, 38 C.M.R. 9 (1967) and United States v. Minnifield, 9
U.S.C.M.A. 373, 26 C.M.R. 153 (1958).
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by civilian police307 and Secret Service investigators3°8 are admissible in
a military court despite absence of warnings. With regard to line-
ups, the civilian courts have extended greater protections,300 a military
board of review having held that an article 31 warning is not necessary
before subjecting an accused to a lineup.310 The Court of Military Ap-
peals seems to have adopted a less stringent rule concerning statements
made to undercover agents than would be required under the Supreme
Court's rule enunciated in Massiah v. United States.311 The military court
held in United States v. Hinkson that an accused was not entitled to
warnings when he was engaged in conversation by an undercover Office
of Naval Intelligence (ONI) agent in the waiting room of the ONI office
where he had been ordered to report.31 2
There are some slight differences between military and civilian court
rules with respect to use of a confession in a trial. The Court of Military
Appeals 313 has adopted a stricter rule than the Supreme Court3 14 con-
ceming the degree of corroboration required for a confession to estab-
lish an offense. The military rule requires that there be evidence outside
the record to establish "the probable existence" of each element of the
offense charged, while the Supreme Court has held only that independent
evidence is required to establish the truthfulness of the confession. How-
ever, the Court of Military Appeals 315 has adopted a less stringent rule
than the Supreme Court310 concerning the use of an improperly obtained
statement to impeach the accused's credibility concerning matters he has
affirmatively introduced at trial.
One of the less favorable aspects of the right against self-incrimina-
tion in the military comes from the subordinate status of the serviceman
in dealing with superiors. The serviceman, obligated to obey all lawful
orders of a superior, is sometimes placed in a position of complying with
the order of superiors when such compliance may involve self-incrimina-
tion. Military law has left a number of such situations beyond the pro-
tection of the right against self-incrimination. The use of military psy-
307 United States v. Lewis, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 355, 40 C.M.R. 67 (1969).
308 United States v. Penn, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 194, 39 C.M.R. 194 (1969).
0a United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Russell v. United States, 389
F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1967).3 10 CM 418783, Webster, - C.M.R. - (Mar. 21, 1969).
311 377 U.S. 201 (1964). But see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
312 United States v. Hinkson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 126, 37 C.M.R. 390 (1967)
(Ferguson, J., dissenting).
313 United States v. Smith, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 105, 32 C.M.R. 105 (1962); United
States v. Villasenor, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 19 C.M.R. 129 (1955).
314 Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954). But see Forte v. United States,
94 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
315 United States v. Caiola, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 336, 40 C.M.R. 48 (1969) (Ferguson,
J., dissenting).
316 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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chiatrists provides a good example. The Court of Military Appeals re-
cently upheld the requirement in the ManuaP17 that an accused may be
required to submit to a board of one or more medical officers if the com-
manding officer has reason to believe that he is insane or was so at the
time of the offense, and that the prosecution can exclude testimony of-
fered by an accused concerning his mental condition if he has not sub-
mitted to such examination.318 The military court has also held that there
is no right to counsel or to be informed of one's rights at a military psy-
chiatric evaluation, 319 and although military courts have upheld a right to
warnings when an accused makes statements to a psychiatrist,320 the
court has permitted a military psychiatrist to testify in rebuttal of an ac-
cused's insanity defense where the accused had not been fully advised of
his rights.321 In practice, most servicemen are given a routine psychiatric
evaluation prior to court-martial and their rights are not explained to
them. Not infrequently the medical officer who administers such exami-
nation is called to testify in rebuttal if the accused raises the defense of
mental incompetency.
Other situations in which servicemen are sometimes ordered to
undergo examinations in which military law does not hold that there
is a right to warnings include surveying officer2- and security in-
vestigations.323 A recent Court of Military Appeals decision, United
States v. Vogel,32 4 provides an example of the continuing insensitivity
317 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES. 1969, at r 121 (rev. ed.)
[hereinafter cited as MANUAL, 1969].
318 United States v. Babbidge, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 327, 40 C.M.R. 39 (1969).
319United States v. Wilson, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 400, 40 C.M.R. 112 (1969).
320United States v. Bunting, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 170, 19 C.M.R. 296 (1956) (state-
ments of accused taken without warnings not admissible in evidence where
accused charged with murder and ordered to report for examination to deter-
mine mental competency); CM 418212, Hamlin. - C.M.R. - (Sept. 23, 1968)
(statements of accused to military psychiatrist at examination conducted at
request of staff judge advocate not admissible as evidence of mental competency
or for impeachment without establishing that warnings were given); CM 387109,
Reed, 21 C.M.R. 355 (1956) (statements made in second examination to same
medical officer by accused suspected of use of narcotics not admissible without
warnings). But see United States v. Malumpy. 12 U.S.C.M.A. 639, 31 C.M.R.
225 (1962) (statements admissible without warnings where medical examina-
tion not made pursuant to criminal investigation); United States v. Baker, 11
U.S.C.M.A. 313, 29 C.M.R. 129 (1960); NCM 262, Barnes, 13 C.M.R. 552
(1953) (medical officer's opinion based on statements of accused made in ex-
amination without warnings admissible where medical officer had no reason to
suspect accused as dope addict).
321 United States v. Schell, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 410, 40 C.M.R. 122 (1969).
32See Army JAG Instruction 1969/3370 (Jan. 31, 1969) (article 31 warnings
not required before taking oral statements in surveying officer investigation).
32 United States v. Ledbetter. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 39 C.M.R. 67 (1968) (dicta).
3s United States v. Vogel, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 160, 39 C.M.R. 160 (1969) (Ferguson,
3., dissenting).
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of military courts to the inherent coercion placed on a serviceman
in certain situations involving superiors. There the court held that
an accused was not entitled to be warned of his rights when he was sus-
pected of a crime, ordered to report to the chapel, and there volunteered
an incriminating statement to a major. A strong dissent by Judge Fergu-
son argued that the Miranda requirements should have been applied.
C. Right to a Speedy Trial
The UCMJ requires that when a person is placed in arrest or confine-
ment prior to trial, "immediate steps shall be taken to inform him of the
specific wrong of which he is accused and to try him or to dismiss the
charges and release him." 325 Military cases have been particularly strict
in applying this requirement. 326 A serviceman usually receives a speedier
trial than an accused in a civilian court and can obtain a reversal
when his trial was delayed without good reason for a shorter time
than the duration needed for reversal in a civilian court.3 7 However, it
is especially important that the right to a speedy trial is protected in the
military because there is no general right, as there is in civilian courts,
to bail pending trial. Pretrial release is left up to the sole discretion of
the commander, and a substantial proportion of servicemen, particularly
those awaiting general courts-martial, are incarcerated prior to trial.
Also, sentences in the military run from the date of sentencing and not
the date of arrest 28 (although courts sometimes take into consideration
the amount of pretrial confinement in adjudging sentence), and so undue
delay in bringing an accused to trial substantially affects his rights.
325 10 U.S.C. § 810 (1964) (art. 10 of the UCMJ).
326 See, e.g., United States v. White, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 462, 38 C.M.R. 260 (1968);
United States v. Batson, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 30 C.M.R. 48 (1960); United States v.
Brown, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 498, 28 C.M.R. 64 (1959).
327See United States v. Boehm, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 530, 38 C.M.R. 328 (1968)
(comparing military rule on speedy trial with FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, 48, and re-
quirements of sixth amendment). See also United States v. Weisenmuller, 17
U.S.C.M.A. 636, 38 C.M.R. 434 (1968); United States v. Smith, 17 U.S.C.M.A.
427, 38 C.M.R. 225 (1968). But see United States v. Smith, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 55,
37 C.M.R. 319 (1967) (Ferguson, J., dissenting). Recent federal cases tend to
adopt a similarly stringent speedy trial rule. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 402
F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
328See MANUAL, 1969, supra note 317, at 1111 88d, 1261. The military practice
of executing the confinement portion of a sentence immediately after sentencing
was challenged in Noyd v. Bond, 285 F. Supp. 785 (D.N.M. 1968), rev'd, 402
F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1968), aff'd, 395 U.S. 683 (1969), on the ground that arti-
cle 71(c) of the UCMJ provides that a sentence of a punitive discharge or one
year confinement or more may not be executed until affirmed by a board of
review. The Supreme Court decision did not reach this contention, finding lack
of jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust military remedies, but the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals subsequently ordered the military not to impose confinement or
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D. Right against Double Jeopardy
The UCMJ provides that no person shall be tried a second time for the
same offense without his consent.3- This means that if a serviceman has
been acquitted or convicted in a prior court-martial and the verdict has
not been voided for lack of jurisdiction, he cannot be tried for the same
offense, or an offense of which the offense charged was a lesser included
offense, in another court-martial.3 0 Also, when the same acts constitute
a crime against the United States, trial by court-martial is a bar to a
second trial in a federal court, and vice versa. However, there is no
double jeopardy protection against being tried in a state court and then
being tried for the same crime in a court-martial, or vice versa. 1 Pro-
fessor Keeffe's suggestion that the right against double jeopardy should
be extended to such situations was rejected by the drafters of the
UCMJ.332 However, as far as double jeopardy protection when a new
trial has been ordered, the UCMJ adopted the more protective rule that
the sentence on a new trial cannot exceed that of the original trial. This
rule was recently adopted by the Supreme Court for all cases except those
in which the increased sentence is based on conduct occurring after the
first sentence.3
E. Right to Discover Evidence and Subpoena Witnesses
The Manual provides that upon reasonable request and without the
necessity of further process, documents and other evidentiary materials
in the custody of military authorities will be made available to the de-
fense to exame or use.334 This is comparable to rule 16 (b) of the Fed-
other restraints pending completion of the appeal to the Court of Military Ap-
peals. Noyd v. Bond, Misc. No. 79-25 (U.S.C.M.A., June 26, 1969). But see
Levy v. Dillon, 286 F. Supp. 593 (D. Kan. 1968), denying release, on habeas
corpus petition, from disciplinary barracks despite the fact that appeal to a board
of review was not completed. The decision was based on a finding that article
71(c) was not applicable because, until affirmance by a board of review, sentence
had not been "executed." Justice Douglas subsequently ordered petitioner released
until the full Court could pass on his application for bail pending determination
of his habeas corpus petition after he had fully exhausted his military appeals
remedies. Levy v. Parker, 90 S. Ct. 1 (1969).
32 10 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1964) (art. 44(a) of the UCMJ).
330 MANUAL, 1969, supra note 317, at I, 68d.
331 United States v. Rosenblatt, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 28, 32 C.M.R. 28 (1962); ACM
18339, Herrington, 33 C.M.R. 814 (1963); ACM S-21050, Reed, 33 C.M.R. 932
(1963); ACM 17156. Panchisin, 30 C.M.R. 921 (1961); ACM S-11780, Peck,
20 C.M.R. 810 (1955).
332 Statement of Professor Keeffe, supra note 129.
= 10 U.S.C. § 863(b) (1964) (art. 63(b) of the UCMJ). See Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), rev'g Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
See also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
3 MANUAL, 1969, supra note 317, at I 15c.
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eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, except that a federal judge, upon mo-
tion of the government, may condition his order upon the defense also
disclosing its documents. Federal discovery is also conditioned by the
Jencks Act335 which excludes discovery prior to trial of the work product
of agents made in the investigation or prosecution of the case and state-
ments made by government witnesses to agents. The military also
usually withholds work product but ordinarily permits defense counsel
to see witnesses' statements.
Military discovery procedures have been traditionally informal and
liberal. Since both counsel are usually lawyers from the Judge Advocate
General's office working together in the same office, it is common for
them to trade files, briefs, and other evidence rather freely. This prac-
tice is a mixed blessing for an accused because it can result in the prose-
cution obtaining liberal discovery of defense evidence which it might not
otherwise be able to obtain. This informal practice also has the disad-
vantage of causing defense counsel to rely heavily upon both the good
faith and the investigation of the prosecution. Thus, The Advocate, an
excellent monthly newsletter for military defense counsel, cautions:
Defense counsel should not rely solely on the good faith of the prosecutor,
or the rapport between the parties which often characterizes trial by
court-martial, but instead should make diligent efforts to obtain maxi-
mum discovery of items which might not be known even to the prosecutor;
these efforts should be made a part of each trial record.3 36
Military pretrial procedure, particularly after the Military Justice Act
of 1968, is well suited to the early discovery of evidence by defense
counsel. The article 32 investigating officer has broad powers to order
production of documents and evidence, and this can be a fruitful source
of discovery.337 Additionally, under the new Act, the military judge is
empowered to hold pretrial sessions (called "article 39(a) sessions")
which can include such matters as discovery.338 Broad discovery is per-
mitted, including such items as statements of the accused, statements of
witnesses and nonwitnesses, documentary evidence, medical and labora-
tory reports, official records, and personnel records.330
One significant kind of information which cannot be discovered in a
court-martial is privileged material containing military or state secrets,
classified information pertaining to national defense, and the Inspector
335 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b). For a case involving
application of the Jencks Act to courts-martial see United States v. Augenblick,
393 U.S. 348 (1969).
336 1 THE ADVOCATE, September 1969, at 1.
337 MANUAL, 1969, supra note 317, at gfI 34a, 34c.
338 Act of Oct. 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335, amending 10 U.S.C.
§ 839(a) (1964) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (Supp. IV, 1968)) (art. 39(a)
of the UCMJ).
339 See 1 THE ADVOCATE, September 1969, at 1-6.
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General's reports. 34° Ira Glasser, associate director of the New York
Civil Liberties Union, has described the discovery problem as it arose in
the court-martial of Captain Levy:
As the trial record in the Levy case indicates, the chief and perhaps the
only evidence leading to the charges that resulted in a general court-
martial was contained in a 180-page intelligence dossier on Captain
Levy. Civilian counsel was never allowed to see more than a fraction of
that dossier (having been assured by the prosecution that nothing in it
was relevant) on the grounds that the material was classified and civilian
counsel was without security clearance. Military counsel was allowed to
see the dossier, but only on condition that he would not talk about it to
civilian counsel! The obvious choice the army would seem to have is
clear: either it must reveal the evidence to the defense or else it cannot
introduce it. Yet in the weird world of military law, that choice need not
be made. The evidence is both introduced and kept from defense scru-
tiny.341
Somewhat similar problems of disclosure of confidential information
containing informer secrets and the results of government espionage have
arisen in civilian courts in connection with claims of violation of de-
fendant's fourth amendment rights. The Supreme Court in its recent de-
cisions in Alderman v. United States342 and Giordan v. United States34
has upheld the right of a defendant to have surveillance records turned
over to him without first being submitted to the trial judge for exami-
nation as to relevance.
The UCMJ provides that trial counsel, defense counsel, and the court
shall have equal opportunity to obtain witnesses and other evidence by
subpoena. 3" The process for subpoena is similar to that used in the fed-
eral courts. A military subpoena runs anywhere within the jurisdiction
of the United States. However, the power to issue a subpoena under the
UCMJ was given to the prosecutor trial counsel, rather than to an inde-
pendent individual such as a clerk of the court as in most civilian jurisdic-
tions. The defense counsel submits his request to subpoena a witness to
the trial counsel and, if he refuses, the convening authority (or the law
officer, if the court is already in session) decides the matter. The defense
counsel is required to submit a statement in writing with a synopsis of
expected testimony and reasons showing why the personal appearance of
the witness is necessary,34 thus having to reveal his evidence and argu-
3 MANUAL, 1969, supra note 317, at 151.
341 Glasser, Justice and Captain Levy, 12 CoLuM. F. 46, 47-48 (1969).
342394 U.S. 165 (1969).
= 394 U.S. 310 (1969).
344MANuAL, 1969, supra note 317, at 115.
345 Id. at ff 115a.
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ment in advance.346 The Military Justice Act of 1968 may have changed
this undesirable procedure. Since the military judge can hold pretrial
sessions which deal with discovery, 347 it appears that he, rather than the
convening authority, will rule on many discovery motions. The UCMJ
has not been directly altered to reach this result, but hopefully the Manual
and military practice will insure that discovery will be placed in the dis-
cretion of the independent military judge.
F. Right to a Public Trial
The Court of Military Appeals has upheld the right to a public court-
martial.3 48 Exceptions arise when the commander determines that good
order will be endangered or classified information will be presented. 3 9
The commander's power to close a trial to the public can be abused, but
so can that of a civilian judge. Cases have also occurred, particularly in-
volving Vietnam War dissenters, where attendance at a court-martial by
sympathetic supporters has been prevented by a commander's denying
them access to the post.3 50 However, increasing judicial scrutiny of post
regulations affecting first amendment rights appears to be resulting in
more liberal post regulations,3 51 and denial of access to open trials has
not been a serious problem.
346 See Glasser, supra note 341, at 47.
In the Levy case, civilian witnesses for the defense had to come volun-
tarily or else the defense had to request a subpoena from the prose-
cution! Furthermore, the defense had to justify the relevance of the
desired witness to the prosecution; which meant that the defense had
to reveal its argument in advance. Even then, subpoenas were with one
exception never granted. Military witnesses for the defense who were
not at Fort Jackson but who were willing to come were also prevented.
One key witness, a doctor who had been chief of psychiatry at two
hospitals in Vietnam, who was now serving the last weeks of his duty
at Fort Dix in New Jersey and who would have testified that Dr. Levy
was being prosecuted for saying things in an army hospital in South
Carolina that were said widely and freely and without fear of prose-
cution in army hospitals in Vietnam, was ready to come. Plane reser-
vations were made. All that remained was to issue a military subpoena,
since the doctor could not leave Fort Dix without orders. The prose-
cution, however, decided that the testimony was irrelevant and so the
witness never was allowed to testify.
347 See text accompanying note 338 supra.
348 United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 22 C.M.R. 41 (1956).
349 MANUAL, 1969, supra note 317, at ff 53c.
350 A description of the closing of a court-martial proceeding at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma, in July 1967, appears in Sherman, Dissenters and Deserters, 160 Naw
REPUBLIC, Jan. 6, 1968, at 25.
35IThe Army has recently revised Army Reg. 210-I, para. 5-5, to permit
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G. Right to a Transcript of the Trial
An accused is entitled to a verbatim transcript of the trial in a general
court-martial,352 but not in a special court-martial (except when a bad
conduct discharge can be adjudged),a or in out-of-court hearings.3 " A
summarized record of trial is made in a special court-martial, but if the
testimony is complicated, this type of record is rarely adequate. The
absence of a verbatim transcript not only removes a salutary check on
arbitrariness during trial, but also prevents any meaningful review of
the conviction and makes the determination as to the sufficiency of the
evidence of questionable value.3s5
printed material to be distributed on post with prior approval of the commander.
Army JAG Legal Service, Pamphlet No. 27-69-9, Apr. 9, 1969, at 15 advised:
In view of recent court decisions (see, e.g., Shuttlesvorth v. City of Birming-
ham, 37 U.S.L.W. 4203 (1969)), if commanders deny approval to distribute
publications on post through other than regularly established distribution
outlets, they should be prepared to justify their actions by citing reasonable
standards for denying approval. These standards, which need not be in-
cluded in post regulations, must be specific. Vague criteria such as "good
taste" and "in the best interests of the command" are of doubtful validity
and are likely to invite legal challenge.
352 10 U.S.C § 854(a) (Supp. IV, 1968) (art. 54(a) of the UCMI); MANuA.,
1969, supra note 317, at 82b.
353 10 U.S.C. § 854(b) (1964) (art. 54(b) of the UCMIJ); MANuA, 1969,
supra note 317, at 83b.
35United States v. Ransom, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 195, 15 C.M.R. 195 (1954); CM
417779, Holthause & Laut, - C.M.R. - (Nov. 18, 1968); CM 417540, Sachs, -
C.M.R. - (Sept. 5, 1968).
35 See O'Connor v. Cushman, Misc. No. 69-14 (U.S.C.M.A., Apr. 21, 1969)
(dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). Petitioner claimed denial of constitutional
rights resulting from refusal of convening authority to provide a verbatim
transcript of his special court-martial trial which took six and one-half hours and
involved testimony of four psychiatrists. A summarized record was provided,
primarily containing notations as to time and appearance of witnesses.
The convening authority was notified more than a month before the
court martial of defense counsel's request for a verbatim transcript.
He was provided with specific reasons why the transcript was neces-
sary, including the fact that lengthy and detailed testimony from ex-
pert witnesses was expected, a lengthy trial was expected, a vital issue
as to accused's mental responsibility would be raised, and important
issues needed to be preserved for review in case of conviction. In re-
fusing the transcript convening authority gave no reason and provided
no showing that a transcript could not be provided. On the contrary,
petitioner believes that there were trained stenographers available on
the day of his trial and that a transcript could have been provided with
little expense or trouble to the Army. . . .It is clear, on the facts, that
the Summarized Record which was provided was so sparse, haphazard,
inaccurate, misleading, and prejudicial that no adequate review of the
court martial can be made.
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In comparison, most civilian court jurisdictions provide a stenographer
who makes a verbatim recording as a matter of course in courts of
general criminal jurisdiction. Although it has been argued that special
courts-martial are like traffic and municipal courts50 which do not ordi-
narily provide verbatim records of proceedings, there is usually a right
to a trial de novo from such civilian courts. However, there is no de
novo appeal from a special court-martial, and its possible sentence of
six months confinement, plus substantial forfeiture of pay (which can
amount to several thousand dollars for a ranking noncommissioned of-
ficer) and demotion, is more comparable to crimes tried in courts of
general criminal jurisdiction. The special court-martial has always been
the poor stepchild of the UCMJ system, and now that lawyers will be
provided, it is unfortunate that there is still no right to a verbatim tran-
script, even when requested by accused and a showing of complicated
testimony is made.
Ill. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE
The discussion of procedural due process rights in the last section, al-
though focussing on certain weaknesses in military procedures, indi-
cated that a serviceman's procedural due process rights are not sub-
stantially different from those available in civilian courts. However, in
the area of substantive due process, the court-martial compares less fa-
vorably. The methods by which the crimes are charged, the court-martial
convened, the personnel chosen, the verdict arrived at, and a review
made, go directly to the issue of whether the accused has received a fair
and impartial trial. The weaknesses of the court-martial system lie par-
ticularly in its structure which the UCMJ failed to change. These weak-
nesses, and suggestions as to what changes are now needed without en-
dangering military effectiveness, will be considered in relation to the
categories already used to analyze prior military codes:
1. Statements of Crimes and Punishments-Most of the individual
military crimes are stated with sufficient specificity in the UCMJ to avoid
charges of unconstitutional vagueness and overbreadth. However, even
a staunch supporter of the military justice system, Frederick Bernays
Wiener, has conceded:
It cannot be denied that there is language in the void for vagueness cases
broad enough to condemn as unduly indefinite the prohibition in Article
Brief for Petitioner at 9-10, O'Connor v. Cushman, Misc. No. 69-14 (U.S.C.M.A.,
April 21, 1969).
3 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks, 377
F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967); LeBallister v. Warden, United States Disciplinary
Barracks, 247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965); United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A.
199, 216, 33 C.M.R. 411, 428 (1963) (Quinn, J., concurring). But see In re
Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
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133 against 'conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman' and the
prohibitions in Article 134 against 'all disorders and neglects to the pre-
judice of good order and discipline in the armed forces' and against
'all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. "' 7
The question is whether a modern military code must retain these open-
ended criminal definitions which survive from the day when mili-
tary authorities did not find it necessary to inform servicemen in ad-
vance of the behavior they deemed criminal. It has been argued that
these general articles are not unconstitutionally vague and should be re-
tained because they date from 1775 and have been sustained since that
time; because particular definitions found in the Manual provide ade-
quate specificity; because the words convey a sufficiently definite mean-
ing when measured by common understanding and practices; because
it is impossible to draft a criminal law demanding adherence to mili-
tary standards based on an implicit code of honor with more specificity;
and because the Armed Forces differ from civilian society in requiring
absolute obedience.2 58
The military establishment views these vaguely defined crimes not as
setting a trap for the serviceman but as providing the commander with
the tools which he needs for insuring good order and discipline. From
the military point of view, efficiency in combat is the paramount con-
sideration, and the idea that such efficiency can only be obtained by
strict compliance of servicemen with military standards of conduct,
guided by an unwritten code of honor, lies deep in military tradition.
There is still a strong feeling among officers that the only alternative to
strict discipline and absolute obedience to an undefined code of mili-
tary conduct is chaos. Thus, the military sees the general articles as
giving the commander the power to insure that his men live up to the
"higher" standards required of servicemen, and the fact that failure to
do so results in criminal penalties is accepted as a necessary part of the
discipline process.
In a day when most servicemen will not see combat,35 when sub-
stantial numbers of servicemen live off post and lead a nine-to-five
military existence, and when even in combat such qualities as initiative,
creativity, and intelligent reaction have replaced the old standard of
357Wiener, Are the General Military Articles Unconstitutionally Vague?, 54
A.B.A.J. 357, 363 (1968). See also Ackroyd, The General Articles, Articles 133
and 134, of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 264
(1961).
358 Wiener, supra note 357, at 358-63.
359 Although all servicemen still undergo training in combat skills in basic
training, a minority of all servicemen are selected for the advanced combat
training necessary for adequate performance in a combat zone today. Also a
minority of all servicemen have combat military occupation specialties (MOS).
See J. SHERBURNE & K. GROVES, EDUcATIoN IN THE ARMED FORCES 37 (1965).
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blind obedience to orders, 360 military emphasis on obedience to a rigid
and unspecified code of conduct administered by commanders with
criminal sanctions has been subjected to question. Thus, there is a basic
policy conflict between military demands for broad tools, such as the
general articles, to enforce the conformity it feels is necessary to main-
tain military efficiency and civilian demands for greater military con-
cessions to individual diversity.
The arguments previously made for maintaining the general articles
draw these responses. First, the historical antiquity of the general
articles seems to carry little weight today, for the principal character-
istic of military law reform in this century has been the rejection of the
argument that because practices and procedures date back to 1775 and
have been reenacted again and again by Congress, they should neces-
sarily be continued.
Second, although the Manual does contain a number of precise speci-
fications which can be used to charge a serviceman with a crime under
article 133 (from cheating at an examination to failure to pay a
debt)3 61 and article 134 (58 specifications running from wrongfully
kicking a horse to making disloyal statements),36,2 these are only ex-
amples of conduct which might be criminal under the general articles.
An infinite variety of other conduct, limited only by the scope of a com-
mander's creativity or spleen, can be made the subject of court-martial
under these articles. Furthermore, some of the specifications are them-
selves written in such indefinite and overbroad language as not to pro-
vide adequate notice of what acts will be called criminal .1 3 Specifi-
cations in the Manual, which are actually only a form to guide a prose-
cutor in filling out a complaint rather than the statement of a crime, do
not seem to be the most satisfactory method of stating crimes in a
modem criminal code.
360See M. JANOWITz, THE NEW MILITARY 17-25 (1967); M. JANOWTZ, Tim
MILITARY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW NATIONS 119-20 (1964); M. JANOWITZ,
THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER 8 (1960).
361 MANUAL, 1969, supra note 317, at app. 6c, art. 133.
362 Id. art. 134.
363 Brief for Appellant at 21-23, NCM 68-1734, Harvey, - C.M.R. - (July
10, 1969) (review granted, Oct. 31, 1969) claimed that the specification for
making "disloyal statements ...with design to promote disloyalty among the
troops" was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Appellant argued:
The Manual provides only two unhelpful sentences in the section en-
titled "Discussion" under the "disloyal statements" specification of Arti-
cle 134. The first sentence states that certain disloyal statements ...
may "be punishable as conduct to the prejudice of good order and disci-
pline or conduct reflecting discredit upon the armed forces." The second
sentence states: "Examples are public utterances designed to promote
disloyalty or disaffection among troops, as praising the enemy, attacking
the war aims of the United States, or denouncing our form of govern-
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Third, it is more difficult today than ever before to rely on a common
understanding of generalities such as "conduct unbecoming an of-
ficer and a gentleman" or "conduct bringing discredit upon the armed
forces." In our pluralistic society, it is difficult to find universal agree-
ment as to the meaning of such subjective terms. One need only ob-
serve the conduct at a Saturday night party at an officers' club to ap-
preciate the fact that there is considerable scope for selective enforce-
ment in the open-ended articles (article 133 and 134 include such speci-
fications as public drunk or disorderly actions, obscene language, and
committing a nuisance). 364
The fourth argument for maintaining the general articles is that the
open-ended crimes, admittedly falling short of the constitutional re-
quirements for certainty and particularity, must be retained because it
is impossible to draft a criminal code which defines with specificity the
ment." It strikes one immediately that these examples, which are not
legal terms of art and have no judicial gloss to aid in definition, are also
so vague that the serviceman still has little guidance as to what is
criminal and so overbroad that they could include statements which are
obviously protected by the First Amendment. For example, in the case
of "praising the enemy," who is the enemy? Is it a country with whom
the United States is engaged in a declared war? If not, how is a serv-
iceman to know which countries might be considered "the enemy"? Is
North Vietnam the enemy? Russia? Communist China? Cuba? East
Germany? Poland? Syria and Egypt? What constitutes praise? Can one
applaud the peace efforts of the Soviet Union in the Indian-Pakistan
dispute? Can he praise the educational programs of Premier Castro?
Can he comment favorably on the tenacity of Ho Chi Minh? Article
104 states, "Enemy imports citizens as well as members of military
organizations and does not restrict itself to the enemy government or
its armed forces." Is one, therefore, forbidden not only from praising
the government but also the people? Is it a crime to praise the spirit
of the North Vietnamese while denouncing their government?
The example of "attacking the war aims of the United States" is
equally confusing. Is it an attack on the war aims of the U.S. to call
for escalation of the war? To urge that we pull out of Vietnam? Can
a serviceman be sure what the war aims of the United States are? Is
the aim of our present Vietnam policy to insure a popularly elected
government in Vietnam or an anti-Communist government? Do state-
ments calling for a coalition government constitute a crime? "Denouncing
our form of government" is similarly unhelpful. What is meant by
"our form of government?" Is it the Constitutional framework? Can
a soldier advocate abolition of the electoral college system established
in the Constitution? Can a serviceman urge taking away constitutional
powers of the Supreme Court or denounce the school desegregation de-
cision? What elements are so basic to our "form of government" that they
cannot be denounced--federalism, capitalism, democracy, welfare state
programs, the draft?
Id. at 21-23.
36See MANUAL, 1969, supra note 317, at app. 6c, arts. 133, 134.
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broad spectrum of conduct which the military needs to make criminal.
This argument rests on an assumption which is subject to question.
There seems to be no reason why the present specifications under arti-
cles 133 and 134 could not be rewritten as individual crimes so that
each provides a clear statement of the elements of the crime charged.
If there is other specific conduct which the military desires to make
criminal, separate criminal definitions could be drafted covering such
conduct. The military problem is not really so very different from
civilian law in this respect. Drafters of civilian criminal codes run up
against the same kinds of problems when legislators indicate that they
want to make criminal all conduct which might be "disruptive" or
"dangerous to the economy" or "potentially violent." The old solution
was to draft a very vaguely defined crime so that almost any conduct
which the police or prosecutor wanted to call criminal would fall with-
in the definitional scope. These statutes have been declared unconsti-
tutional so frequently in recent years 365 that drafters have now realized
that a crime must be stated with specificity and definiteness and have
begun to draft criminal codes accordingly.
The real question today is whether the military should be held to
the requirements of specificity imposed on civilian definitions of criminal
conduct or should be permitted to continue to court-martial individuals
for conduct which all reasonable servicemen are supposed to recognize
as criminal. It will be remembered that General Ansell was disturbed
by the vagueness and breadth of article 134. He did not propose that
it be abolished but that it carry a maximum sentence of six months.10
Many of the specifications under the general article now provide for
maximum sentences of several years, the highest being 20 years.
Articles 133 and 134 have been applied particularly during the Viet-
nam War period to punish servicemen who have dissented in some
manner from the war, and the sizable punishments given in some of
these cases make General Ansell's recommendation particularly mean-
ingful.36 7 General Ansell's compromise reflects his feeling that a com-
265 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1963); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Straut v. Calissi, 293 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1968);
Synder v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D.
Ill. 1968); Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Huerta v. Flood,
103 Ariz. 608, 447 P.2d 866 (1968).
366S. 64, 1919, supra note 78, art. 96 at 38.
367 United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967) (two
years reduced to one, for contemptuous words against the President under arti-
cles 88 and 134); NCM 68-1734, Harvey, - C.M.R. - (July 10, 1969) (six
years reduced to three, for disloyal statements under article 134); CM 418868,
Amick & Stolte, - C.M.R. - (May 16, 1969) (four years each for distributing
anti-war leaflets under articles 81 and 134); NCM 68-1733, Daniels, - C.M.R.
- (May 15, 1969) (ten years reduced to four, for disloyal statements in violation
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mander needs to have some general disciplinary powers to control a
wide variety of unspecific conduct of servicemen, but once the pos-
sible sentence exceeds six months, the commander should only be
allowed to court-martial for violation of crimes stated in advance with
specificity. Thus, his philosophy seems consistent with the proposal that
although article 15 nonjudicial punishment (which enables a com-
mander to assess one month in custody plus forfeitures and demotion
without following judicial formalities) is a necessary tool for enforcing
discipline, court-martial prosecutions for violation of the general arti-
cles should either be limited by the punishment authorized or prohibited
altogether.
This proposal would appear to satisfy the military's need to enforce
general standards of conduct which are not amenable to specific draft-
ing, while still preventing the vague general articles from being the basis
for long-term sentences. A commander could nonjudicially punish a
serviceman or officer for conduct violating articles 133 and 134, but if
he desired to see the man court-martialed with the possibility of a sub-
stantial sentence, then he would have to prosecute him for a crime de-
fined in the UCMJ with specificity. In fact, once a commander moves
above the one month sentence available under article 15 (and in sum-
mary courts-martial) 36 and decides to use a special or general court-
martial, the man's useful relationship to the military in the future is
likely to be impaired anyway. Statistics show that a high percentage of
men found guilty in special and general courts-martial will never be re-
habilitated for service again.36 9 Most general court-martial convictions
result in confinement and a punitive discharge, and a substantial pro-
portion of men convicted in special courts-martial are punitively or
administratively discharged. 370 Thus, the military recognizes that when
a man is tried by one of the two higher courts-martial, and particularly
of 18 U.S.C. § 2387 (1964) assimilated by article 134); CM 416463, Levy,
C.M.R. - (Aug. 29, 1968) (review denied, Jan. 6, 1969) (three years for anti-
war statements under articles 133 and 134 and refusal to teach Green Berets
under article 90).
368 The maximum punishments of a summary court-martial are confinement
for one month, hard labor without confinement for 45 days, restriction to speci-
fied limits for two months, and forfeiture of two-thirds of one month's pay. 10
U.S.C. § 820 (1964) (art. 20 of the UCMJ). The maximum punishments under
article 15 depend on the rank of the commanding officer imposing the punish-
ment with officers of the grade of major or lieutenant commander able to im-
pose correctional custody of 30 days, forfeiture of one-half of one month's pay
per month for two months, reduction in rank, extra duties, restrictions for 60
days, and detention of one-half of one month's pay per month for three months.
10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (1964) (art. 15(b) of the UCMJ).
369 See Joint Hearings on S. 745, supra note 206, at addendum to pt. 3, app. B,
1045-47, 1054-56.
370 Id. at pt. 3, app. B, 966-73, 980-86, 1000-25.
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if he receives a substantial sentence, he is often no longer of value to it.
This makes it even more questionable to permit a commander to court-
martial under the vague standards of articles 133 and 134 in the name
of discipline.
Although it is difficult to verify, it appears unlikely today that there
would be an adverse effect upon military efficiency if these vaguely de-
fined crimes were restricted to punishment under article 15 (and,
perhaps, in summary courts-martial). It is true that the commander
would no longer be able to hold over his men's heads the threat of a
major court-martial for unspecified conduct. But he would still have
substantial "disciplinary" powers with which to maintain order and
discipline among his men. Actually, the minor disciplinary powers,
rather than the threat of major court-martial are the primary means of
enforcing discipline in the military. Furthermore, the power to court-
martial under vague standards tends to encourage an arbitrariness of
command which is undesirable in itself and which can have an adverse
effect upon morale.
Other deficiencies in the manner of statement of crimes and punish-
ments in the UCMJ include the retention of certain crimes which are
stated in such terms as to violate first amendment rights. These include
the crime of "contemptuous words" against the President, Vice Presi-
dent, Congress, Secretaries of Departments, state governors, and legis-
latures (article 88), and "provoking or reproachful words or gestures"
towards any other person subject to the UCMJ (article 117). Since
crimes are rarely charged under these articles (the prosecution of
Lieutenant Howe in 1965 under article 88 for carrying a sign reading
"END JOHNSON'S FASCIST AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM" and "LET'S
HAVE MORE THAN A CHOICE BETWEEN PETTY IGNORANT FASCISTS
IN 1968" in a peaceful off-post rally, while off-duty and in civilian clothes,
was the first prosecution thereunder since the UCMJ took effect in
1951),3'1 they appear to play no significant role in maintaining military
discipline and efficiency. Furthermore, it is unthinkable that the military
would undertake broad enforcement of these articles, and so they seem
to serve no other purpose than to provide a means of selective and dis-
criminatory prosecution for a commander.
Finally, as to punishments, there should be a thorough overhaul of
the table of maximum punishments. Some maximum punishments are
too high, permitting the extravagant sentences which are still handed
out by courts-martial, particularly for military crimes (for example,
sentences of at least 14 years were imposed on the first three men
court-martialed for a brief sitdown strike protesting stockade condi-
tions at the Presidio, all later cut to two years after intense public
371 See United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
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pressure) ?- Also, consideration should be given to providing defi-
nitional subcategories of various crimes whenever possible so that
findings by the court of less culpable elements would result in a smaller
maximum sentence.
In summary, the following suggestions for changes in the UCMJ are
made in connection with the statement of crimes and punishments: (a)
articles 133 and 134 should be abolished, with new articles adopted
contemplating sanctions for undesirable types of conduct that can be
drafted with specificity, or prosecution under article 133 and 134 should
be limited to article 15 nonjudicial punishment proceedings and sum-
mary courts-martial; (b) articles 88 and 117 should be abolished; (c)
double jeopardy should attach to prevent trial of servicemen for the
same crime in a court-martial after trial in any civilian court, and vice
versa; (d) the table of maximum punishments should be rewritten with
an eye to lowering the maximum sentences, particularly for military
crimes; (e) an attempt should be made to include subcategories indi-
cating differences in culpable elements and providing lower maximum
penalties for lower degrees of culpability; (f) and the President's
power to alter or suspend the table of maximum punishment as to
particular geographical areas or to suspend the table for particular
crimes should be removed.
2. Pretrial Proceedings-The UCMJ failed to alter the basic dif-
ference between military and civilian court pretrial proceedings, i.e.,
the absence of a right to grand jury or other determinative pretrial in-
vestigation in the military. Here again, there is a basic difference in ju-
dicial philosophy between the two systems. Civilian law places emphasis
upon the role of an independent grand jury 37 3 selected at random from
the community at large, which can prevent the prosecutor from going
ahead with a criminal case if it refuses to indict. This policy lies in a
belief that a separation of functions within the criminal process will
prevent any one individual from exercising too much control over the
process and thus preclude arbitrariness and prejudice. Under military
law, commanders have always exercised an absolute right to decide
whether to court-martial their men, and even the requirement in the
UCMJ that the commander must appoint an investigating officer and
consider his report does not remove that power since the commander
is not required to follow the investigating officer's recommendations.
372 See N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1969, at 7, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1969, at
56, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1968, at 23, col. 5.
373 Although the right to a grand jury is guaranteed in federal criminal trials
by the fifth amendment, it has not been held to be a required element of due
process, applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment. Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). Most states have provisions for grand juries
but the scope of the right varies considerably.
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The pretrial investigation is still viewed primarily as an aid to the
commander in insuring that he has all the facts before he makes his
decision. The policy reason behind the military practice is a belief that
a commander must himself possess the power to insure that a man is
court-martialed or his authority will be weakened, and that without
this power he will not be able to carry out his function of insuring order
and discipline within the unit.
Once again a central consideration in weighing the competing mili-
tary and civilian policies is whether, in fact, the military practice is
needed to maintain discipline and efficiency. It is highly question-
able whether the commander's absolute power to court-martial adds
much to the efficiency of the modem military. Commanders possess
substantial disciplinary powers over their men under the normal ad-
ministration of discipline and the use of article 15. Also, the fact that
a commander could still prefer court-martial charges against one of his
men, with the final decision as to the sufficiency of evidence to court-
martial being made by a separate and independent individual, would not
seem to reduce significantly the commander's effectiveness. Furthermore,
the commander's power to reject the recommendations of the investi-
gating officer and his staff judge advocate creates an opportunity for arbi-
trariness which itself endangers morale and discipline within a unit.
The absence of a right to pretrial bail under the UCMJ has already
been discussed.374 A broader right to pretrial release would seem to
present no threat to military discipline. It would avoid much needless
incarceration with its attendant aggravation of personality and psy-
chiatric disorders and permit, in many cases, productive use of the ac-
cused by the military prior to trial and greater assistance by the accused
in his own defense.
The following suggestions for changes in the UCMJ are made con-
cerning pretrial proceedings: (a) the power of commanding officers to
convene a general court-martial should be removed. Such officers should
only have the power to forward charges to the circuit judicial officer (see
page 96) with recommendations as to appropriate action; (b) the cir-
cuit judicial officer, upon receipt of charges and recommendations should
have the duty to appoint an impartial investigating officer who is legally
qualified and is not under the command of the forwarding officer; (c) the
investigating officer should conduct an investigation as now provided by
article 32, and upon completion of his investigation he should submit his
report to the circuit judicial officer for review; (d) if the investigating of-
ficer recommends that any or all of the charges not be referred to a
general court-martial, the circuit judicial officer should only overrule
such recommendations and refer such charges to a general court-
martial if he determines, in a written review dealing with each issue of
3 See text accompanying notes 258, 259 supra.
MILITARY LAW
fact or law raised by the investigating officer, that there is legally suffi-
cient evidence to refer such charges to a general court-martial; (e) the
circuit judicial officer should have the authority to convene the court
if the above requirements have been met (see pages 96-97 for method of
convening courts); and (f) all servicemen should be entitled to release
from confinement pending court-martial, except when substantial evi-
dence is presented indicating that pretrial confinement is necessary in
order to insure the presence of the accused at the court-martial. Re-
quests for release from pretrial confinement should be made not to the
commander, but to an individual or agency independent of the com-
mander, such as a military judge, or the circuit judicial officer.
3. Role of the Commander-The most important difference be-
tween military and civilian justice after the passage of the UCMJ lies
in the role of the commander in a court-martial. Under the civilian
criminal law process, different functions are performed by independent
individuals: The district attorney decides whether to prosecute; the
grand jury determines whether to indict; the defense counsel has no
connection with any of the other participants; the jury is picked at
random from the community; the judge and other court officials have
no relation to the district attorney; and the appellate courts are inde-
pendent tribunals. In a court-martial, the commander plays a role, in
varying degrees, in all of these functions. He decides whether to prose-
cute; he has the power to handpick the jury from his command and the
trial counsel and defense counsel from his legal officers; he has certain
supervisory powers over the administration of the trial; and he has the
power to review the findings and sentence.
The Military Justice Act of 1968, by creating military judges inde-
pendent of the commander convening authority, removed one of the
functions from the commander's control. Also, commanders do not usual-
ly handpick court members or counsel, leaving this up to one of their
staff officers, such as the staff judge advocate, and commanders do not
become involved personally in the administration of most courts-
martial. However, the ultimate power still lies with the commander and,
in cases in which he is particularly interested, a commander frequently
takes a hand in the selection of court and counsel and in various ad-
ministrative matters. The military cases have upheld the convening au-
thority's power over a variety of supervisory and administrative matters
connected with a court-martial. He has the power to enter into a pre-
trial agreement with the accused whereby he promises to cut down the
sentence in return for a guilty plea 75 and to grant immunity to service-
375 Although pretrial agreements were initiated in 1953 at the direction of the
then Acting Judge Advocate General of the Army, they are not provided for in
either the UCMJ or the MANUAL, 1969. See CM 390869, Callahan, 22 C.M.R.
443, 447 (1956). They have been upheld by the military courts, CM 384022,
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men if they will testify against someone else .37  This is an immensely
important part of military justice prosecution; there are guilty pleas in
two-thirds of all Army general courts-martial and almost three-quarters
of these are negotiated pleas.3 17 The convening authority, as has al-
ready been discussed, 378 rules on defense motions to subpoena witnesses
and obtain other evidence before trial. He can excuse court members
both before3 79 and, in certain limited situations, after 80 the trial has
begun. The Court of Military Appeals has even held that the con-
vening authority can reverse a court's dismissal of charges granted on
such grounds as denial of a speedy trial, if he disagrees, and order the
court to try the man anyway. 381
The administrative functions carried out by the staff judge advocate
are usually performed without direct supervision by the commander
but are subject to the commander's overall control. The staff judge ad-
vocate, who is directly responsible to the commander, performs a
variety of impartial administrative functions in a court-martial as well
as acting as the commander's lawyer in an admittedly partisan role.
In a typical case, for example, the staff judge advocate might have con-
ferred with the commander about an individual and might have been
aware of the commander's desire to court-martial him. He also might
have advised the commander as to legal issues regarding the court-
martial, selected the trial and defense counsel and court members with
or without instructions from the commander, carried out a variety of
functions related to the preparation for and administration of the trial,
Proctor, 19 C.M.R. 435 (1955), although the Court of Military Appeals has
held there are limitations on agreements. United States v. Veteto, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
64, 39 C.M.R. 64 (1968); United States v. Brady, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 614, 38 C.M.R.
412 (1968); United States v. Cummings, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 376, 38 C.M.R. 174
(1968). It has been stated that pretrial agreements for negotiated guilty pleas
are not in accord with Air Force Procedure (AFP 111-1-1, Military Justice
Handbook, para. 64e, n.2 (November 1962) (cited in ACM 18519, Rahn, 33
C.M.R. 945, 953 (1963)). There appears to be serious question as to the
propriety of negotiated pleas in civilian courts. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's
Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHi. L. REv. 50 (1968).
376 MANUAL, 1969, supra note 317, at f[ 150b. See also United States v. Kirsch,
15 U.S.C.M.A. 84, 35 C.M.R. 56 (1964); ACM 10757, Guttenplan, 20 C.M.R.
764 (1955).
377 1 THE ADvocATE, April 1969, at I.
378 See text accompanying notes 344-47 supra.
379 See United States v. Allen, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 626, 18 C.M.R. 250 (1955).
380 See CM 419200, Geraghty, - C.M.R. - (Jan. 28, 1969) (convening au-
thority could relieve a colonel sitting on a court-martial after the trial had begun
by indicating to the law officer that he was needed "for a very important matter
involving exigencies of the service").
381 10 U.S.C. § 862(a) (1964) (art. 62(a) of the UCMJ); Lowe v. Laird,
18 U.S.C.M.A. 131, 39 C.M.R. 131 (1969); United States v. Boehm, 17
U.S.C.M.A. 530, 38 C.M.R. 328 (1968) (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
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including giving advice and instructions to counsel, and finally advised
the commander concerning review of the conviction and sentence. The
potential for conflict of interest is increased by the fact that the staff
judge advocate is considered first and foremost to be the commander's
lawyer, and the staff judge advocate's office to be the commander's law
firm. As former Judge George W. Latimer of the Court of Military Ap-
peals has stated: "If we look the facts in the face, we must realize that
presently the staff judge advocate is the officer who is suspected of
being a messenger of conviction. He is always pictured as the alter
ego of the commander." 382
The military's defense of the structure of the legal corps relates to
its emphasis upon unified command authority. It is felt that if the com-
mander could not demand the unqualified obedience and loyalty of all
legal personnel, he would lose effective control of discipline within his
unit. This is not to say that the military position assumes that the staff
judge advocate or the defense counsel will compromise the interests of
the accused under pressure from the commander. The military takes
pains to emphasize that although the staff judge advocate and the de-
fense counsel are directly responsible to the commander and are charged
with insuring that the interests of the command are preserved, never-
theless they are also charged with insuring that the rights of the ac-
cused are protected. There is no problem in serving both the interests
of the command and the accused, the military maintains, because they
are the same.
The problem with this analysis is that, in fact, the commander and
accused often have different views of what rights the accused has and
what is a fair and impartial proceeding. Commanders, no matter how
conscientious, can become personally involved in disciplinary matters
and court-martial cases, and this involvement can color their view of
how the case should be handled. Likewise, the juggling of interests by
the staff judge advocate and his legal officers can become a difficult
process, for they too experience the inevitable conflict which arises
when they are expected to maintain loyalties to two individuals whose
interests are not, in fact, the same. The military, which tends to minimize
possible conflicts between the interests of the command and service-
men and puts great faith in the ability of officers to perform consci-
entiously in a variety of assignments, sees no conflict of interest here;
civilians, who emphasize independence of administrators, do.
"In the nature of things," the Court of Military Appeals has ob-
served, "command control is scarcely ever apparent on the face of the
382 Latimer, Improvements and Suggested Improvements in the Administration
of Military Justice, REPORT OF CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, AR.MY JUDGE AD-
VOCATE CONFERENCE 54 (1954).
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record. . .. ,, ss1 For this reason, critics claim, there is much more im-
proper command influence than ever reaches the military appeals
courts. They cite the 1967 cases at Fort Leonard Wood, involving Gen-
eral Lipscomb, where the Court of Military Appeals reversed almost
a hundred convictions after charges of improper command influence
were made, as one of the rare occasions on which overbearing actions
by commanders were detected and publicized.38 4 The military, how-
ever, argues that an investigating officer found that the general had
acted imprudently, but not illegally, and that this was just an example
of overcaution on the part of the court.
Until recently there was little objective evidence either way to support
or disprove claims of widespread command influence. This summer,
however, a former career Army officer, Luther C. West, completed a
dissertation for the Doctor of Juridical Science degree at George Wash-
ington University Law School entitled "The Command Domination of
the Military Judicial Process." 385 This dissertation, as yet unpublished,
contains a detailed and documented description of improper command
influence in a number of cases of which Mr. West, as an Army officer
in the Judge Advocate General's office, had personal knowledge. The
accounts make up a startling picture of command intrigue, staff judge
advocate compliance, and lower level accession to command wishes.
The cases range from intense reprisals against a young military defense
counsel, who raised the defense of command influence, 38 to documented
proof of false or misleading testimony by three field grade officers in
an article 32 investigation to cover up the role a commanding general
had played in incidents leading up to court-martial charges.38 7 Mr.
West's conclusions remind one of the equally critical statements of
another career soldier, General Ansell, 50 years before:
The military judicial setting is still dominated by military commanders,
from the inception of charges to the final completion of appellate review,
with the exception of the handful of cases each year that are subject to
review by the United States Court of Military Appeals, and in these cases
only a semblance of constitutional protection against command control
is afforded the military defendant.
383 United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 149, 37 C.M.R. 411, 413
(1967).
384 Id. See also N.Y. Times, June 25, 1968, at 3, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 25,
1967, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 22, 1967, at 1, col. 5.
385 L. West, The Command Domination of the Military Judicial Process, Aug.
10, 1969 (unpublished thesis in George Washington University Law School, Wash-
ington, D.C.).
386 Id. The case of Lieutenant Wayne Loudermilch is described at 244-88 of the
thesis.
387 Id. The case of Lieutenant Dennis Morrisseau is described at 298-329 of the
thesis.
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There can be no conclusions drawn from this study other than that
the forces of justice under law within the military community are still
locked in unending combat with the forces of order, whether it be
called military necessity, discipline, law and order in the streets, or
what have you, and that the omnipresence of the Court of Military Ap-
peals is, at best, a very weak preserver of the balance between these
two opposing social forces ....
The entire court-martial process should be lifted from the shoulders
of the military commander, with the only possible remaining connection
being in the area of preferring charges for trial, and in the furnishing of
necessary logistics and court-martial members who in turn should be
selected for jury duty by impartial civilian administrative methods as
opposed to military command channels. Thus, the complete staff judge
advocate function, as well as the law officer, prosecutor, and defense
functions including the post-trial review function, should be non-mili-
tary . . . Only when procedural protections of this magnitude come
to pass, will the conflicting interests of military necessity and justice
under the rule of law (if there is indeed any conflict between these
values) be fairly administered and balanced in our nation's military
courts.ass
Mr. West's account, of course, is limited to a tiny percentage of the
total courts-martial, and many of the cases displaying extreme command
influence, which he refers to, involved circumstances which particular-
ly aroused the ire of the commander. There is probably truth to the
claim by military apologists that the average court-martial (a high per-
centage of courts-martial are for AWOL) is not directly affected by
improper command influence. However, when a commander views a
court-martial case as a particular threat to the command, such as cases
involving political dissent, alleged homosexual acts, barracks thefts, or
any kind of disobedience, the court-martial system seems to provide an
unduly attractive opportunity for a commander to influence the trial.
Even if one is willing to admit that the court-martial does not always
provide the same kind of impartial trial as does a civilian court, the
dispositive question is whether the military can permit courts-martial not
to be administered by the commander without adversely affecting disci-
pline. Again, there is no objective way to predict the effect of removing
command control of courts-martial on military discipline. However, if
past military predictions as to the dire effects of other reforms which
lessened commander control over military justice are any indication,
the threat would seem to be exaggerated. Commanders once warned
that if lawyers were used in general courts-martial, servicemen would
learn that they could "beat" charges with legal technicalities, and dis-
cipline would be impaired. Commanders warned that if law officers or
judges were introduced into courts-martial, legal considerations, rather
than the needs of the command, would become paramount, and dis-
3ss Id. at 447-48, 451.
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cipline would suffer. Commanders warned that if persons other than
the commander could set aside court-martial convictions, the com-
mander's authority and prestige would be undermined, and discipline
would fail. After each of these reforms, and many others, the military
quickly and efficiently adapted to the change, and there was no evi-
dence that discipline or efficiency suffered.
One source of enlightenment as to the possible effect on discipline
of civilianizing reforms in military justice is the experience of other
countries. It appears that a number of countries have restricted com-
mand control over military justice to a greater degree than has the United
States and have suffered no adverse consequences. Perhaps the best
example is West Germany. When the West German army was es-
tablished in 1955, it was reconstructed on democratic principles, and
troops were made subject to civilian courts for discipline. There have
been no military courts in West Germany since the collapse of Hilter's
regime in 1945, and there has been general satisfaction over the ab-
sence of courts-martial. 3 9 Great Britain,390 Canada, 391 and France392
have all introduced civilianizing elements into their military systems of
justice which appear to exceed those of the United States, all without
adverse effect on discipline. At approximately the same time that the
UCMJ was passed, Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia
provided for civilian tribunals to review military trials.393 Great Britain
went even further by making the Judge Advocate General of the mili-
tary a civilian office under the Lord Chancellor and delegating to it a
number of functions previously held by commanders, including pro-
viding counsel and judges. "94 In Canada, the Court-Martial Appeals
Board made up of civilians was given broad review powers, exceeding
those of our Court of Military Appeals, over courts-martial. 395
A reduction of commanders' powers over military justice is con-
sistent with the civilianization trend which has been taking place in the
military since World War II. There is a certain anachronistic ring to
arguments that a commander needs to control courts-martial to ob-
tain instant and unthinking response from his men and that any lessening
of his powers would weaken his ability to maintain discipline. The
3 8 9 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1969, at 12, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1969, at
3, cols. 1-2.
390 WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JusTic 231 (1967).
391 National Defence Act, CAN. REV. STAT. C. 184 (1952) established a "Code
of Service Discipline." Paragraphs 189-96 provide for a review system under a
civilian Court-Martial Appeal Board.
392 E.g., the French military code acknowledges the right to disobey an order
against one's conscience. Paxton, The Right to Disobey, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1968,
at 14 (Book Review).
393 See WIENER, supra note 390, at 232.
394 Note 159 supra.
39 Note 391 supra.
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truth is that the nature of the military has changed dramatically since
World War II and likewise the nature of discipline has had to change.
Servicemen today have more technical jobs, better education, and more
individual rights than ever before. Technology has transformed the
military into a highly bureaucratic society. A whole new class of en-
listed men, called specialists, came into being after the Korean War.
They perform technical jobs and are not placed in a troop environ-
ment. Many servicemen work in jobs not much different from that of
a civil servant or a corporation employee, and substantial numbers live
off post. Only about ten percent of today's servicemen have MOS's
(job descriptions showing their occupational speciality) which involve
combat skills, while 54 percent hold technical specialties (electronics,
mechanics, crafts, etc.) and the rest hold service specialties (food,
administration, clerical, etc.).3 Most servicemen are not given spe-
cialized combat training,397 and since some 20 men are now needed in
support for every combat soldier, there is no need for them ever to
be in combat. Seventy-five percent of enlisted men are serving their
mandatory tour and will return to civilian life when it is completed393
In short, today's military is a big business with a substantial portion of
its members being noncareer civilian-soldiers who serve their country
in a service job or at a desk.
This change in the nature of the military inevitably calls for a re-
evaluation of traditional military attitudes towards discipline and the
role of the commander. Two of the traditional commandments of mili-
tary discipline, absolute and unquestioning obedience to commands of
superiors and absolute conformity to official attitudes, have already
been seriously undercut. After Nuremberg, men in the ranks cannot
escape individual responsibility for acts which they are ordered to do,30
and the Court of Military Appeals has further undercut the concept of
absoluteness of orders by creating a number of areas in which a service-
man is not bound to follow the orders of a superior.400 The following
language of a board of review in United States v. Kinder (1953) indi-
96B J. SHELBURNE & K. GROVES, EDUCATION IN THE ARMED FORCES 37 (1965).
3971d. at 26-40.
s
98 Id. at 41.
399See CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (NuREMBERO)
arts. 6, 8 (1945). These articles provide for individual responsibility for war
crimes and crimes against humanity and "the fact that the defendant acted
pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall not free him from
responsibility." See also Note, Nuremberg Rule of Superior Orders---Court-Martial
Trial of Captain Howard Levy, 9 HARV. INT'L L.J. 169 (1968); Kimball, The
Court-Martial of Dale Noyd: A Commentary on the Tensions Between Law and
Moral Action, 86 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 116 (1969).
40oSee, e.g., United States v. Gentle, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 437, 37 C.M.R. 57 (1966);
United States v. Wilson, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 165. 30 C.M.R. 165 (1961); United
States v. Granger, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 719, 26 C.M.R. 499 (1958).
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cates the change in attitude towards the relationship of a serviceman to
his commander:
The obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier
is a reasoning agent. He does not respond, and is not expected to respond,
like a piece of machinery. It is a fallacy of wide-spread consumption that
a soldier is required to do everything his superior officer orders him
to do.
4 01
A similar alteration of attitude has taken place concerning the obliga-
tion of servicemen to conform to official attitudes and demands. No
young man who enters the service today has escaped the influence of the
individualistic and democratic values of our society, and it is more and
more difficult for the military to command the absolute conformity to
official views it once could. The current movement for expanded service-
men's rights, particularly as regards exercise of first amendment rights
involving reading and expressing dissenting views, has already led to re-
writing of regulations to permit many of these activities. 40 2 The substan-
tial number of court cases still pending may further extend servicemen's
individual rights.403
These changes have significantly reduced the role and the power of
the commander. Whereas once the commander possessed the authority
to control virtually every aspect of the life of his men, today there are
distinct areas where he lacks authority. In many ways, the military trust
in the commander-soldier relationship as the keystone of an effective
military is now subject to question. Many servicemen work in a bureau-
cratic or technical atmosphere, and the command structure, with its rigid
notions of caste, rank, and absolute obedience, has little to do with their
effectiveness on the job. The traditional view of the commander as an all
powerful pater familias is today something of an anachronism and, even
among combat troops, the specialization of jobs has removed much of
the need for the crude authoritarianism which has always characterized
the command philosophy. Our civilian paramilitary, like police and fire-
men, demonstrate that men can function effectively in life-endangering
activities under a normal civilian superior-subordinate relationship where
the superior lacks absolute powers and criminal law sanctions. This is
not to say that commanders are on the way out, but rather that the role
of the commander, except with some modifications in a combat situa-
tion, must necessarily be closer to that of a civilian manager.
401 ACM 7321, Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742, 776 (1953) (quoting from the "Einsatz-
gruppen Case").
402See note 351 supra.
403 Pending federal habeas corpus petitions seeking to overturn court-martial
convictions claiming denial of first amendment rights include Howe v. Laird,
Civil Action 622-68 (D.D.C., Mar. 11, 1968); Levy v. Laird, No. 1057HC (M.D.
Pa., filed Apr. 19, 1969). For other first amendment cases still on appeal within
the court-martial system see note 367 supra.
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There is also something unrealistic about the notion that a command-
er must himself possess all effective powers over his subordinate per-
sonnel or his authority and effectiveness will be undermined. This, of
course, is the premise behind the contention that a commander must con-
trol all functions of a court-martial. Today, with instant communications
and easy mobility, there is no reason to believe that a commander's ef-
fectiveness would be destroyed if he had to rely upon other agencies to
perform court-martial functions. Commanders may once have held their
men in check by the fear which their disciplinary powers engendered,
but discipline in the modern military is surely not based upon such crude
displays of retributory powers. The fact is that in many ways the military
command structure has succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of the mil-
itary; servicemen today generally accept the authority of the individuals
who fill various command positions, and there is much less need for
constant displays of command power to hold men in line. The fact that
such authority is not absolute, or that it must be shared with other offi-
cials, is not a reason for rejecting that authority. In fact, the young ser-
vicemen of today are more sensitive to abuse of authority, brutality, and
injustice than to the pettiness of bureaucracy. The fact that their com-
mander, in order to court-martial them, must submit the charges to an
independent court administered by impartial officials is more likely to
win their acceptance than the spectre of an all powerful commander
whose control makes a farce out of courts-martial.
Of course, it is difficult to judge what the reactions of millions of ser-
vicemen would be to removal of command control of courts-martial, and
the foregoing analysis can hardly be considered a scientific prediction.
However, it should indicate that there are complicated dimensions to this
question, and that the obsession of the military with individual command
powers as the only key to military effectiveness fails to take into account
both changed conditions and a variety of other relevant factors. There
is simply no concrete evidence on which to argue that removal of com-
mand control of court-martial appointments and machinery would ad-
versely affect military discipline today.
It has been suggested that the only way to remove the threat of im-
proper command control over courts-martial is to remove military juris-
diction over servicemen's crimes altogether or to replace the military ad-
ministrators with civilians. However, the court-martial structure can be
modified to prevent a commander from influencing a trial and yet leave
a workable criminal law system. Based in part upon an administrative
scheme proposed by Colonel J. F. Rydstrom in an article in the A.B.A.
Journal, entitled "Uniform Courts of Military Justice," 404 and in part
404Rydstrom, Uniform Courts of Military Justice, 50 A.B.AJ. 749 (1964).
Under Colonel Rydstrom's proposal the judicial circuits would provide the judge,
the court personnel, and counsel, but they would not have the power to appoint
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upon the new use of "regions" and "circuits" in the Air Force trial ju-
diciary4 5 and the use of "law centers" in the Navy,408 the following sug-
gestions for reform of the UCMJ are made concerning the role of the
commander in courts-martial:
A. The only connection which a general court-martial convening au-
thority will have with a general court-martial will be to refer charges
accompanied by a recommendation for general court-martial to the cir-
cuit judicial officer for investigation, and possible convening of a general
court-martial (see page 86). The only connection which a special court-
martial convening authority will have with a special court-martial will be
to refer charges to the circuit judicial officer for convening of a special
court-martial.
B. The United States and the world will be divided into judicial cir-
cuits with areas similar to the present Army areas. A judicial circuit of-
fice will be established for each circuit, and the Judge Advocate Generals
of the services will be responsible for providing lawyers and personnel
for each circuit. The personnel provided by each service will be deter-
mined by the ratio of its personnel in that circuit to the total personnel in
that circuit. One service, usually the one predominant in the circuit area,
will be given primary responsibility for the operation of each judicial
circuit office. That service will provide a circuit judicial officer who will
be in charge of the office and to whom all other personnel will be respon-
sible and be subject for efficiency reports. He will report directly to the
Judge Advocate General of his service.
C. Each judicial circuit will be divided into at least four divisions:
a field judiciary division, a trial counsel division, a defense counsel divi-
sion, and a review division. The divisions will function as separate of-
fices, but the chiefs of each section will be under the command of the
circuit judicial officer.
D. Upon the direction of the circuit judicial officer that charges be
referred to a general court-martial, pursuant to the requirements for in-
vestigation and approval thereof (see pages 86-87), or upon the receipt
by the circuit judicial officer of charges for a special court-martial from a
special court-martial convening authority, the circuit judicial officer will:
(i) Insure that the field judiciary division appoints a military judge,
a court reporter, and such other court personnel as are neces-
sary, and arrange the time and place for the court-martial to
the court or to review the decisions. He argues that this arrangement would pro-
vide a higher caliber of legal representation, would remove counsel from com-
mand control, and would encourage more lawyers to stay in the service. He
suggests that his plan could be implemented by the services without need for a
change in the UCMJ.
405 See Kenney, The Trial Judiciary, U.S.A.F. JAG L. REv. 208-11 (1969).
405 See Selman, The Military Justice Act of 1968: Some Problems and Practical
Solutions, 23 JAG J. 147-53 (1969).
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be held, so notifying the commanding officer and the accused
involved.
(ii) Insure that the trial counsel and defense counsel divisions pro-
vide a trial counsel and a defense counsel who will take such
steps necessary to investigate and prepare the case for trial.
(iii) Insure that a court is chosen by random selection from all the
officers eligible for court-martial duty within the circuit and, if
the accused has elected to have enlisted men on his court, insure
that the requisite number of enlisted members are chosen by
random selection from all the enlisted men eligible for court-
martial duty within the circuit (see pages 98-99).
E. Upon the completion of the trial, the military judge will forward
the record to the circuit judicial officer for review.
4. Membership and Selection of the Court-Trial lawyers are well
aware of the fact that trials are often won or lost according to whether
the lawyer is able to obtain jurors whose attitudes and prior experiences
relate favorably to their case. Thus, the commander's power to hand-
pick the court members from a small, select class (his officers) gives a
tremendous advantage to the prosecution. If the present requirement
that at least two-thirds of the members of every court-martial must be
officers were removed, and if members were selected at random from
the entire military community at the particular installation, it is likely
that a heavy majority of the members would be young men in the lower
ranks. The military views this change as highly undesirable, arguing that
class antagonisms might prevent lower ranking servicemen from render-
ing an honest verdict and cause undue sympathy for the accused. The
military has also raised the somewhat contradictory objection that low
ranking enlisted men might be overwhelmed by the presence of officers
on the court and therefore not exert their own independence. Finally,
the military has argued that low ranking enlisted men are not qualified
to serve on courts-martial because of their lack of experience in the mili-
tary and their lack of understanding and appreciation of the purposes
and objectives of military discipline.
These arguments actually go to the heart of the jury system itself.
Permitting an accused to be tried by a jury of his peers chosen at random
always involves the possibility that jurors will be sympathetic to the ac-
cused, swayed by other members of the jury, or that they will not appre-
ciate the purposes and objectives of the prosecution and the criminal
laws. These qualities, however, are only objectionable if they prevent a
juror from viewing a case with an open mind, and they have a valuable
function in insuring trial by a jury whose members reflect the different
experiences, attitudes, and class prejudices found in the community. The
court-martial comprised solely of officers is especially lacking in these
qualities.
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There seems to be little basis for arguing that lower ranking service-
men are not qualified to sit as members of courts-martial. Today, when
a high percentage of enlisted men have a high school education and a
substantial minority are college educated, they appear to possess as ac-
ceptable qualifications as the average civilian juror. There may be, how-
ever, some risk that court-martial members from lower ranks will be
more class motivated and less objective than civilian jurors. The young
recruit, who has been forced to accept a highly disciplinarian way of
life, may harbor deeper antagonisms against a military prosecution than
does the average civilian juror towards the district attorney's case. The
continued effects of the anti-war movement, of the servicemen's move-
ment for unionization in the military, and of the movement for ex-
panded individual rights in the military have increased anti-establish-
ment antagonisms among some servicemen. Of course, similar problems
exist in civilian law, and no one has suggested that the right to be tried
by a jury of the accused's peers should be suspended because, for ex-
ample, a high percentage of the jury in a prosecution for acts connected
with a labor dispute might be sympathetic to the aims of the workers.
Both the military and some of its critics have maintained that trial by
peers is not adaptable to the military because of the potential bias in-
evitably created by the military caste system. Thus, advocates of the pres-
ent system argue that the right to court-martial members randomly selec-
ted from a broader base would be dangerous, while reformers, such as
Charles Morgan, 47 argue that the military can never provide a service-
man an impartial trial and therefore all military crimes should be tried in
civilian courts. General Ansell, on the other hand, took the position that
if court membership were weighted somewhat against complete domina-
tion by the lower ranks, while still insuring that members of the same
rank as the accused would hold the controlling votes on the court, trial
by jury approximating the civilian right to trial by one's peers could be
achieved. The following suggestions for reform of the UCMJ are based
upon this view. However, like most compromises, this view can only be
recommended with the caveat that it may prove inadequate to insure
serviceman a fair trial, and as a result broader guarantees of trial by
one's peers or a civilian jury may ultimately be required.
A. An enlisted man or officer may elect to have one-half of a general
or special court-martial composed of members of his own rank.
B. The circuit judicial officer of each judicial circuit will insure that
the name of every enlisted man assigned to a unit within that district
who is eligible for court-martial duty is placed in an enlisted man's jury
roll or wheel, and that the name of every officer assigned to a unit within
that district, who is eligible for court-martial duty, is placed in an officer's
jury roll or wheel. Standards for eligibility will be established, with ex-
407 THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 25, 1969, at 63, 119.
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ceptions from court-martial duty limited to extreme personal or official
hardship, with the requirement that such reasons be described in full in
writing and sent to the circuit judicial officer who will rule on such ex-
emptions.
C. The circuit judicial officer will insure that a court is chosen by
random selection from the officers' jury roll or wheel for court-martial
duty for each individual court-martial and, if accused has elected to have
enlisted personnel on his court, will insure that the requisite number of
enlisted members is chosen by random selection from the enlisted men's
jury roll or wheel.
5. Judicial Functions-The establishment of a field judiciary sys-
tem in the Military Justice Act of 1968 insures that the court-martial
function of military judges will be performed by individuals free from the
commander's control. This procedure is satisfactory, and the only rec-
ommended changes would be to put the military judges under the admin-
istration of the judicial circuits which have been proposed.
6. Defense Counsel-The most serious weakness in the present law
providing for military lawyers in both general and special courts-martial
is that the lawyers come from the office of the commander's staff judge
advocate. The staff judge advocate, because of his close association with
the commander as his principal legal advisor, is not independent. The
staff judge advocate's office often resembles a small law firm, and there
is usually a good deal of discussion of cases between opposing counsel
and other lawyers in the office. All actions are inevitably influenced
by the staff judge advocate. Law firms have recognized that they cannot
avoid conflict of interest problems by claiming that different lawyers in
the firm are handling each side of the case and, despite the good faith of
most military lawyers, the closeness in which they work and the over-
riding command interest of the staff judge advocate are not conducive
to an adversary defense.
A second problem with military defense counsel is that, in some
cases, the usually higher ranking members of the court prevent counsel
from taking as strong a position of advocacy as they should. The only
way to avoid such problems is to remove as many of the trappings of
rank as possible from a court-martial trial, and to forbid any adverse
action against a defense counsel on account of his zeal in the court room.
Finally, one substantial defect in the adequacy of military defense coun-
sel results from the refusal of the Judge Advocate General to permit
them to bring collateral suits for extraordinary relief (such as habeas
corpus, injunction, mandamus, and declaratory judgment) in federal
district courts.408 There are times when the only way a serviceman's
40SIn the court-martial case involving Lieutenant Morrisseau, discussed by
West, note 384 supra, his appointed military counsel was refused permission from
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rights can be protected is by seeking federal court relief,409 and if he is
unfortunate enough only to be represented by a military lawyer, that ave-
nue will be foreclosed to him.
The following suggestions for reform of the UCMJ in this area are
made:
A. Defense counsel will be selected by the chief of the defense coun-
sel division of the judicial circuit. A defense counsel need not be a mem-
ber of the same service as the accused, unless the accused so requests.
B. Defense counsel are subject to the command of the chief of their
division who is in turn responsible to the circuit judicial officer. They
will not be subject to the command of any commander convening author-
ity or his staff judge advocate.
C. No adverse action of any kind may be taken against a defense
counsel by an individual subject to the UCMJ on account of his per-
formance as counsel in a particular case, except that the chief of the
defense counsel division and the circuit judicial officer may rate him on
the merits of his judicial work.
D. Defense counsel shall be authorized to bring suit in federal
district courts when deemed necessary to protect the interests of a client.
Court costs will be paid by the military.
E. The chief of the defense counsel division may assign as a defense
counsel for a particular case an officer from the appellate counsel divi-
sion of the office of the Judge Advocate General and such counsel shall
be permitted to represent the client through appelate review.
410
7. Nature of the Trial-The UCMJ, as amended by the Military
Justice Act of 1968 and supplemented by the Manual, now provides
a relatively judicial format for general and special courts-martial.
The military rules as to admissibility of evidence, 411 scope of cross-
the Judge Advocate General of the Army to file a federal court action seeking to
enjoin the court-martial on the ground that the prosecution was brought without
hope of ultimate success and would have a chilling effect on first amendment
rights. The suit was prepared by civilian counsel but the court-martial charges
were dropped before it was filed.
409 See Extraordinary Remedies, 1 THE ADVOcATE, August 1969, at 1-4; Sher-
man, Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies
Doctrine, 55 VA. L. REv. 483 (1969).4 10 See Rydstrom, supra note 404, at 750 n.10.
411 The rules of evidence contained in the MANUAL, 1969, supra note 317, at TU
137-54, are comparable to the rules followed in most federal courts. Occasionally
one system or the other applies a more stringent rule, for example, the Court of
Military Appeals in United States v. Gooding & Axel, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 188, 39
C.M.R. 188 (1969) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) declined to follow the restrictive
rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) which concerned the ad-
missibility of pretrial statements by a joint defendant.
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examination, 412 and afflirmative defenses413 such as the defense of in-
sanity,414 are comparable to civilian courts. The military rule as to chal-
lenges, both peremptory (only one permitted to the defendant) 1 5 and
for cause,416 are barely satisfactory and do not provide the same kind
of broad protection found in civilian trials. Decisions of the Court of
Military Appeals as to requirements of specificity of specifications,4 17
providency of guilty pleas, 418 and instructions to the court 19 are at least
as fair as most civilian courts.
4 1 2 MAUxL, 1969, supra note 317, at 51 149b. See also United States v. Baldwin,
17 U.S.C.M.A. 72, 37 C.M.R. 336 (1967).
413 MANUAL, 1969, supra note 317, at IT 214-16.
414Id. at ff 120b. "A person is not mentally responsible in a criminal sense for
an offense unless he was, at the time, so far free from mental defect, disease, or
derangement as to be able concerning the particular act charged both to distin-
guished right from wrong and to adhere to the right." Id. The military test for
insanity is broader than the M'Naghten rule, with a formulation similar to that of
the ALl MODEL PENAL CODE.
415Id. at 1 62e. In contrast, under FED. R. CIM. P. 24(b) each side is entitled
to 20 peremptory challenges if the offense charged is punishable by death; the
government to six and the defense to ten if the offense is punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year; and each side to three if the offense is punishable
by imprisonment for not more than one year or by fine, or both.
416 Id. at 1 62f. Court members who display on voir dire prejudices and con-
flicts of interest which would be grounds for challenge for cause in a civilian
court are frequently allowed to remain on courts-martial. See, e.g., the Presidio
courts-martial in which a defense challenge was denied as to a major who stated
that he did not think demonstrations were ever a proper way to express griev-
ances and admitted that he bowled weekly with the post's Provost Marshal
who was directly involved in the incident on which the courts-martial were based.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1969, at 3, col. 1. The reason often given for a less liberal
challenge rule in the military is that the number of officers available for court-
martial duty is usually limited.
417See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 37 C.M.R. 129
(1967); United States v. Fleig, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 444, 37 C.M.R. 64 (1966). But see
United States v. Aloyian, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 333, 36 C.M.R. 489 (1966) (Ferguson,
J., dissenting).
418United States v. Care, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 535, 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969); United
States v. Calpito, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 450, 40 C.M.R. 162 (1969). The Care decision
was intended to bring military procedure as to the judge's obligation to insure
the providency of a guilty plea up to the federal court standard as expressed in
FED. R. CuRi. P. 11, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). However, it has been suggested that the mili-
tary rule, permitting the trial judge to question the accused to determine if there
is a factual basis for the plea, rather than determining this factor from other
sources as under the federal rule, could prejudice the accused or cause him to
incriminate himself in an uncharged crime. I THE ADVOCATE, September 1969,
at 8-9.
419 United States v. Johnson, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 436, 40 C.M.R. 148 (1969); United
States v. Meador, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 91, 39 C.M.R. 91 (1969).
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Unfortunately, vestiges of the old court-martial administrative hear-
ing still remain and serve as constant reminders that this is a military,
not merely a judicial, hearing. It seems unlikely that the participants can
escape being affected by such military aspects or that they serve any
useful judicial purpose. The following are recommendations for changes
in court-martial trial proceedings to make the formalities conform to a
genuine judicial proceeding: (a) Judicial robes for military judges
should be provided. The court room should be redesigned so that it will
be identical to a civilian court room with the judge at the front and the
court in a jury box. Seating by rank and saluting should be abolished.
The use of "sir" when examining witnesses should be discouraged; (b)
a transcript should be provided by the field judiciary division in all gen-
eral and special courts-martial if requested by accused and a showing is
made that lengthy or complicated testimony is expected; (c) the proce-
dure for compelling attendance of witnesses and discovery of evidence
should be changed so that all of such requests are made to the circuit
judicial officer or to the military judge if already appointed; and (d)
classified material and other material which cannot be made available
to the accused and his military and civilian counsel should be made in-
admissible as evidence in a court-martial.
8. Post-Trial Proceedings-The appellate structure in the military
needs a thorough overhauling. The numerous administrative reviews by
officers all too often become a routine without any real scrutiny of the
record. The courts of military review are not yet independent, and too
few cases get to the Court of Military Appeals. The following recom-
mendations are made:
A. Commanders will not review court-martial convictions or sen-
tences. Upon completion of all general and special courts-martial, the
military judge will forward the record to the circuit judicial officer for
review by the review division of the judicial circut.
B. Upon completion of the review by the judicial circuit, if any part
of the sentence still remains, the record of all general and special courts-
martial will be forwarded to the Judge Advocate General for review.
C. Upon completion of the review by the Judge Advocate General,
the accused will have 30 days in which to give a notice of appeal to
the court of military review from any general court-martial convic-
tion, or from any special court-martial conviction in which the sentence
as approved on review includes a bad conduct discharge or exceeds four
months confinement. No further review will be provided for other cases.
D. Upon completion of the appeal to the court of military review,
the accused will have 30 days in which to give a notice of appeal to
the Court of Military Appeals from any general court-martial conviction
in which the sentence as affirmed by the court of military review affects
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a general or flag officer or extends to death or includes a bad conduct or
dishonorable discharge or includes confinement of one year or more.
E. The Court of Military Appeals shall review all such cases as to
errors of both law and fact.
F. The Court of Military Appeals4 20 and the courts of military re-
view4 1 will grant equitable and extraordinary relief in any situation in-
volving a serviceman, and the Court of Military Appeals shall possess
the power to issue any writ necessary to insure the prompt protection
of servicemen's rights under the Constitution, the laws of the United
States, or military rules and regulations.
G. Jurisdiction is extended to United States district courts to hear
cases in which a serviceman claims a denial of his constitutional rights
resulting from the action of a court-martial or a military determination,
when it is shown that the military remedy, including court-martial, is not
adequate to protect the rights of the petitioner or to prevent a chilling
effect upon the first amendment rights of the petitioner or others sim-
ilarly situated.
8. The judges of the courts of military review, who may be civilians
or military men, will be appointed by the President for terms of three
years. They will be assigned to the office of the Judge Advocate General
and the court will be placed there, but only for administrative conveni-
ence and personnel and administrative support. They will not be rated
if they are military men on their tour as a judge on the court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The movement for civilianization of military law has achieved only
limited success in the 50 years since General Ansell proposed an over-
haul of the court-martial system. However, the tremendous changes
which have taken place in the nature of the military suggest a renewed
movement for reform of the basic structure of the court-martial, with
particular emphasis upon further limitation of command control and
broadening of court membership. These changes, far from threatening
the dissolution of proper military order, appear to promise a more equi-
table system of justice which will strengthen the morale of servicemen
and restore the confidence of the public in the quality of military justice.
420 Although the Court of Military Appeals has now claimed it possesses "all
writs powers," it has denied relief in most cases seeking extraordinary relief. See
Sherman, supra note 409, at 532 n.228.
421 It has been suggested that Courts of Military Review can grant extraordinary
relief. In re Strickland, Misc. No. 69-48 (U.S.C.M.A., Sept. 24, 1969); CM
419804, Dolby, - C.M.R. - (Sept. 19, 1969); CM 419804, Smith, - C.M.R.
(Feb. 14, 1969), but the courts have not exercised such powers.

